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ABSTRACT 
These studies explore how, where, and when representations of variables critical to decision-
making are represented in the brain. In order to produce a decision, humans must first 
determine the relevant stimuli, actions, and possible outcomes before applying an algorithm 
that will select an action from those available. When choosing amongst alternative stimuli, 
the framework of value-based decision-making proposes that values are assigned to the 
stimuli and that these values are then compared in an abstract “value space” in order to 
produce a decision. Despite much progress, in particular regarding the pinpointing of 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) as a region that encodes the value, many basic 
questions remain. In Chapter 2, I show that distributed BOLD signaling in vmPFC represents 
the value of stimuli under consideration in a manner that is independent of the type of 
stimulus it is. Thus the open question of whether value is represented in abstraction, a key 
tenet of value-based decision-making, is confirmed. However, I also show that stimulus-
dependent value representations are also present in the brain during decision-making and 
suggest a potential neural pathway for stimulus-to-value transformations that integrates these 
two results. 
 
More broadly speaking, there is both neural and behavioral evidence that two distinct control 
systems are at work during action selection. These two systems compose the “goal-directed 
system”, which selects actions based on an internal model of the environment, and the 
“habitual” system, which generates responses based on antecedent stimuli only. 
Computational characterizations of these two systems imply that they have different 
informational requirements in terms of input stimuli, actions, and possible outcomes. 
Associative learning theory predicts that the habitual system should utilize stimulus and 
action information only, while goal-directed behavior requires that outcomes as well as 
stimuli and actions be processed. In Chapter 3, I test whether areas of the brain hypothesized 
to be involved in habitual versus goal-directed control represent the corresponding theorized 
variables. 
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The question of whether one or both of these neural systems drives Pavlovian conditioning 
is less well-studied. Chapter 4 describes an experiment in which subjects were scanned while 
engaged in a Pavlovian task with a simple non-trivial structure. After comparing a variety of 
model-based and model-free learning algorithms (thought to underpin goal-directed and 
habitual decision-making, respectively), it was found that subjects’ reaction times were better 
explained by a model-based system. In addition, neural signaling of precision, a variable 
based on a representation of a world model, was found in the amygdala. These data indicate 
that the influence of model-based representations of the environment can extend even to the 
most basic learning processes. 
 
Knowledge of the state of hidden variables in an environment is required for optimal 
inference regarding the abstract decision structure of a given environment and therefore can 
be crucial to decision-making in a wide range of situations. Inferring the state of an abstract 
variable requires the generation and manipulation of an internal representation of beliefs over 
the values of the hidden variable. In Chapter 5, I describe behavioral and neural results 
regarding the learning strategies employed by human subjects in a hierarchical state-
estimation task. In particular, a comprehensive model fit and comparison process pointed to 
the use of “belief thresholding”. This implies that subjects tended to eliminate low-
probability hypotheses regarding the state of the environment from their internal model and 
ceased to update the corresponding variables. Thus, in concert with incremental Bayesian 
learning, humans explicitly manipulate their internal model of the generative process during 
hierarchical inference consistent with a serial hypothesis testing strategy. 
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C h a p t e r  1  
INTRODUCTION 
Decision Neuroscience and Neuroimaging 
Through action we exert control over the world. With control, we increase the likelihood of 
our survival (Fuster, 2008). From homeostatic regulation (Rangel, 2013) to risk management 
(Symmonds, Bossaerts, & Dolan, 2010), the selection of good actions is a critical task for 
any nervous system. Understanding the neural and computational mechanisms of decision-
making will aid us in the treatment of its pathologies (P. Read Montague, Dolan, Friston, & 
Dayan, 2012) and also, in a more distant future, enable us to create machines that might 
exhibit some signs of intelligent behavior (Russell & Norvig, 2009). In addition, cross-
species (B. Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010; Rushworth, Mars, & Summerfield, 2009) and multi-
scale comparative analyses indicate that at least some neurobiological, algorithmic, and 
computational principles of decision-making (Franklin & Wolpert, 2011) are conserved 
across many domains of action. Thus, elucidating the decision-making process is of 
fundamental importance to understanding both the brain and the human experience. 
For many years, a major obstacle in this research program was the lack of in vivo recordings 
of neural signaling in the human brain with reasonable spatial and temporal resolutions. 
However, advances in non-invasive brain recording techniques have allowed us 
unprecedented access to functional activity within the human brain. In particular, in 1992 a 
seminal study (Ogawa et al., 1992) showed that a neuroimaging technique known as 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allowed us to non-invasively record blood-
oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) signals in the brain, effectively using our own blood as a 
contrast agent for magnetic resonance. Neural activity leads to increased energy demands in 
order to hyperpolarize cells following spiking, and the BOLD signal measures the 
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concomitant relative increase in regional oxygenated blood flow. Due to the lack of physical 
damage (for example, with intracranial recording) or effects of radiation (e.g., positron 
emission tomography) and comparatively excellent data resolutions, fMRI came to dominate 
modern neuroimaging. Combined with the application of sophisticated machine learning 
algorithms to analyze this neural data and the computational modeling of behavior in order 
to make predictions regarding the internal variables used by the brain, recent years have seen 
rapid advances in our understanding of human decision-making from a coarse neuro-
computational standpoint (John P. O'Doherty, 2011; Rangel & Hare, 2010; Rushworth & 
Behrens, 2008). 
Multi-Voxel Pattern Analysis 
A typical fMRI-based experiment consists of three steps: (i) the acquisition of imaging data 
while subjects perform a task, (ii) the pre-processing of said data, usually automated by a 
software package such as FSL (http://fsl.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslwiki/) or SPM 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/), and (iii) the general linear modeling (GLM) of voxel 
responses via a haemodynamic response model as a function of task variables. This allows 
one to map predicted neural signals onto distinct regions of the brain, for example, BOLD 
signals in visual cortex would transiently increase when a stimulus is presented on-screen 
and motor cortex would be more active when a response is performed. In 2001, a novel 
approach to fMRI analysis was successfully attempted (Haxby et al., 2001) which is now 
known as multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA). In this study, distinct exemplars of faces 
and houses were “decoded” from patterns of BOLD signaling while subjects passively 
viewed images of these stimuli. More specifically, volumes of neural data were labeled with 
the exemplar being viewed during that scan, then the data was split into “training” and 
“testing” data before a classification algorithm (Bishop, 2006) or “classifier” learned how to 
distinguish between neural samples contained in the training data as a function of the labels. 
Finally, the classifier was asked to predict the labels of the held-out data samples in order to 
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estimate a generalization accuracy score. If this score was significantly above chance then it 
was determined that there existed multi-voxel activity patterns within the neural data which 
encoded the identities of the exemplars in question. 
To this day, most MVPA is based on variations of this basic analysis template. The progress 
made using this approach is exemplified by the fact that less than ten years later, a movie 
being watched by subjects in the scanner could be re-constructed (Nishimoto, Vu, & Gallant, 
2010) from independent clips of film (drawn from the Youtube video website). Essentially, 
MVPA reverses step (iii) of general linear modeling by attempting to predict decision 
variables from the neural data rather than predicting neural data from decision variables 
(Naselaris, Kay, Nishimoto, & Gallant, 2011; Pereira, Mitchell, & Botvinick, 2009). Since a 
model mapping data to variables does not necessarily require a response model defined a 
priori, MVPA attempts to take advantage of fine-grained statistical correlations across 
multiple voxels in order to makes its predictions (Haynes & Rees, 2006). The source of these 
distributed patterns of BOLD signaling, whether it be based on sampling from varied 
distributions of neuronal populations (Kamitani & Tong, 2005), coarse regional connectivity 
profiles and neural organization (Op de Beeck, 2010), or complex spatiotemporal filtering 
(Kriegeskorte, Cusack, & Bandettini, 2010), is still an open question. However many 
predictions regarding the representational contents of brain algorithms (which do not depend 
on the specification of a neuronal model) can be tested using MVPA only and not via GLM. 
For example, if we hypothesized that a brain region X contains motor instructions for a 
particular response A, a GLM might conclude that region X is active while such a 
representation is made, but only the analysis of the pattern of activity within X would be 
conclude that a specific motor command A is being represented and not another motor 
command B. Furthermore, representational dissimilarity analysis (Kriegeskorte, 2009; Mur, 
Bandettini, & Kriegeskorte, 2009) (one of myriad of MVPA techniques) can produce a 
distance function which relates objects cognitively in a “space” of internal representations, 
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thus addressing the question of how stimuli are represented in cognition and not just where 
in the brain. 
Feature selection forms a crucial part of MVPA, that is, what voxels do we input into our 
pattern analysis algorithm? The first paper (Haxby et al., 2001) to apply MVPA to 
neuroimaging data simply entered all available voxels into their decoding algorithm. 
Although this increases the chance of a significant classification by maximizing the number 
of features that the algorithm can take advantage of, it does so at the expense of localizing 
the representations to a specific region. One particular approach to this issue, which I employ 
in two studies in this thesis, is the “searchlight” technique (Chen et al., 2011; Kriegeskorte, 
Goebel, & Bandettini, 2006). Briefly, MVPA is performed within a sphere of voxels centered 
at each voxel in the brain. This allows one to assign a decoding score to each voxel in the 
brain based on the information available locally around that voxel. After smoothing and 
performing group-level statistical tests on these “decoding maps” of the brain, the 
experimenter can conclude where in the brain specific identities are being represented. In 
summary then, MVPA can estimate what, where, and how stimuli and variables are 
represented in the brain. Knowing what is being represented in the brain at specific 
timepoints during a decision progress significantly restricts the model space of plausible 
algorithms being implemented. 
Value-Based Decision-Making 
Many decision-making processes are modeled computationally as a value comparison 
problem. That is, a subjective value is assigned to each potential option and then these values 
are compared in order to produce a decision. This notion of value-based decision-making has 
a long history in machine learning (R. Sutton & Barto, 1998) and psychology (Schultz, 2006) 
and forms the cornerstone of micro-economic theory in the form of expected utility (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Though expected utility theory (EUT) has been shown to 
fail in some circumstances (Allais paradox) and leads to paradoxical predictions in others 
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(Ellsberg paradox), the core theoretical assumption of value representation and comparison 
has remained intact. In fact, refinements of EUT are generally thought of as context- and 
subject-dependent variations in what is considered valuable, and thus are modeled as 
adjustments to the “final common signal” of value (prospect theory). Thus, centuries of 
decision-making theories and experiments have deemed value to be of fundamental 
importance and therefore support a strong hypothesis that value is of neurobiological 
relevance. 
For many years, lesion studies were the only means of investigating the neurobiological 
foundry of decision-making. Despite the imprecise localization of lesion mapping both in the 
anatomical and functional domains, a broad consensus was formed that ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) was of critical importance in action selection and inhibitory 
control. Lesions of this region lead to inappropriate and impulsive decision-making both 
from economic and social points of view, most famously exemplified in the case of Phineas 
Gage (Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, & Damasio, 1994; Harlow, 1848). Through 
carefully designed behavioral experiments, it became understood that, algorithmically, 
patients who suffered from a lesion of this brain region had trouble prospectively evaluating 
decisions and their outcomes and also integrating environment feedback into future decisions 
(Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Szczepanski & Knight, 2014). 
Computationally, this effect is probably best observed in reversal learning tasks where 
patients perseverate in making decisions that are no longer rewarding (Fellows & Farah, 
2003). Both of these deficits are consistent with an impaired ability to assign values to 
decisions. Thus, it was not unexpected to find that one of the most consistent BOLD signals 
subsequently identified in the human brain was a parametric correlate of subjective value in 
vmPFC (John P. O'Doherty, 2004). 
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Value Abstraction 
A critical assumption is that values are represented and compared in a manner divorced from 
the stimulus to which they are associated, thus addressing the problem of value comparison 
between distinct stimuli with no common features (for example, a risky gamble and a 
chocolate bar). Neurally, one would hypothesize that there exists a region of the brain in 
which value is represented in the same manner regardless of the specific stimulus under 
consideration. In a series of electrophysiological experiments in which monkeys made binary 
choices between options which varied in the identity and amount of juice, it was shown that 
distinct sets of cells in orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) represented, via firing rate, the offer values 
of the two juice options and also the value of the chosen option regardless of the motor 
response requirements or sensory aspects of the task (Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006). In a 
follow-up, the same experimenters found that these neural representations of economic value 
were “menu-invariant” (Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2008), consistent with the requirement of 
transitivity in EUT. That is, cells represented the value of a juice regardless of the alternative 
option in the choice. Interestingly, in contrast, some cells in OFC exhibited binary responses 
to the identity of a juice and did not reflect the amount or value of said juice. Furthermore, 
in other monkey electrophysiological experiments (S. Kennerley, Behrens, & Wallis, 2011; 
S. W. Kennerley, Dahmubed, Lara, & Wallis, 2009), abstract value encoding schemes were 
observed in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, including the subgenual cingulate which forms 
a component of vmPFC in humans). Neurons in this region rate coded value in a multiplexed 
fashion over three qualitatively distinct decision variables, namely reward probability, 
reward magnitude, and effort cost. In contrast, in more ventral potions of the prefrontal cortex 
(PFC), neurons tended to only encode the value of two of the three or just one of the three 
variables. In summary, these data indicated that stimulus-dependent signaling was present in 
OFC during the choice process, in concert with abstract value representations in more dorsal 
portions of medial PFC. 
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In humans, this hypothesis was confirmed in a task requiring subjects to make decisions 
regarding three different categories of items, namely food items, sums of money, and 
material goods (Vikram S. Chib, Antonio Rangel, Shinsuke Shimojo, & John P. O'Doherty, 
2009). Using GLMs, it was found that BOLD signaling in an overlapping region of vmPFC 
correlated with the subjective value of items drawn from all three categories. However, there 
remained the possibility that the neural correlates of subjective value in vmPFC may have 
been based on stimulus-specific value representations in distributed activity patterns which 
were spatially smoothed as one of the standard pre-processing steps. Amongst other results, 
work described in Chapter 2 tested and rejected this possibility in an analogous experiment 
using multi-voxel pattern analysis. 
Value Construction 
A measure on this abstract uni-dimensional space of values is sometimes referred to as a 
“common currency” (P Read Montague & Berns, 2002). Assuming that stimuli 𝑥𝑥 are 
composed of elemental attributes or features with stimulus-specific parameters 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 and 
weights 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 associated with each attribute, the integration hypothesis of subjective value 
(Rangel & Clithero, 2014) proposes a weighted L1 norm for stimulus value computation 
𝑉𝑉(𝑥𝑥) ∶= �𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
 
Qualitatively, this theory has some empirical support. Studies have found neural signals (and 
modulation of functional connectivity) corresponding to the valuation of a specific attribute, 
namely “healthiness” in dlPFC (T. Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009). Also, the same authors 
found that this attribute could be exogenously manipulated via putative attentional 
mechanisms (T. A. Hare, J. Malmaud, & A. Rangel, 2011). Together, these studies indicate 
that stimulus features make dissociable contributions to the overall value of a stimulus, that 
these contributions may be computed in distinct brain regions, and that attention can 
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modulate this contribution. Further evidence for regional differences in reward processing 
comes from an early neuroimaging meta-analysis (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004) which found 
that neural signals for more abstract reinforcers (e.g., money) tended to be concentrated in 
more anterior portions of OFC as opposed to representations of primary rewards (e.g., food) 
in posterior OFC. Taken together, these results suggest the possibility that value 
representations which are dependent on the identity of a stimulus may be detectable in the 
human brain while subjects are evaluating a choice. In Chapter 2, I tested this hypothesis and 
indeed found stimulus-dependent value representations in OFC organized along a 
posterior/anterior gradient whereby value for food items were encoded more posteriorly 
while material goods such as DVDs and books were represented more anteriorly (McNamee, 
Rangel, & O’Doherty 2013). The use of MVPA was critical in this endeavor since these 
value representations were distributed across voxels rather than independently rate coded 
(Jimura & Poldrack, 2012). 
Learning from Reinforcement 
In order to control the world through our action, we must understand how it works. Decisions 
are made based on information acquired through experience which we use to (i) build internal 
models of the generative structure of the world, (ii) understand the effect our actions have on 
it, and (iii) develop policies, or action priorities in given situations. The simplest learning 
algorithms model how we estimate associations between distinct stimuli, a process which is 
referred to as Pavlovian conditioning in classical psychology (Pavlov, 1927). For example, 
if stimulus 𝑋𝑋 (known as the conditioned stimulus) repeatedly precedes stimulus 𝑌𝑌 (the 
unconditioned stimulus), organisms learn to predict 𝑌𝑌 given the presence of 𝑋𝑋. In 
probabilistic terms, a representation of 𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌|𝑋𝑋) is acquired. Although humans and animals 
are capable of encoding probabilistic distributions, the equations of classical conditioning 
theory developed in the early half of the twentieth century focused on the relatively primitive 
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representation of an association strength 𝐴𝐴 between stimuli 𝑋𝑋 and 𝑌𝑌, that is updated for each 
experience: 
𝐴𝐴 ← 𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼(𝐼𝐼 − 𝐴𝐴) 
where 𝐼𝐼 is an indicator variable for the presence of 𝑌𝑌 soon after or in conjunction with 𝑋𝑋. 
This incremental updating rule is the basic computational template for many conditioning 
phenomena. One notable modification is the Rescorla-Wagner rule which incorporates 
“blocking” or competition between stimuli for predictions, 
𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ← 𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 + 𝛼𝛼 �𝐼𝐼 −�𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
� 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 represent the associability for a stimulus 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖. This rule implies that if the presence 
or occurrence of a stimulus is fully explained by alternative stimuli already, then no 
associability is assigned to stimulus 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗. This is equivalent to an important principle in 
Bayesian inference where the likelihood of a given event is scaled by the probability of that 
event based on the current model (see Appendix A for a detailed derivation). 
Even such a basic ability to predict the world can mean the difference between life and death. 
Rustling bushes 𝑋𝑋 could imply that the appearance of a lion 𝑌𝑌 is imminent to a gazelle. 
Compared to 𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍|𝑋𝑋) where 𝑍𝑍 is a harmless elephant, this example highlights the importance 
of the value of the predicted outcome from a decision-theoretic point of view. Thus, we 
would like to estimate the reward or loss associated with a stimulus or action (as in 
instrumental conditioning). This moves us from the domain of associative learning to reward 
learning. For example, one might compute a value estimate 𝑉𝑉�(𝑎𝑎) from rewards 𝑅𝑅 obtained 
by selecting a particular action 𝑎𝑎 as the average reward obtained on previous performances 
of that action: 
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𝑉𝑉�(𝑎𝑎) ∶= 𝑅𝑅1 + 𝑅𝑅2 + ⋯+ 𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛
𝑛𝑛
  
In this way, one can assign a subjective value to an action that inputs into the decision 
process. However, this averaged representation of reward based on a “batched” update is not 
consistent with real “online” interactions in the environment that occur continuously. This 
motivates the use of the aforementioned incremental updating algorithms for reward 
learning: 
𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡+1(𝑎𝑎) =  𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑎𝑎) + 𝛼𝛼(𝑅𝑅 − 𝑉𝑉𝑡𝑡(𝑎𝑎)) 
The relationship between a reward variable 𝑅𝑅 and its estimated value is non-trivial, primarily 
because a reward may have different values depending on the context in which it is 
considered. For example, the value of food is dependent on an animal’s internal state of 
hunger. Another complication is that reward may not be directly contingent on an action but 
require multiple sequential actions to be performed. Such sequential decision-making 
environments are modeled as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), which consist of the 
following 5-tuple (R. Sutton & Barto, 1998): 
(𝑆𝑆, {𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠, 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆},𝑃𝑃,𝑅𝑅, 𝛾𝛾) 
𝑆𝑆 denotes a set of states which could refer to parametric combinations of external factors and 
variables internal to an agent. 𝐴𝐴𝑠𝑠 is the set of actions available in state 𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆, 𝑃𝑃: 𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴 × 𝑆𝑆 →[0,1] is a transition probability function 𝑃𝑃(𝑠𝑠′|𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠), which describes the probability of 
arriving in state 𝑠𝑠′ after taking action 𝑎𝑎 in state 𝑠𝑠. 𝑅𝑅 is a reward function where 𝑅𝑅(𝑠𝑠′,𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠) 
describes the immediate reward acquired after the transition (𝑠𝑠′,𝑎𝑎, 𝑠𝑠), where 𝛾𝛾 ∈ [0,1] is a 
factor that exponentially discounts future rewards and thus weighs the relative importance of 
immediate and future rewards. Given that no agent in a naturalistic environment can be 
considered immortal, 𝛾𝛾 < 1 is a reasonable assumption and should be tuned to the expected 
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time horizon of the environment. The goal of an agent in such an environment is to compute 
a control policy which maximizes expected future reward 
𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾1𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+2 + ⋯ ] 
𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸 � 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
� 
where time is indexed by 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑅𝑅 implicitly depends on the selected state-action transitions. 
Within this framework, a decision trajectory through many transitions may forgo many 
unrewarded actions in favor of a large final reward. Learning such policies raises the 
temporal “credit assignment” problem of delayed reinforcement. If an agent has to select 
many actions, only the last of which is rewarded, how to does it assign positive values to the 
distal non-rewarded actions? A popular approach to this problem is temporal difference 
learning (TD-learning) (R. Sutton & Barto, 1998), which is described by the following 
equations in the Pavlovian case (where an agent passively receives rewards at times indexed 
by 𝑡𝑡): 
𝑉𝑉�(𝑡𝑡) ← 𝑉𝑉�(𝑡𝑡) + 𝛼𝛼𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 
𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑉𝑉�(𝑡𝑡 + 1) − 𝑉𝑉�(𝑡𝑡) 
𝑉𝑉�(𝑡𝑡) is the algorithm’s estimate of expected future reward, which is linearly updated by a 
prediction error 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 scaled by a learning rate 𝛼𝛼. The prediction error 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 is composed of the 
difference between the reward received plus the estimated future reward at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 and 
the current estimate of 𝑉𝑉�(𝑡𝑡). This local updating rule is possible due to the fact that the 
expected reward function satisfies Bellman’s principle of optimality (Bellman, 1952). We 
can derive a new form of the expected reward function in order to expose Bellman’s principle 
in this situation: 
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𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸 �� 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=0… � 
𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸 �𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + � 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡+𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖=1… � 
𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡] + 𝛾𝛾𝑉𝑉(𝑡𝑡 + 1) 
TD-updating works by propagating reward prediction errors backwards through experienced 
trajectories. Initially, early states will be incorrect in their estimate of expected future reward 
while states proximal to the actual rewards will become more accurate. Over time, the 
estimates of expected rewards at future states will be used for reward prediction errors for 
earlier states and eventually they will be associated with accurate predictions of reward. 
Despite the simplicity of this approach, it has been successfully used to train an artificial 
agent to learn to play backgammon at an elite level (Tesauro, 1995), exhibiting its capacity 
for generating complex, apparently intelligent behaviors. Importantly, neural signals 
corresponding to the aforementioned prediction errors 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 have been identified in 
dopaminergic neurons in the nervous system of several species (McClure, Berns, & 
Montague, 2003; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997), lending weight to the notion that 
temporal difference learning is being used in the brain. 
Multiple Mechanisms 
Based on classic early animal experiments we have described a reward-based associative 
account of reinforcement learning. However, there are many alternative algorithms which 
seek to learn a model of the MDP environment itself by estimating the reward and transitions 
functions directly (Engel, 2005). Based on this information, one can compute the expected 
future reward contingent on an action by brute force or sampling and thus produce a control 
policy. The collection of algorithms which take this approach are broadly referred to as 
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“model-based” as opposed to the “model-free” algorithms such as TD-learning and Q-
learning described previously. This distinction echoes the difference (Spence, 1950) between 
the development and use of “cognitive maps” in decision-making (Tolman, 1948) versus the 
reliance on conditioned stimulus-response behaviors (Pavlov, 1927). Since the early days of 
instrumental conditioning, evidence has accumulated that animals make decisions based on 
both of these systems depending on many environmental factors. A primary factor appears 
to be time, or more specifically, the reduction in uncertainty over time. The more experience 
an animal has with an action-outcome contingency, the more automated or habitual the 
selection of this action becomes. In contrast, in early learning periods, decision-making 
remains “goal-directed” in the sense that animals incorporate predictions regarding the 
expected outcome of an action during action evaluation. Two behavioral assays are used 
(Bernard W. Balleine & Anthony Dickinson, 1998) to distinguish between these modes of 
decision-making: (i) outcome devaluation and (ii) contingency degradation which test for 
sensitivity to rewards and transition probabilities, respectively. Neurobiologically, the neural 
substrates subserving these two methods of action selection have been localized to 
dorsolateral striatum and infralimbic or orbitofrontal cortex in rodents using a range of 
techniques from lesions to optogenetics (Jones et al., 2012). In humans, homologous regions 
such as the posterior putamen for habits (E. Tricomi, B. Balleine, & J. P. O'Doherty, 2009) 
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex for goal-directed action selection (Glascher, Daw, Dayan, 
& O'Doherty, 2010; Alan N. Hampton, Peter Bossaerts, & John P. O'Doherty, 2006; John P. 
O'Doherty, 2004) have been implicated. The essential distinction between these systems is 
the manner in which decision value is computed, whereby habits are based on cached or pre-
computed values that can be retrieved in the manner of a look-up table while goal-directed 
decision values are generated online. A theoretic study mapped habits and goal-directed 
decisions onto model-free and model-based reinforcement learning systems, respectively 
(Nathaniel D. Daw, Yael Niv, & Peter Dayan, 2005). 
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Questions of Representation 
Note that these two systems require different environment inputs in order to learn and control. 
For example, since the habit system is not outcome-sensitive, one expects that the neural 
system that generates a habitual action response would not receive or contain a representation 
of the predicted outcome(s). In contrast, the goal-directed system requires both action and 
outcome information in order to generate a decision. In Chapter 4, I describe an fMRI-MVPA 
study in which we decoded actions and outcomes at the time of the presentation of an initial 
stimulus (i.e., before an action is performed or an outcome received). We localized action 
(but not outcome) representations to posterior putamen in agreement with previous GLM-
based analyses (Elizabeth Tricomi et al., 2009) and showed that dlPFC contained 
overlapping representations of actions and outcomes during the putative decision phase. We 
also show that the action decoding accuracy in putamen and dlPFC (but not other regions 
such as vmPFC) correlated with reaction times on a per-subject basis, thus providing 
evidence that these regions are causally involved in generating responses. 
Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning1 
Many RL algorithms fail “in the real world” due to a problem with dimensionality, in which 
there are too many states over which to integrate information to make decisions let alone 
learn (Barto & Mahadevan, 2003). It has been proposed that state-space structures be 
compressed in order to make calculations tractable. In particular, multiple actions (and their 
interceding states) might be concatenated into “meta-actions” or, more generally, “options” 
(R. S. Sutton, Precup, & Singh, 1999). Decision policies would be developed over these 
options rather than the individual actions, thus reducing the computational complexity of any 
policy-learning algorithm. An example of an option might be “go to the lab”, which would 
be composed of more basic actions “leave home”, “catch bus”, and “enter building”. Of 
1 The next three subsections are adapted with permission from (O’Doherty, Lee, & McNamee, 2014). 
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course, these basic actions can themselves be composed of even more elemental actions 
reflecting a nested hierarchy of action complexity. It is has been suggested that the brain 
might implement such a hierarchical scheme, with different levels of a hierarchy tasked with 
selecting actions at different levels of abstraction. (Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009). The 
notion of a hierarchy in RL appeals to a long literature in cognitive neuroscience suggesting 
the existence of a cognitive hierarchy within prefrontal cortex, with certain brain systems 
sitting higher up in the hierarchy (possibly located more anteriorly within prefrontal cortex) 
and thereby exerting control over systems lower down in the hierarchy (Badre & D'Esposito, 
2009; Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003). Consistent with the hierarchical RL notion, a 
recent neuroimaging study has found that neural activity in ACC and insula correlated with 
prediction errors based on “pseudo-rewards” (representing the completion of an elemental 
action forming part of a rewarding option) in a temporally extended, multi-step decision-
making task (Ribas-Fernandes et al., 2011). 
Bayesian Approaches to Reinforcement Learning 
Another important trend in the literature has been to use Bayesian inference to learn about 
reward distributions, or any other task-related decision variable, instead of using an RL 
approach involving reward prediction errors (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 
2007; Friston et al., 2013; A. N. Hampton, P. Bossaerts, & J. P. O'Doherty, 2006; O'Reilly, 
Jbabdi, & Behrens, 2012). One advantage of the Bayesian approach is that this method 
provides a natural way to resolve the issue of how the rate at which a belief about the world 
is updated in the face of new information is set as a function of the environment (Yu & 
Dayan, 2003) . In particular, among other factors, the amount of volatility present in the 
environment (the extent to which reinforcement contingencies are subject to change), should 
influence the rate at which new information is incorporated into one’s beliefs, and this can 
be modeled in a very straightforward way in a Bayesian framework (Behrens et al., 2007). 
Another advantage of Bayesian inference is that because these models encode 
representations of full probability distributions (or approximations thereof), a natural 
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consequence is that it is easy to extract a measure of the degree of uncertainty (or, conversely, 
precision) one has in a particular belief. Such uncertainty or precision signals can be used not 
only to inform that rate at which one should update learning rates (see (Payzan-LeNestour & 
Bossaerts, 2011), but can also be used to inform decision-strategies such as when to explore 
or when to exploit a given decision option (i.e., one might want to explore an option about 
which one is maximally uncertainty) (Badre, Doll, Long, & Frank, 2012; Donoso, Collins, 
& Koechlin, 2014; Payzan-Lenestour & Bossaerts, 2012; Schwartenbeck, Fitzgerald, Dolan, 
& Friston, 2013). Supporting the relevance of a Bayesian framework for understanding the 
neural implementation of RL, uncertainty and precision signals have been reported in a 
number of brain structures, including the midbrain, amygdala, and prefrontal and parietal 
cortices (Payzan-LeNestour, Dunne, Bossaerts, & O'Doherty, 2013; Prevost, McCabe, 
Jessup, Bossaerts, & O'Doherty, 2011; Prevost, McNamee, Jessup, Bossaerts, & O'Doherty, 
2013; Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, Mathys, Dolan, & Friston, 2014; K. Wunderlich, U. R. 
Beierholm, P. Bossaerts, & J. P. O'Doherty, 2011).  However, it is important to note that 
while Bayesian approaches have considerable appeal due to their elegance and appeal to 
optimality, it remains challenging to definitively ascertain whether or not the brain is literally 
implementing Bayesian inference, and it is often possible to capture many of the same 
features of Bayesian models, such as flexible adjustments of learning rate, or a representation 
of variance or uncertainty in a learned belief with non-Bayesian (Li, Schiller, Schoenbaum, 
Phelps, & Daw, 2011; John M. Pearce & Geoffrey Hall, 1980; Preuschoff & Bossaerts, 2007; 
K. Wunderlich et al., 2011) or hybrid Bayesian-RL approaches (Dearden, Friedman, & 
Andre). 
Learning and Inference over State-Space 
In many typical RL applications, the states and actions available in those states are defined 
from the outset, i.e., used as input into the algorithm and not considered further.  However, 
perhaps the biggest single challenge for RL agents is how to determine the relevant states 
and actions in the first place: when faced with noisy sensory information from the world, 
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how does the agent determine the relevant features that constitute a state, and then identify 
what are the relevant actions in that state? (Ahmad & Yu, 2013; Gershman & Niv, 2010; 
Kwok & Fox, 2004). This problem is essentially already being worked on by neuroscientists 
studying sensory perception and sensorimotor learning, as it depends on the capacity to 
segment and identify relevant objects and contexts and determine actions (Poggio & Ullman, 
2013; Ridderinkhof, 2014; Shadlen & Kiani, 2013; Wolpert, Diedrichsen, & Flanagan, 
2011).  One approach to this problem in the neural RL community has involved setting up 
an experimental situation in which a given stimulus has multiple dimensional attributes (e.g., 
shape, color, motion). Inspired by earlier cognitive set-shifting tasks (Milner, 1963; Robbins, 
1996), one of these dimensions is unbeknownst to the participant, selected to be “relevant” 
in terms of being associated with a reward, and the goal of the agent is to work out which 
attribute is relevant, as well as to work out which exemplar within an attribute (e.g., a green 
color vs a red color) is actually reinforced (R. C. Wilson & Y. Niv, 2011; K. Wunderlich et 
al., 2011). Bayesian inference or RL can then be used to establish the probability that a 
particular dimension is relevant, which can then be used to guide further learning about the 
value of individual exemplars within a dimension.  
The ability to construct a simplified representation of the environment focused only on 
essential details reduces the complexity of the state-space encoding problem. One way to 
accomplish this is to represent states by their degree of similarity to other states, either via 
relational logic (Kumaran & Maguire, 2009), transition statistics (Schapiro, Rogers, 
Cordova, Turk-Browne, & Botvinick, 2013), or feature-based metrics (Konidaris, 
Scheidwasser, & Barto, 2012; Mnih et al., 2013). Furthermore, the construction of 
generalized state-space representations can speed up state-space learning considerably by 
avoiding the time cost of re-learning repeated environmental motifs (e.g., if I learn how to 
open my first door, I can generalize this to all doors). 
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Latent Learning 
Part of the process of identifying the current state of an environment with respect to decision-
relevant variables is to accurately estimate the state of unobservable variables based on 
observable, conditionally related signals using hierarchical inference. This problem becomes 
particularly challenging when multiple distinct states must be estimated over as opposed to 
a binary state-space where the likelihood of each possible state is anti-correlated (K. 
Wunderlich, U. Beierholm, P. Bossaerts, & J. P. O'Doherty, 2011; Yang & Shadlen, 2007). 
Due to cognitive limitations, it is possible that humans use a serial hypothesis testing strategy 
when performing Bayesian inference over many states in order to simplify the inference 
process. More specifically, a person might eliminate a possible state from their “belief space” 
if its posterior probability falls below a fixed threshold and continue to perform inference 
over a reduced state-space. We investigated whether such manipulations of internal models 
are performed in a computational fMRI study, as reported in Chapter 5. 
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C h a p t e r  2  
STIMULUS-DEPENDENCY OF VALUE ENCODING IN VMPFC2 
In order to choose between manifestly distinct options it is suggested that the brain assigns 
values to goals using a common currency. While previous studies have reported activity in 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) correlating with the value of different goal-stimuli, 
it remains unclear whether such goal-value representations are independent of the associated 
stimulus categories as required by a common currency. Using multi-voxel pattern analyses 
on fMRI data, a region of medial prefrontal cortex was found to contain a distributed goal-
value code that is independent of stimulus category. More ventrally in vmPFC, spatially 
distinct areas of the medial orbitofrontal cortex were found to contain unique category-
dependent distributed value codes for food and consumer items. These results implicate the 
medial prefrontal cortex in the implementation of a common currency and suggest a ventral 
versus dorsal topographical organization of value signals within vmPFC. 
 
2 Adapted with permission from (McNamee et al., 2013). 
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Introduction 
There is a considerable body of research demonstrating value signals in the brain while 
participants engage in a variety of decision-making tasks, particularly within the medial 
orbitofrontal and adjacent medial prefrontal cortices, collectively known as the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex or vmPFC (T. Hare, O'Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, & Rangel, 2008; Kable 
& Glimcher, 2007; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006; H. Plassmann, J. P. O'Doherty, & A. 
Rangel, 2007; Rushworth & Behrens, 2008; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; L. 
Tremblay & Schultz, 1999). In order to enable decisions to be made between stimuli with 
fundamentally different qualities, it has been suggested that the brain uses a “common 
currency” in which values are assigned to different stimuli on a common neural scale (P Read 
Montague & Berns, 2002; John P O'Doherty, 2007; Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). 
Consistent with this hypothesis, several fMRI studies have reported overlapping univariate 
value signals in vmPFC while human subjects evaluate different types of goods such as food, 
money, books, DVDs, clothes, and social rewards (Vikram S. Chib et al., 2009; FitzGerald, 
Seymour, & Dolan, 2009; D. J. Levy & Glimcher, 2011; Lin, Adolphs, & Rangel, 2011).  
However, the finding of overlapping neural activations representing goal-value for distinct 
stimuli in a univariate manner does not provide sufficient evidence for the existence of a 
stimulus-independent goal-value code, as required by the common currency hypothesis. 
There remains the possibility that an area exhibiting scaling with goal-values in a similar 
manner across different categories could in fact be composed of distributed and distinct yet 
spatially overlapping goal-value codes for different item categories. The first aim of this 
study was to determine whether distributed value signals within the vmPFC are unique for 
each category of good, even if such value signals overlap spatially, or whether by contrast 
there exists a truly generic common value signal in which the value of each category of good 
is encoded using the same distributed code. 
Even if there is a common currency to facilitate comparisons across goals of different types 
at choice time, it is also necessary to represent unique goal-specific value codes. This is 
 
32 
 
because in order to compute the current incentive value of particular goals, the specific 
sensory properties of a goal-outcome must be integrated together with the organism’s current 
motivational state. For instance, the goal-value of salted peanuts and a soda will differ 
markedly depending on whether an individual is salt-deprived or thirsty. Moreover, 
according to attribute integration theories of value computation, the summary value of a 
complex good is computed online by summing the value of component attributes of a good 
at the time of decision-making (Padoa-Schioppa, 2011; Rangel & Hare, 2010). This type of 
mechanism would also involve the encoding of a goal-value signal that depends on the 
sensory features of the goal-stimulus being valued as an intermediate step toward the 
computation of a generic value code. This motivates the second aim of this study: to test for 
distributed patterns of activity in which goal-values are encoded in a manner that is specific 
to particular categories of stimuli. 
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Results 
To address these aims, we modified a previously deployed paradigm (Vikram S. Chib et al., 
2009), in which we optimized the design for multi-voxel pattern analysis techniques 
(MVPA). MPVA has been successfully applied in many decision-making paradigms: 
economic value (Krajbich, Camerer, Ledyard, & Rangel, 2009), associative value (Kahnt, 
Heinzle, Park, & Haynes, 2010), reward modality (Clithero, Smith, Carter, & Huettel, 2011), 
value-based decisions (Alan N. Hampton & O'Doherty, 2007), and consumer choices (I. 
Levy, Lazzaro, Rutledge, & Glimcher, 2011; Tusche, Bode, & Haynes, 2010) have all been 
decoded from fMRI data. In this study, participants were scanned with fMRI while they 
reported their “willingness to pay” (a proxy measure of their stimulus valuation obtained via 
a Becker-DeGroot-Marschack auction process (Becker, DeGroot, & Marschak, 1964)) for 
three different classes of goods: food items, monetary lotteries, and non-comestible 
consumer items (Figure 1a). We trained a pattern classifier on distributed voxel activity to 
categorize stimuli at the time of decision-making as being either high or low in subjective 
value based on each participant’s ratings. Although each category was composed of different 
stimuli, many value-relevant features are common to all stimuli in each category and there is 
little to no overlap across categories. Thus we hypothesized that a classifier would be able to 
decode stimulus-independent value patterns across categories, while stimulus-dependent 
value representations should only be decodable within categories.  
This motivated the following classifier training procedures: first, to test for the presence of 
category-independent value signals, we trained a classifier to decode value from samples 
drawn from one of the categories, and tested its performance in recognizing the value of 
exemplars drawn from a different category. Second, to test for category-dependent value 
codes, we trained the classifier on one stimulus category only, and determined if this 
classifier could decode the value of independent exemplars drawn from that same category 
but not exemplars from other categories. Third, we tested for regions representing stimulus 
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identity (particularly the category from which the items were drawn) independent of stimulus 
value. 
Notably, all multivariate analyses were performed on data in which the regularly observed 
univariate value signals had been removed (see Online Methods), thus ensuring that the 
MVPA could not classify based on this smoothed “global” activity. On account of prior 
findings in which stimulus value signals and other decision-making variables have been 
localized to vmPFC (Elliott, Dolan, & Frith, 2000; John P. O'Doherty, Kringelbach, Rolls, 
Hornak, & Andrews, 2001; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006; L. Tremblay & Schultz, 1999; 
Wallis, 2007, 2011), we focused our analysis on this area. To elucidate the spatial 
organization of various value coding strategies in vmPFC, we correlated voxel t-scores from 
the group-level multivariate value analysis with those from the univariate to determine how 
these qualitatively different value signals relate to each other. Moreover, we correlated the 
multivariate value voxel t-scores with voxel location to assess spatial variation in value 
signals across vmPFC. These correlation analyses suggest a topographic map of value signals 
within vmPFC with respect to stimulus-dependency and coding complexity (the distributed 
or univariate nature of the neural activity). 
All reported value-related effects (both univariate and multivariate) are significant at a 
voxelwise FDR-adjusted threshold of p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons within 
vmPFC. Effects which are unrelated to value representation are corrected across the whole 
brain at the same threshold (see Online Methods). A cluster extent threshold of 10 voxels 
was applied in all analyses. All conjunctions are performed using the “conjunction null” 
hypothesis (Nichols, Brett, Andersson, Wager, & Poline, 2005). 
 
Univariate stimulus value signals. 
To replicate previously reported univariate results (Vikram S. Chib et al., 2009) in which an 
overlapping area of vmPFC was found to correlate with the stimulus value of goods from all 
three categories, we performed the same univariate analysis (Vikram S. Chib et al., 2009) , 
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testing for overlapping correlations with WTP for the goods from each category. Consistent 
with our previous findings, an area of vmPFC showed a significant effect in a conjunction 
contrast (peak [x = 0, y = 35, z = −7], t = 3.14, Figure 1b). We then searched for a brain 
region expressing univariate value uniquely for a particular class of items by examining 
linear contrasts between the WTP regressor parameter estimates for each category. No part 
of vmPFC showed a significant correlation between smoothed BOLD activity and WTP for 
only one of the categories (even at p < 0.005 uncorrected). In a whole-brain analysis, some 
activations were observed in parts of the visual and premotor cortices for the trinkets category 
only (only at p < 0.005 uncorrected); however, these clusters did not survive a corrected 
threshold and are thus not interpreted further. This lack of category-dependent univariate 
value coding is in agreement with previous results (Vikram S. Chib et al., 2009). 
 
Distributed category-dependent stimulus value signals. 
Our multivariate analyses showed that regions of the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) 
encode the value for food and trinkets in a category-dependent manner (Figure 2a). A 
posterior region of mOFC exhibited food-dependent value coding (peak [x = −9, y =17, z = −22], t = 3.05), while a more anterior region of mOFC exhibited trinket-dependent 
value coding (peak [x = −3, y = 41, z = −11], t = 3.86). We did not find evidence for a 
unique category-dependent value-coding region for monetary gambles in prefrontal cortex. 
To replicate these results independently, we repeated our procedures on a previously 
acquired dataset (Vikram S. Chib et al., 2009), which used a similar task, but was not 
optimized for MVPA. This additional analysis revealed the same pattern of category-
dependent stimulus value signals in mOFC, with an anterior locus encoding the value of 
trinkets and a posterior locus encoding the value of food goals (Supplementary Figure 2). 
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Spatial organization of the category-dependent value codes. 
Figure 2b plots MVPA t-values for the within-category analyses for all voxels in mOFC as 
a function of the MNI y-coordinate. Taking this t-score as an indication of the strength of the 
distributed value representation, we found that the strength of food value representation 
declined (r = −0.52) along the posterior-anterior axis, while the value representation 
strength of trinket items increased (r = 0.54). Linear regressions of these voxel accuracy t-
scores against their MNI y-coordinates, performed separately for each category, were highly 
significant according to parametric tests (p < 10−21). To control for correlation inflation 
caused by the spatial smoothing of the classification results, we ran a simulation analysis (see 
Online Methods). In this non-parametric test, no correlation drawn from the simulated null 
distribution exceeded the empirically observed correlations for either food or trinkets, 
thereby ruling out a spatial smoothing confound. These results therefore show an interaction 
between item category and the directionality of the encoding gradient. 
We also performed an analogous test using a leave-one-participant-out procedure to alleviate 
concerns about the possibility of a non-independence bias contributing to this result. This 
supplementary approach also yielded a significant interaction between decoding accuracies 
for food and trinket values as a function of posterior vs. anterior location within mOFC 
(Supplementary Figure 3). A similar analysis in mPFC showed that this category-dependent 
encoding gradient was not present in mPFC, and thus is specific to mOFC. 
Another potential concern is that our anterior/posterior gradient results are due to differences 
in generic properties (i.e., independent of the category definitions) of the goal-stimuli across 
categories such as, for instance, the familiarity of the stimuli or their availability to the 
participant. To address this, we obtained behavioral ratings for the stimuli from a subset of 
the original participants (8 out of 13) on five attribute scales ( “valence”, “intensity”, “liking”, 
“access”, and “familiarity”), and tested for a difference in average ratings between the food 
and trinket stimulus categories. At the group-level there was no significant difference with 
respect to any attribute (p > 0.05). There were few significant differences in some of these 
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attributes at the level individual subjects, and none of those differences were consistent 
across individuals (Supplementary Figure 4, Supplementary Table 2, Supplementary Table 
3, Supplementary Table 4). This analysis therefore suggests that potential generic stimulus 
attribute differences do not explain the anterior/posterior gradient results. 
 
Category-independent value signals. 
In contrast to the category-dependent value representation results in mOFC, a more dorsal 
region of vmPFC (overlapping with that from the univariate analysis, Figure 3a) was found 
to contain category-independent value signals. A classifier trained in this area using data 
from one item category was able to predict the value class (high vs. low) in either of the other 
stimulus categories as well as in its own category. At p < 0.05 SVFDR, all six cross-
category training/testing combinations were significant in a conjunction test (peak [x = −3, y = 41, z = 3], t = 2.40). 
A potential confound is the fact that for zero bids (which make up a large proportion of the 
low value items), no motor response had be performed, while high value items always require 
a button press. Thus the neural processes involved in generating the motor response may be 
contributing to the significant category-independent value classification signals in vmPFC. 
To account for this possibility, we performed a category-independent value searchlight 
analysis with zero bid trials omitted and tested whether there was a significant classification 
signal within a 20mm radius sphere surrounding the peak coordinates of the category-
independent value signal identified previously. We again found evidence for a category-
independent value signal, albeit at an uncorrected threshold due to the fewer number of trials 
and smaller value variance (peak [x = 9, y = 53, z = 7], t = 1.94). We also tested whether 
there were any clusters within the regions identified as representing value in a category-
dependent manner (using small volumes around the relevant coordinates), and found no 
significant classification signals. Thus, only the dorsal portion of vmPFC represented value 
in a category-independent manner regardless of whether zero bid trials were included. In 
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addition, we replicated the category-independent result in mPFC in the independent dataset 
from Chib et al. (Vikram S. Chib et al., 2009) (Supplementary Figure 2a). This provides 
further evidence against a possible motor confound since in that paradigm a motor response 
was required on all trials, yet the same result was found. 
Another issue is that the information on the bid feedback screen (Figure 1a) is correlated with 
our measurement of goal value, and thus activity could be driven by a signal elicited by the 
bid feedback as opposed to the goal-value per se. Evidence that this effect does not explain 
our results also comes from the additional analysis of the Chib et al. dataset (Vikram S. Chib 
et al., 2009). In that task, no feedback was given to the subjects at the end of each trial, yet 
we still find evidence of a category-independent value code in mPFC.  
 
Comparison between univariate and multivariate value codes. 
Our finding of both univariate and multivariate value signals within vmPFC raises the 
question of how these different value encoding mechanisms relate to each other. It is possible 
that a set of voxels might encode both a univariate code and a multivariate code 
simultaneously. Alternatively, a set of voxels might exclusively encode a univariate value 
signal but no multivariate value signal, or vice versa. In order to establish whether value 
signals within the vmPFC are either uniquely multivariate or univariate, or show multiplexed 
univariate and multivariate value coding, we computed correlations between multivariate 
decoding accuracy and univariate signal strengths separately for our two main areas of 
interest: the mOFC and the mPFC. A multiplexed signaling strategy would manifest as a 
relatively high correlation between multivariate decoding accuracy and univariate signal 
strength. Alternatively, a low correlation implies that either a univariate or multivariate signal 
is present but not both. These distinct possibilities have implications for the computational 
nature of value encoding processes occurring in a given region.  
On the basis of the findings for category-dependent multivariate value codes in mOFC, and 
univariate value signals more dorsally in mPFC, we hypothesized that the complexity of 
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value coding in vmPFC might follow a ventral/dorsal gradient such that value codes 
distributed along the orbital surface tend not to contain any univariate encoding, but that as 
one moves superiorly up the medial wall, value codes could come to increasingly reflect a 
univariate code in conjunction with multivariate signals, while at the same time shedding 
category-dependency in the value code. 
This hypothesis makes several predictions: (1) univariate value coding strength should 
increase along the z-axis while multi-voxel encoding should be more evenly divided between 
mOFC and mPFC, (2) the univariate signal should be relatively stronger than the multivariate 
signal in mPFC on average across voxels, and (3) univariate and multivariate coding should 
be more highly correlated dorsally in mPFC (such that both of these encoding strategies are 
present in the same voxels). We investigated this coding gradient hypothesis by testing each 
of these predictions in analyses which compare the univariate and within-category 
multivariate value coding results within mOFC and mPFC (Figure 3): (1) we correlated 
second-level voxel t-scores against voxel MNI z-coordinates across vmPFC (that is, mOFC 
and mPFC together) for the univariate and multivariate signals separately and examined 
whether these correlations were significantly different, (2) paired t-tests on a per-voxel basis 
were used to study how the relative strengths of these encoding strategies change across 
vmPFC, and (3) a correlation study was implemented to investigate whether the predictive 
relationship between univariate and multivariate signaling is different in these two 
subregions. 
To implement the first test, we correlated the multivariate and univariate value t-scores from 
the second-level analyses with the z-axis coordinate of the associated voxel (Figure 4a). This 
was done for the food (univariate r = 0.89, distributed r = 0.4) and trinket stimulus 
categories (univariate r = 0.72, distributed r = 0.68). For each combination of item class 
and coding strategy, value signal strength increased along a ventral-dorsal gradient (p <0.05, in both parametric and non-parametric tests). By bootstrapping the empirically 
observed results, we estimated sampling distributions for these correlation strengths. Non-
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parametric confidence bounds on the correlation strengths were established and indicated 
that although the strength of both signals increased along an ventral-dorsal gradient, 
univariate coding increased significantly more steeply (p < 0.05). In addition, we 
implemented a similar analysis investigating differences between peak value representation 
scores in ventral and dorsal regions of vmPFC for multivariate and univariate encoding 
strategies while utilizing data on a leave-one-participant-out basis. This analysis again 
confirmed these results (Supplementary Figure 5). 
Our second test examined the relative prevalence of univariate and multivariate codes in 
these regions. We found a significant difference (paired t-tests, p < 0.05) in the relative 
strengths of the multivariate and univariate value signals between mOFC and mPFC for both 
the food and trinkets categories by comparing t-scores on a per-voxel basis. An important 
caveat here is that univariate and multivariate analyses have different intrinsic sensitivities 
(Jimura & Poldrack, 2012), thereby complicating the interpretation of absolute differences. 
However, this result does show that the multivariate signal is relatively stronger in mOFC as 
compared to mPFC (Figure 4b).  
The third test aimed to determine how the univariate and distributed codes interact in mOFC 
and mPFC. The second-level t-scores from the univariate and multivariate analyses were 
correlated on a per-voxel basis in each of these two subregions separately. This revealed a 
strong difference between the subregions, whereby the univariate and multivariate t-scores 
are significantly more correlated in mPFC for both food (r = 0.24) and trinkets (r = 0.61) 
than in mOFC (food r = −0.28, trinkets r = 0.34, Figure 3b). This indicates that the 
distributed goal-value signals found in mOFC are largely independent from univariate goal-
value codes, whereas this is not the case in mPFC. 
 
Distributed coding of stimulus category. 
Finally we looked for regions showing distributed coding of stimulus category, independent 
of its value. We found category discriminating activity in several areas of the brain (Figure 
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5). Areas in the frontal lobe included medial PFC (peak [x = −3, y = 20, z = −22], t =6.12), central OFC (peak [x = −21, y = 38, z = −11], t = 11.14), dorsolateral PFC (right 
hemisphere peak [x = 45, y = 32, z = 21], t = 5.84, left hemisphere peak [x = −60, y =17, z = 14], t = 11.34), and frontopolar cortex (peak [x = 6, y = 65, z = −11], t = 6.89). 
Fusiform (peak [x = 24, y = −43, z = −29], t = 6.90), parahippocampal (peak [x =36, y = −10, z = −33], t = 6.56), and inferior temporal gyri (right hemisphere peak [x =30, y = −73, z = −15], t = 7.36, left hemisphere peak [x = −45, y = −64, z = −22], t = 7.64) were observed in the temporal lobes. More posteriorly, the intraparietal sulcus 
(right hemisphere peak [x = 33, y = −70, z = 42], t = 7.94, left hemisphere peak [x =
−48, y = −31, z = 42], t = 11.65), precuneus (peak [x = −6, y = −64, z = 14], t =5.54), posterior cingulate cortex (peak [x = 3, y = −43, z = 42], t= 7.43), and visual 
cortex (peak [x = 9, y = −79, z = 32], t = 11.34) were implicated. 
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Discussion 
It has been argued that to make decisions involving different types of goods the brain needs 
to encode item values on a comparable scale, often called a “common currency” (Alan N. 
Hampton & O'Doherty, 2007; P Read Montague & Berns, 2002; Rangel et al., 2008). While 
a number of studies have found that BOLD responses in an overlapping area of vmPFC 
correlate with the value of stimuli at the time of making decisions (Vikram S. Chib et al., 
2009; FitzGerald et al., 2009; T. A. Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle, & Rangel, 2010; Hackjin Kim, 
Shimojo, & O'Doherty, 2011; D. J. Levy & Glimcher, 2011), there are many open questions 
regarding the nature of the code used in these computations. In particular, previous tests 
cannot rule out the possibility that the results were generated by category-dependent (e.g., 
foods vs. social vs. objects) value codes that are implemented in distinct yet spatially 
intermingled networks, and which are inconsistent with the common currency hypothesis. In 
addition, previous studies have been unable to find a spatial topography in the organization 
of goal-value signals in vmPFC. 
Here, by using a paradigm optimized for multivariate analyses, we found evidence for the 
existence of both category-dependent value signals (which only reflect the value of particular 
types of stimuli), and category-independent value signals (which reflect the value of all 
stimuli, regardless of their category). The category-independent value signals were located 
in a region of vmPFC along the medial wall but above the orbital surface, and coincided 
substantially with the areas found in previous univariate analyses (Vikram S. Chib et al., 
2009), as well as in a univariate analysis of the present dataset. Our results provide evidence, 
up to the fidelity provided by multi-voxel fMRI (Formisano & Kriegeskorte, 2012; Misaki, 
Kim, Bandettini, & Kriegeskorte, 2010), for the existence of a truly generic value code in the 
mPFC in which goal-values are represented independently of the category from which the 
stimuli are drawn. They also point towards a ventral-dorsal gradient within the vmPFC, as 
one transitions from the category-dependent value regions of the orbital surface to the more 
dorsal category-independent regions of mPFC. This suggestion is consistent with the fact 
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that in many fMRI studies which have identified value representations in vmPFC for 
different classes of reinforcers using standard univariate techniques, decision-value and goal-
value signals tend to appear superior to the orbital surface (Vikram S. Chib et al., 2009; T. 
Hare et al., 2008; Hilke Plassmann et al., 2007). In contrast, two distinct voxel clusters in 
mOFC were found at the group level to encode category-dependent goal-values for food and 
trinkets; a more posterior region was found to contain food-dependent value signals, while a 
more anterior region of mOFC was found to encode a trinket-dependent value signal. 
Furthermore, a correlational analysis of the classifier’s local sensitivity vs. spatial location 
revealed an anterior-posterior gradient in the mOFC, with category-dependent values of 
increased abstractness (i.e., trinkets) encoded more anteriorly. Although a similar effect 
could be caused by two separate food and trinkets peaks with Gaussian noise, visual 
inspection of the t-score plots and the strength of the linear dependence suggest an actual 
gradient effect in the nature of the value code. These findings resonate with the results of a 
meta-analysis (Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004) in which an anterior vs. posterior gradient was 
reported within mOFC in response to reward outcomes according to the “complexity” or 
degree of abstractness of the reinforcer. A previous univariate fMRI study reported 
dissociated posterior and anterior clusters of activation within OFC for reward expectation 
representations for sexual vs. money reinforcers (Sescousse, Redouté, & Dreher, 2010), 
though this effect was located more laterally where we observed stronger distributed 
encoding of stimulus category rather than stimulus value. However, unlike these studies, the 
results of the present study correspond specifically to goal-value representations where 
values are used as an input to the choice process as opposed to pure expectancy signals or 
the value computed at the time of the consumption experience (often called outcome value). 
These results support the proposal that there is indeed a gradient within mOFC whereby 
value signals corresponding to the processing of more biologically basic stimulus attributes, 
such as food or sexual stimuli, are encoded more posteriorly, while the value of more abstract 
stimulus attributes are encoded more anteriorly. 
 
44 
 
The findings obtained here implicating vmPFC in the encoding of a common currency for 
goal-values are consistent with evidence from lesion studies in both human and non-human 
primates implicating this region in value-based decision-making (Bechara et al., 1994; 
Fellows & Farah, 2005; Walton, Behrens, Buckley, Rudebeck, & Rushworth, 2010). The 
present results suggest that a lesion to the vmPFC would alter or disrupt the encoding of goal-
values that are in turn used to guide behavior, thereby resulting in a decision-making 
impairment. In particular, an implication of the present findings is that a selective lesion to 
either anterior or posterior mOFC might result in a very specific impairment at decision-
making over only certain classes of goods. While it is unlikely that lesions studied in human 
patients would ever have the anatomical specificity to enable such a possibility to be tested, 
this is something that could be potentially tested in an animal model. 
It is notable that we did not find evidence for a category-dependent value code for monetary 
gambles, while both a univariate value signal for these gambles and category-independent 
value signals (training or testing on neural samples from the money category) were robustly 
encoded more dorsally within the mPFC areas involved in implementing category-
independent value codes. One possible interpretation of this result is that because money is 
by definition a generalized reinforcer that has acquired value by virtue of its exchangeability 
for other reinforcers, money might only be represented according to a generic (category-
independent) as opposed to a category-dependent value code. Furthermore, money is not tied 
to a specific sensory modality, and is therefore not dependent on specific sensory coding 
mechanisms (such as taste, olfaction, or vision). Moreover, within the attribute integration 
account of valuation, given that money does not have any component attributes, it could be 
argued that money cannot be encoded in a category-dependent manner. Another more 
mundane possibility is that, unlike items drawn from the food and trinkets categories, the 
actual values of the monetary sums are presented explicitly and do not require a complex 
stimulus-to-value transformation as would be the case if, for example, piles of coins had been 
displayed whose composition and size were indicative of monetary value. 
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Beyond goal-value signals, we also found evidence for value independent category identity 
codes within a region of central OFC, but also extending more medially to overlap with some 
of the value coding areas. These findings suggest the existence within parts of OFC of 
stimulus-identity codes. Perhaps unsurprisingly, such stimulus-identity coding was also 
found to be widespread in other parts of the brain outside of the OFC, including dorsal frontal 
cortex, parietal cortex, and visual cortical areas. Many of these areas were previously 
implicated in a EEG study of the time course of value computation (Harris, Adolphs, 
Camerer, & Rangel, 2011). Nevertheless, the presence of such signals within the OFC 
provides insight into the possible mechanisms by which value codes might get computed 
within the vmPFC during the choice process. In order to compute a category-dependent value 
code, it is clearly necessary to first have access to information about the identity of the 
stimulus, so that the incentive value of the goal state can be retrieved with respect to prior 
associations between the identity of the goal state and motivational states acquired through 
incentive learning (Bernard W. Balleine & Anthony Dickinson, 1998). Such goal-value 
codes are also likely necessary in order to facilitate choices over goals to be computed, 
because when comparing between the values of different goods, it is also necessary to be 
able to bind the results of the comparison process with the identity of the specific goods in 
question. Furthermore, according to the attribute integration view of value computations, it 
is necessary to encode information about various attributes associated with each stimulus in 
order to pass such information to the areas involved in category-dependent valuation. Further 
work will need to be performed to determine how these distinct value and identity 
representations within vmPFC get integrated and used during the decision process.  
The loci of the value coding and category coding results in vmPFC can be interpreted in 
terms of the neuroanatomical structure of the brain. Based on cytoarchitectonic 
heterogeneities in OFC (Mackey & Petrides, 2010; Ongur & Price, 2000), a broad distinction 
has been made between a lateral prefrontal network (Brodmann areas 11, 13, and 47/12) 
covering central and lateral OFC and a medial prefrontal network (Brodmann areas 11m, 13 
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medially, along with 14 and extending up the medial wall to areas 10m, 24, 25, and 32) 
corresponding to ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Recently, a resting-state connectivity study 
(Kahnt, Chang, Park, Heinzle, & Haynes, 2012) has provided functional evidence in support 
of this parcellation scheme in human OFC. The sensory efferents of central OFC and the 
visceromotor afferents of the medial network (Croxson et al., 2005; Ongur & Price, 2000) 
suggest that the sensory-visceromotor pathway from central OFC to mOFC to mPFC could 
support a high-level stimulus-to-value transformation during decision-making. In this study, 
we found that central OFC coded stimulus category bilaterally, with these areas partially 
overlapping value-coding regions in vmPFC. This part of OFC has been shown to receive 
sensory input in all sensory modalities (both unimodal and multimodal), association cortices, 
and memory-related regions, and in particular is connected to several of the posterior regions 
which were found to encode stimulus category in a distributed manner. Moreover, adjacent 
to this central OFC result, category-dependent value signals were located in medial OFC, 
which has strong reciprocal connections to limbic areas involved in the emotional and 
hedonic processing of stimuli along with other parts of prefrontal cortex, which may 
contribute to an evaluation of the stimulus in the context of the current internal state of the 
subject and external state of the world (Louie & Glimcher, 2012). These effects could include 
inhibiting desires to consume food (T. Hare et al., 2009), or retrieving goal-related episodic 
memories (Duarte, Henson, Knight, Emery, & Graham, 2010) such as remembering whether 
or not a book has been read or not. Finally, these attribute-dependent value signals would be 
passed to the more dorsal areas of mPFC involved in category-independent value 
representations where a summary goal value is transmitted to action control circuits via 
mPFC (T. Hare, J. Malmaud, & A. Rangel, 2011; John P. O'Doherty, 2011; Rangel & Hare, 
2010). Further support for this value processing pathway model can be found in a recent 
electrophysiological study (Cai & Padoa-Schioppa, 2012) in monkeys which found that 
neurons in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) encoded the value of a chosen outcome only after 
a decision had been made and in particular after the same variables had been signaled by, 
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presumably upstream, neurons in OFC. In addition, neurons in the dorsal bank of ACC but 
not the ventral bank were sensitive to the action required to make the choice. 
It is important to note that while the present conclusions are supported by the particular set 
of stimuli we have used (consumer items, food, and money gambles), we cannot rule out the 
possibility that if we had used an entirely different class of goods (such as luxury goods, or 
social stimuli, etc.), the results could have turned out differently. Future studies will need to 
further establish the generality of the common coding area in the more dorsal part of vmPFC 
identified here, as well as establish whether other classes of items are coded uniquely within 
the medial orbital surface. 
Finally, the importance of the multivariate methodology used in this paper is worth 
highlighting. As described above, a large number of previous studies have found that neural 
activity in an overlapping area of vmPFC, which encompasses the area where we have found 
category-independent goal-value signals, correlates with the value of a wide class of stimuli 
and stimuli at the time of choice. However, none of these previous univariate studies found 
the category-dependent value codes identified here. The reason might be due to the nature of 
the category-dependent signals. If, as conjectured above, they reflect the computation of 
value for stimulus specific attributes, then the category-dependent value signals are likely to 
be distributed across multiple voxels, which makes them difficult to localize using univariate 
approaches. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Task, univariate value signals, and behavioral results. 
 
Figure 1. a.) Illustration of experiment time course and data extraction. Subjects were 
presented with an 80% chance of obtaining a stimulus drawn from a pool of 120 stimuli 
evenly divided into three categories (food, money, and “trinkets”) and they responded with 
an integer willingness-to-pay value between zero and four euros inclusive (see Online 
Methods). In preparation for the multivariate analyses, we extracted a sample of neural data 
at the bid time-point on each trial (with a shift of five seconds to account for haemodynamic 
delay). For a given bid, the two volumes closest in time (one before, one after) to the shifted 
time-point were averaged to create a single sample (Clithero et al., 2011). b.) A region of 
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vmPFC, overlapping with a previous similar result (Vikram S. Chib et al., 2009), was found 
to be parametrically modulated by the chosen bid value at the time of decision, peak 
coordinates [x = 0, y = 35, z = −7], t = 3.14, p < 0.05 SVFDR (results presented at p <0.005 uncorrected in figure). c.) Distribution of WTP bids across all subjects for each 
category of items. The distribution of bids is shown in c, and is similar to those obtained 
previously (Vikram S. Chib et al., 2009). The average bid was €1.47 (SD, €1.28) for food 
items, €1.91 (SD, €1.3) for monetary sums, and €1.97 (SD, €1.56) for trinkets. There was a 
difference between the mean bids of the three categories (ANOVA, p < 0.001). The average 
bids were significantly greater than zero for all three classes (p < 0.001). The majority of 
bids were non-zero (71% for food, 82% for money, 74% for trinkets). 
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Figure 2. Distributed category-dependent value codes in mOFC for food and trinkets. 
 
Figure 2. a.) Stimulus value was found to be represented in distributed codes in mOFC for 
the food (blue) and trinkets (red) categories. The peak classification accuracy t-scores are at 
the following coordinates; food [𝑥𝑥 = −9,𝑦𝑦 = 17, 𝑧𝑧 = −22], 𝑡𝑡 = 3.05; trinkets [𝑥𝑥 =
−3,𝑦𝑦 = 41, 𝑧𝑧 = −11], 𝑡𝑡 = 3.86, p<0.005 SVFDR (results presented at 𝑝𝑝 < 0.005 
uncorrected in figure). No evidence for a multi-voxel money category value representation 
was found. b.) Food and trinket category-dependent value encoding regions in mOFC are 
organized along an anterior to posterior axis across subjects, with the most significant voxels 
for food values located significantly more posteriorly within mOFC, while the most 
significant voxels for trinket values are located significantly more anteriorly, as shown in a 
correlation analysis of second-level voxel t-scores vs. y-axis location. The large dots indicate 
peak 𝑡𝑡-scores. No such effect was found more dorsally in mPFC. 
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Figure 3. Organization of univariate and distributed value signals in vmPFC 
distinguished by coding mechanism and stimulus information content. 
 
Figure 3. a.) A sagittal view of vmPFC shows that univariate and multivariate category-
independent value representations are concentrated in mPFC while category-dependent 
value signals (for the food and trinkets categories) are located more ventrally in OFC. The 
peak of the category-independent value decoding conjunction was found at [𝑥𝑥 = −3, 𝑦𝑦 =41, 𝑧𝑧 = 3], 𝑡𝑡 = 2.40, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05 𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 (results presented at p<0.005 uncorrected in figure). 
b.) Histograms reflect bootstrapping results for univariate/multivariate value correlation 
analyses performed for each combination of category and vmPFC subregion. Correlations 
were significantly stronger in mPFC compared to mOFC for both food and trinkets. For food, 
the univariate and multivariate value t-scores were significantly anti-correlated. 
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Figure 4. Comparisons of univariate and multivariate value signal strengths across 
vmPFC subregions. 
 
 
Figure 4. a.) For the food and trinket categories, univariate (brighter colors) and within-
category MVPA (darker colors) second-level voxel t-scores are plotted as a function of the 
voxel’s z-coordinate. This plot shows that the t-scores in the univariate brain maps show a 
significantly greater tendency to increase along the z-axis (𝑝𝑝 < 0.05). b.) Bars indicate the 
difference between the within-category MVPA and univariate value t-scores across voxels 
for the food and trinkets item categories within mPFC and mOFC. Error bars indicate 
standard error of the mean (+/- SEM). 
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Figure 5. Stimulus category coding. 
 
Figure 5. In the frontal lobe, central OFC (peak [𝑥𝑥 = −21,𝑦𝑦 = 38, 𝑧𝑧 = −11], 𝑡𝑡 = 11.14), 
mPFC (peak [𝑥𝑥 = −3,𝑦𝑦 = 20, 𝑧𝑧 = −22], 𝑍𝑍 = 6.12), mFPC (peak [𝑥𝑥 = 6,𝑦𝑦 = 65, 𝑧𝑧 =
−11], 𝑡𝑡 = 6.89), and dlPFC (peak [𝑥𝑥 = −60,𝑦𝑦 = 17, 𝑧𝑧 = 14], 𝑡𝑡 = 11.34) contain 
distributed neural patterns pertaining to the identity of the stimulus under consideration. 
More posteriorly, regions of the temporal lobes including the fusiform, inferior temporal, and 
parahippocampal gyri and areas around the intraparietal sulci also reflect category 
discriminating activity (see Supplementary Table 1). Results presented at 𝑝𝑝 < 0.005 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅. 
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Supplementary Figures 
Supplementary Figure 1. Masks covering distinct subregions of vmPFC. 
 
Supplementary Figure 1. Based on previous functional and anatomical results, our a priori 
hypothesis was that distributed and univariate value encoding signals would be found in 
vmPFC extending from the orbital surface to more dorsal regions up to and including parts 
of Brodmann areas 10 and 32. Due to the similarity of the experimental design, we used 
univariate peak coordinates from a related study (Chib et al., 2009) to construct a medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) mask as a sphere with a radius of 9mm surrounding these peak 
coordinates (corresponding to the size of the multivariate searchlight sphere). A similar 
functional mask did not exist for the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), most likely due to 
the distributed nature of the value codes found there and the relative scarcity of MVPA 
studies in value-based decision-making, and thus the mOFC mask was constructed according 
to anatomical descriptions used previously in the literature (Beckmann et al., 2009). This 
mask encompassed the medial orbital and olfactory sulci bilaterally with the anterior and 
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posterior limits defined by the extents of these sulci. The vmPFC mask was defined as a 
union of these two masks. 
 
Supplementary Figure 2. Independent replication of main results. 
 
Supplementary Figure 2. For an independent replication of our results, we applied our 
analysis procedures to the data acquired for a previous study (Chib et al., 2009) with a similar 
task paradigm but with some important differences. This study also used a BDM auction 
process to elicit the participants’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) on an integer scale from $0 to $3 
for a variety of items drawn from three categories (food, monetary sums, and “trinkets”). 
However, the WTP bids (that is, the goal values) for all the items were recorded before the 
participant entered the scanner. Subsequently, on each trial in the scanner, participants were 
required to make binary choices between an item and a fixed reference sum of money (the 
median bid over all items placed during the pre-scan behavioral experiment). The motor 
response performed was a left or right button press and was completely uncorrelated with 
both the choice and the value of the item since the item and the reference sum of money were 
randomly presented to the left and right of a fixation cross. Choosing the item meant that the 
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participant paid the reference price in exchange for an 80% chance of receiving the item. If 
they chose the reference amount of money, they would neither pay anything nor have the 
opportunity to play the lottery. 
The analyses in the original study indicated that the value of the lottery item on each trial 
was commonly represented (as a smoothed univariate BOLD response) in a dorsal portion 
of vmPFC for all three item categories. This value representation was interpreted as a 
“decision value” signal (as opposed to a goal value in the paradigm used in the current study), 
since it is being computed in order to make a binary decision choice. In light of our results, 
we hypothesized that distributed value signals, both category-dependent and category-
independent, would accompany this smoothed value signal in the ventral and dorsal portions 
of vmPFC, respectively. More specifically, we expected to see an anterior/posterior 
dissociation in category-dependent value signals along the medial orbital surface, whereby 
food value would be located more posteriorly and trinkets more anteriorly. We performed 
the same value decoding analyses as described in the main text on this dataset (19 
participants; 15 male; mean age, 23.7; age range, 18-47). For this dataset, we thresholded all 
statistics at p < 0.005 uncorrected (unless otherwise specified), since this data was not 
optimized for MVPA and since we have strong a priori hypotheses from the primary 
analyses in the main text. 
a.) At 𝑝𝑝 < 0.005 uncorrected, food-category-dependent value representation was located in 
posterior mOFC (peak [𝑥𝑥 = 3,𝑦𝑦 = 33, 𝑧𝑧 = −24], 𝑡𝑡 = 2.86). At 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05 uncorrected, a 
category-independent value signal (conjunction across training/testing on food/trinkets and 
trinkets/food respectively) was located in mPFC (peak [𝑥𝑥 = 6,𝑦𝑦 = 57, 𝑧𝑧 = 12], 𝑡𝑡 = 1.98). 
b.) At 𝑝𝑝 < 0.005 uncorrected, a trinket-category-dependent value representation was 
located in anterior mOFC (peak [𝑥𝑥 = −15,𝑦𝑦 = 57, 𝑧𝑧 = −9], 𝑡𝑡 = 2.94). No clusters were 
present in any unanticipated ROI (e.g., a trinket category-dependent value signal where food 
category-dependent signals were found in the primary dataset). Not unexpectedly (since this 
dataset was not optimized for MVPA), none of these clusters reached significance under 
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SVFDR correction (though the category-dependent results survive small volume familywise 
error correction, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05 𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸). Results are thresholded at 𝑝𝑝 < 0.005 and 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05 
and overlaid on an averaged structural image. These results provide a completely 
independent replication of the ventral/dorsal and anterior/posterior vmPFC value coding 
dissociations observed in the main study. 
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Supplementary Figure 3. Leave-one-participant-out anterior/posterior mOFC gradient 
analysis. 
 
Supplementary Figure 3. Here we replicate the anterior/posterior mOFC gradients 
identified in the main text in a completely non-circular manner using ANOVA interaction 
tests applied to per-subject classification scores derived using a leave-one-participant-out 
approach.  
For each subject and item category, we first performed second-level mass-univariate t-tests 
on the classification maps for 12 participants only (leaving one participant out). The peak t-
score coordinate within the mOFC ROI was identified and the classification score for the 
left-out participant at the peak coordinate was recorded. In addition, the peak t-score from 
the alternative item category analysis within a searchlight sphere of voxels (restricted to the 
mOFC ROI) surrounding that peak coordinate was also taken. For example, for each subject 
we recorded two food value classification scores: (1) one based on the peak coordinate in 
mOFC and (2) the other based on the peak coordinate within a searchlight sphere of the peak 
coordinate from the trinket value decoding. Similarly, two trinket value classification scores 
were also acquired for each subject. In this way, for each item category and subject, we 
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independently derived a classification score and then also recorded a classification score for 
the alternative item category within the same locality. This process was repeated for every 
subject in both analyses being contrasted. The end result was a dataset composed of four 
classification scores for each subject derived in a completely independent manner. 
 
The data was entered into a repeated-measures 2x2 ANOVA design (spatial location x item 
category) and there was a significant interaction between the two factors (p < 0.05) whereby 
the trinket-category-dependent value encoding signal was stronger in the region identified 
more anteriorly but not posteriorly and vice versa for the analogous food-related signal. This 
replicates the corresponding result in the main text (Figure 2b) in a completely independent 
manner. 
In this figure, the simple main effect of spatial location on classification score is plotted 
across item category, i.e., the distribution of the relative differences in t-scores between the 
anterior and posterior ROIs (food items in blue, trinkets in red). Error bars reflect standard 
error of the mean. 
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Supplementary Figure 4. Item ratings.
 
Supplementary Figure 4. We acquired post-hoc behavioral ratings of the food and trinket 
items used from 9/13 of the original participants. One participant did not complete the 
questionnaire, leaving 8/13 to be analyzed. The items were rated on five scales from a score 
of 1 to 7: “valence”, “intensity”, “liking”, “accessibility”, and “familiarity”. Items were 
presented in a random fashion across categories. Specifically, the questions were: 
 
LIKING – How much do you like this item? A score of 1 means “I do not like this item at 
all”, a score of 4 means “I neither like nor dislike this item”, while a score of 7 means “I 
really like this item a lot”. 
FAMILIARITY – How familiar are you with this item? A score of 1 means “This item is 
unknown to me”, a score of 4 means that “I am somewhat familiar with this item”, while a 
score of 7 means “I’m completely familiar with this item”. 
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INTENSITY – How intense are the feelings evoked by this item? A score of 1 indicates 
“This item evokes no feelings or emotion for me”, a score of 4 “I have some feelings towards 
this item”, while a score of 7 means “I have very intense feelings towards this item”. Note 
that for this question, it is irrelevant whether the feelings/emotions you have are positive or 
negative. 
ACCESSIBILITY – How easy do you feel it is for you to obtain this item? A score of 1 
means “It is almost impossible for me to get this item”, a score of 4 means “I can get this 
item without much difficulty”, while a score of 7 means “I would have no problem getting 
this item”. 
VALENCE – How pleasant or unpleasant is this item? A score of 1 means “It is a very 
unpleasant item”, a score of 4 means “This item is neither pleasant nor unpleasant”, while a 
score of 7 means “This is a very pleasant item”. 
The point-biserial correlation rpb is the Pearson correlation between item ratings and the 
dichotomous variable indicating whether the item is a food item or a trinket. It describes to 
what extent higher or lower ratings are correlated with trinkets or food items. Positive 
correlations indicate that higher ratings correlate with trinkets; negative correlations indicate 
that higher ratings correlate with food items. A zero correlation implies that the ratings are 
evenly matched across items. 
Results of statistical analyses can be seen in Supplementary Tables 2-4. At p > 0.05, there 
was no significant difference between food and trinket items with respect to any rating 
(across subjects or across items). In two ratings (“intensity” and “familiarity”), there was a 
trend towards higher ratings in the food category. The subject-level point-biserial correlation 
showed that this was a weak effect within individual subjects, with only one subject reaching 
a p < 0.05 significance threshold for each rating. Though these ratings were taken post-hoc, 
it is unlikely that the time interval since the scanning took place caused a systematic change 
to the between-category differences in ratings. 
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The bar chart in this figure reflects the point-biserial correlation coefficients 𝑟𝑟𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 for each 
subject between item ratings and a dichotomous variable which indicated whether the item 
was drawn from the food or trinket category. Repeated-measure statistical tests of any ratings 
difference between the food and trinkets category were not significant (𝑝𝑝 > 0.05). As can 
be seen from this figure, there is a high degree of variability within and across subjects in 
these ratings indicating that they are unlikely to account for the gradient effects reported in 
the main analyses. 
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Supplementary Figure 5. Leave-one-participant-out ventral/dorsal vmPFC gradient 
analysis. 
 
Supplementary Figure 5. Here we replicate the ventral/dorsal vmPFC gradients identified 
in the main text in a completely non-circular manner using ANOVA interaction tests applied 
to per-subject classification scores derived using a leave-one-participant-out approach. 
For each analysis, we first performed second-level mass-univariate t-tests on the multivariate 
classification maps and general linear modeling beta maps for 12 participants only. The peak 
t-score coordinate within each vmPFC ROI was identified and a value representation score 
(classification score for the multivariate analyses or first-level GLM t-score for the univariate 
analyses) for the left-out participant at the peak coordinate was recorded. This process was 
repeated for every subject for both the food and trinket item categories. The end result was a 
dataset composed of four classification scores for each subject derived in a completely 
independent manner. 
Since we seek to compare results across encoding strategies, we standardized these results 
by computing the distribution of standardized value signal differences between the ventral 
and dorsal ROIs for each item category and encoding strategy. That is, we subtracted the 
mPFC scores from the mOFC scores and then divided by the standard deviation across both 
ROIs. This data is plotted in this figure. The data was then entered into a repeated-measures 
2x2 ANOVA design (spatial location x encoding strategy) and there was a significant 
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interaction between the two factors (p < 0.05) across item categories, whereby there was a 
greater drop in signal strength in mOFC compared to mPFC for univariate encoding as 
opposed to multivariate encoding. This replicates the corresponding result in the main text 
(Figure 4a) in a completely independent manner. 
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Supplementary Figure 6. Value decoding based on “mean-subtraction” searchlight. 
 
Supplementary Figure 6. We have used the terms “univariate” and “multivariate” to refer 
to signals identified using mass-univariate general linear modeling and MVPA (after 
orthogonalization with respect to the univariate signals), respectively. An alternative 
interpretation of “univariate” and “multivariate” signals in the context of a multivariate 
searchlight algorithm would be the signal identified using the mean and “mean-subtracted” 
activity, respectively, for each sample in the searchlight. The mean-subtracted activity is the 
voxel responses in a searchlight after subtracting the mean voxel response across the 
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searchlight. We repeated the value decoding analyses using this alternative approach. This 
involved applying the same classification procedures as in the main text except with two 
crucial differences: (1) the smoothed GLM-estimated goal value signal was not projected out 
and (2) the mean activity was subtracted and the variance across voxels normalized on a per-
sample basis in every searchlight sphere (in effect, the neural pattern was standardized for 
every sample/sphere). 
We repeated both the category-dependent and category-independent value decoding analyses 
in this manner. To ensure that this different methodology identified the same signals as 
previously in the main text, we tested for a significant activation (at p < 0.05 SVFDR, 10 
voxel extent threshold) within ROIs defined as 20mm-radius spheres (Chib et al., 2009) 
surrounding peaks defined by the equivalent analyses. We also checked that no activations 
were unexpectedly present in an alternative ROI. 
Significant clusters of voxels overlayed on an averaged brain template are presented in this 
figure. Food-category-dependent goal value coding was observed in posterior mOFC (peak [x = 9, y = 14, z = −22], t = 3.15, 𝑝𝑝 < 0.005 𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅) and trinket-category-dependent 
goal value coding in anterior mOFC (peak [x = −3, y = 41, z = −11], t = 4.20, 𝑝𝑝 <0.005 𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅). Cross-category value representations (conjunction across pairwise-category 
analyses) were located more dorsally in mPFC (peak [x = −3, y = 47, z = −4], t = 2.74). 
No results were “mismatched” between the two analysis methodologies occurred. That is, no 
trinket-category-dependent value representation was found in the food ROI and vice versa, 
and no category-dependent value decoding was present in the category-independent ROI and 
vice versa. 
We also implemented an average signal searchlight whereby we attempted to decode cross-
category value signals based on the mean activity within a searchlight sphere only. Out of 
six training/testing data combinations (e.g., train to decode value on monetary sums, test on 
food items), four resulted in a significant cluster in dorsal vmPFC at p < 0.005 uncorrected 
(10 voxel extent threshold), though they did not reach the corrected threshold p <
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 0.05 SVFDR. The ROI was defined as a 20mm-radius sphere surrounding the peak 
coordinates [x = −6, y = 53, z = −4] from the cross-category value decoding conjunction 
in the main text. 
Each panel refers to an equivalent panel in the main text: Figure 2a (a,b), Figure 3a (c), and 
Figure 2b (d). Results are thresholded at 𝑝𝑝 < 0.005 uncorrected and overlaid on an averaged 
structural image. 
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Supplementary Tables 
Supplementary Table 1. fMRI results. 
Category Region Hemi x y z t p 
 
Univariate Value Representation 
Food* Medial prefrontal cortex L -3 38 -4 4.35 <0.001 
Money Medial prefrontal cortex L -3 32 -7 3.24 0.001 
Trinkets* Medial prefrontal cortex  0 41 -7 4.35 <0.001 
Conjunction Medial prefrontal cortex  0 35 -7 3.14 0.001 
 
Distributed Category-Dependent Value Representation 
Food* Medial orbitofrontal cortex L -9 17 -22 3.05 0.002 
Trinkets* Medial orbitofrontal cortex L -3 41 -11 3.86 <0.001 
 
Distributed Category-Independent Goal Value Representation 
Conjunction*† Medial prefrontal cortex L -6 53 -4 2.88 0.002 
Conjunction Medial prefrontal cortex L -3 41 3 2.40 0.008 
 
Distributed Goal Category Representation*‡ 
Conjunction Medial orbitofrontal cortex L -3 20 -22 6.12 <0.001 
Conjunction Medial prefrontal cortex L 9 29 0 7.56 <0.001 
Conjunction Lateral orbitofrontal cortex L -21 38 -11 11.14 <0.001 
Conjunction Frontopolar cortex R 6 65 -11 6.89 <0.001 
Conjunction Frontopolar cortex L -12 71 14 6.78 <0.001 
Conjunction Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex L -60 17 14 11.34 <0.001 
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Conjunction Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex R 45 32 21 5.84 <0.001 
Conjunction Insula R 45 5 3 5.27 <0.001 
Conjunction Middle frontal gyrus L -33 5 35 6.84 <0.001 
Conjunction Middle frontal gyrus R 30 2 28 6.29 <0.001 
Conjunction Middle frontal gyrus L -18 2 60 5.68 <0.001 
Conjunction Anterior cingulate cortex R 15 8 32 6.90 <0.001 
Conjunction Intraparietal sulcus L -48 -31 42 11.65 <0.001 
Conjunction Intraparietal sulcus R 33 -70 42 7.94 <0.001 
Conjunction Precuneus L -6 -64 14 5.54 <0.001 
Conjunction Posterior cingulate cortex R 3 -43 42 7.43 <0.001 
Conjunction Parahippocampal gyrus R 36 -10 -33 6.56 <0.001 
Conjunction Inferior temporal gyrus L -45 -64 -22 7.64 <0.001 
Conjunction Inferior temporal gyrus R 30 -73 -15 7.36 <0.001 
Category Region Hemi x y z t p 
 
Distributed Goal Category Representation*‡ (continued) 
Conjunction Fusiform R 24 -43 -29 6.90 <0.001 
Conjunction Fusiform L -27 -43 -22 7.18 <0.001 
Conjunction Extrastriate cortex L -12 -79 32 11.34 <0.001 
Conjunction Extrastriate cortex R 63 -61 10 6.99 <0.001 
Conjunction Extrastriate cortex R 9 -70 -7 5.15 <0.001 
Conjunction Striate cortex L -21 -79 14 9.67 <0.001 
Supplementary Table 1. Results thresholded at 𝑝𝑝 < 0.05 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅. Voxelwise FDR correction 
was performed within a ventromedial prefrontal ROI for all value-related results (i.e., 
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SVFDR). 
* Results which survive at 𝑝𝑝 < 0.005 FDR or SVFDR. 
† Conjunction across five binary category permutations (all except training value on money 
and decoding value on trinkets). 
‡ Conjunction across all three binary category combinations. 
 
 
Supplementary Table 2. Item ratings, subject-level analysis. 
 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 
Valence (𝐫𝐫𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩) 0.110 -0.129 -0.022 -0.223 0.163 0.296 -0.028 -0.014 
Intensity (𝐫𝐫𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩) 0.073 0.025 -0.141 0.149 -0.016 -0.307 -0.043 -0.160 
Liking (𝐫𝐫𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩) 0.108 -0.095 -0.056 -0.232 0.195 0.364 0.021 0.000 
Access (𝐫𝐫𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩) 0.026 0.079 -0.282 -0.079 -0.112 -0.073 -0.046 0.235 
Familiarity (𝐫𝐫𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩) -0.124 0.038 -0.196 -0.056 0.056 -0.014 -0.284 -0.011 
 
 Mean SEM p 
Valence (𝐫𝐫𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩) 0.019 0.058 0.750 
Intensity (𝐫𝐫𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩) -0.090 0.043 0.077 
Liking (𝐫𝐫𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩) 0.038 0.065 0.579 
Access (𝐫𝐫𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩) -0.032 0.053 0.572 
Familiarity (𝐫𝐫𝐩𝐩𝐩𝐩) -0.074 0.042 0.122 
Supplementary Table 2. Trinkets (+), Food (–), grey background indicates significance at p = 0.05 (rpb = ±0 .2199)  
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Supplementary Table 3. Item ratings, distribution per category across subjects. 
 Food Trinkets   Food > Trinkets 
 Mean SEM Mean SEM  Repeated-measures t-test 
Valence 4.450 0.199 4.456 0.107  p = 0.973, t = -0.035 
Intensity 4.028 0.166 3.712 0.146  p = 0.059, t = 2.250 
Liking 4.400 0.242 4.494 0.126  p = 0.692, t = -0.412 
Access 5.309 0.265 5.225 0.270  p = 0.640, t = 0.489 
Familiarity 5.534 0.214 5.278 0.207  p = 0.111, t = 1.822 
Supplementary Table 3. 
 
Supplementary Table 4. Item ratings, distribution per category across items. 
 Food Trinkets   Food > Trinkets 
 Mean SEM Mean SEM  Independent t-test 
Valence 4.450 0.126 4.456 0.109  p = 0.970, t = -0.037 
Intensity 4.028 0.100 3.712 0.162  p = 0.101, t = 1.661 
Liking 4.400 0.133 4.494 0.129  p = 0.614, t = -0.507 
Access 5.309 0.141 5.225 0.134  p = 0.666, t = 0.440 
Familiarity 5.534 0.144 5.278 0.190  p = 0.285, t = 1.077 
Supplementary Table 4. 
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Supplementary Table 5. Items used organized by category. 
Food Items Money Items “Trinket” Items 
Ambrosia 20c 1984, George Orwell (book) 
Apple Pies 30c A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawkings (book) 
Bombay Mix 40c A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, J. Joyce (book) 
Cashews 60c Abbey Road, The Beatles (music CD) 
Choco Chip Cookies 70c Alarm Clock 
Coco Pops 90c Batteries 
Cornflakes 1.2EUR Blade Runner (movie DVD) 
Cream Crackers 1.3EUR Blank DVDs 
Crunchies 1.5EUR Bourne Ultimatum (movie DVD) 
Digestives 1.6EUR Calendar 
Doritos 1.8EUR Combination Lock 
Elevenses 1.9EUR Dracula (book) 
Fig Rolls 2EUR Family Guy Season 7 (TV series DVD) 
Fingers 2.1EUR Golden Compass, Philip Pullman (book) 
Frosties 2.2EUR Harry Potter (book) 
Fruit Pastilles 2.3EUR Indiana Jones (movie DVD) 
Gherkins 2.4EUR James Bond, Quantum of Solace (movie DVD) 
Granola Bar 2.5EUR Joshua Tree, U2 (music) 
Spam 2.6EUR Kings of Leon Live (music/movie DVD) 
Jaffa Cakes 2.7EUR Lord of the Rings (movie DVD) 
Bacon Fries 2.8EUR Monopoly (boardgame) 
Liquorice All Sorts 2.9EUR OK Computer, Radiohead (music CD) 
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Mikado 3EUR Playing Cards 
Mini Rolls 3.1EUR Shampoo 
Beetroot 3.2EUR Sherlock Holmes (book) 
Pineapple Rings 3.3EUR Slumdog Millionaire (movie DVD) 
French Fancies 3.4EUR Socks 
Pickled Onions 3.5EUR The Departed 
Green & Black Chocolate 3.6EUR The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy (book) 
Rice Krispie Squares 3.7EUR Stapler 
Riesen 3.8EUR T-Shirt 
Salted Peanuts 3.9EUR The Dark Knight (movie DVD) 
Sesame Sticks 4.1EUR The Wire Season 4 (TV series DVD) 
Pringle's Original 4.2EUR Travel Plug Adaptor 
Fox's Shortcakes 4.3EUR Trinity College Key Chain 
Tea Cakes 4.4EUR Trinity College Mug 
Terry's Orange 4.6EUR Trinity College Sweatshirt 
Pickled Eggs 4.7EUR Umbrella 
Walkers Crisps 4.8EUR USB Key 2GB 
Werthers Sweets 4.9EUR Water Bottle 
Supplementary Table 5. The items used were similar to those used in Chib et al, 2009, 
although they were customized to be familiar to participants in Ireland, where the study was 
performed. Our motivation for using these specific goods is that we wanted to include large 
varied groups of items that were approximately similar in their average values to participants 
so as to control for the effects of value per se when doing between category comparisons. In 
addition, we required that the items be “everyday” items to ensure that all the subjects would 
be similarly exposed to the items and thus would be able to reasonably evaluate them. All 
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subjects reported a high degree of familiarity with each of the items in a post-scan verbal 
report. Monetary amounts were selected in the range 10c to 5 euros, in 10c increments. Item 
order was randomly determined at the beginning of each experiment. Forty items were used 
in each class. 
Subjects were only allowed to bid using a discrete set of values (Chib et al., 2009, Plassmann 
et al., 2007), thus the bids recorded are an approximation to the true values for the items. A 
true WTP of €1.20 is measured as €1, and if the subject values an item at €4.50, we record a 
value of €4. However, a correlation analysis reported in Plassmann et al., 2007 showed that 
this discretized WTP distribution strongly reflects how much a subject likes the items, and 
thus can be taken as a good approximation to their true subjective goal-valuations. 
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Supplementary Table 6. Items used in Chib et al., 2009 organized by category. 
Food Items Money Items Trinket Items 
Chocolate Chip Cookies 20c 300 (movie DVD) 
Chocolate Pudding 40c A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawkings (book) 
Cookies 60c Batman Begins (movie DVD) 
Doritos Chips 80c Blade Runner (movie DVD) 
Fig Rolls $1 Bourne Ultimatum (movie DVD) 
Ghiradelli Chocolate Bar $1.2 Caltech Backpack 
Hershey's Milk Chocolate Bar $1.4 Caltech Cap 
Ho-Ho Chocolate Cake Rolls $1.6 Caltech Flag 
Kit Kat Chocolate Bar $1.8 Caltech Key Chain 
Lindt Chocolate Bar $2 Caltech Mug 
Mrs Fields Cookies $2.2 Caltech Travel Mug 
Oreo Cookies $2.4 Caltech Sack 
M & Ms $2.6 Caltech Straw Hat 
Powdered Donuts $2.8 Freakonomics, S. Levitt & S. Dubner (book) 
Pringles Chips $3 Indiana Jones Boxed Set (movie DVDs) 
Reeses Peanut Butter Cups $3.2 Stapler 
Rice Krispie Squares $3.4 Spiderman (movie DVD) 
Skittles Sweets $3.6 The Big Lebowski (movie DVD) 
Sweetarts Hard Candy $3.8 The World is Flat, T. Friedman (book) 
Twix Chocolate Bar $4 Transformers (movie DVD) 
Supplementary Table 6. 
 
76 
 
Methods 
Task. 
Subjects were presented with high-resolution images of three classes of goods: snacks, 
consumer goods (e.g., DVDs, books), and monetary prizes (see Table S5 for details). On 
each trial, participants bid for the right to the prospect of obtaining a displayed item with 
80% probability and nothing otherwise. We introduced the probabilistic element to ensure 
that valuations for monetary sums would be nontrivial. Bids were elicited using a Becker-
DeGroot-Marschack (BDM) auction process. On a given trial, the participant bids €0, €1, €2, 
€3, or €4 for an item. At the end of the experiment one trial is selected at random from each 
of the categories. For each trial selected, a random number is drawn with equal probability 
from the categories of €0, €1, €2, €3, or €4. If the bid equals or exceeds the amount drawn in 
the lottery, then participants pay the bid amount and receive the corresponding item prospect. 
Otherwise, they pay nothing. These rules favor an optimal strategy of bidding the amount 
closest to one’s subjective valuation. The BDM rules were fully explained to participants. 
Subjects were asked to refrain from eating for four hours before arrival for testing. 
Compliance was confirmed through self-reports. Participants were requested to remain in the 
laboratory for one hour post-scan to consume items obtained during the experiment. This 
helped maximize participants’ valuation for food items during testing. On each trial subjects 
were endowed with €4 for bidding (since one trial from each category is ultimately played 
out, this corresponds to a €12 endowment across all three categories). Any remaining money 
from the initial endowment is retained by the subject. 
Each trial began with a stimulus presentation (Figure 1a). Subjects generated a bid within 5s 
by pressing one of four buttons or not responding for a zero bid, followed by a presentation 
of the bid amount (500ms). The inter-trial interval was uniformly drawn from 1-23 seconds. 
Four sessions of length 16 minutes each were completed. The hand used for responding was 
switched after two sessions and the correspondence between the buttons and bids was 
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alternated for the second and fourth sessions. The button configurations were practiced at the 
beginning of each session. 
 
fMRI Data Acquisition. 
Fifteen healthy right-handed subjects participated in this study. The data from two subjects 
were excluded because of technical problems with the MRI scanner, leaving thirteen subjects 
(eight male; mean age 22.1; SD 3.6 years). All subjects gave informed consent and the 
experiment was approved by the School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee, Trinity 
College Dublin. Functional imaging was performed on a 3T Philips scanner with an 8-
channel SENSE head coil at Trinity College Institute of Neuroscience, Dublin, Ireland. 
Thirty-five contiguous sequential ascending echo-planar T2*-weighted slices were acquired 
for each volume, giving whole brain coverage with a slice thickness of 3.55mm and no slice-
gap (in-plane resolution: 3.00 x 3.00 mm; repetition time (TR): 2000ms; echo time (TE): 
30ms; field of view: 240 x 240 mm2; matrix: 80 x 80). A whole-brain high-resolution T1-
weighted structural scan (voxel size: 0.9 x 0.9 x 0.9mm3) was also acquired for each subject. 
Slice orientation was tilted -30° from a line connecting the anterior and posterior commissure 
to alleviate signal loss in the OFC (Vikram S. Chib et al., 2009). 
 
Data Preprocessing and Filtering.  
Slice timing correction, motion correction, and spatial normalization were applied to the data. 
For the general linear model (GLM), the data was high-pass filtered (120s cut-off), and serial 
autocorrelations were estimated using a first-order autoregressive model. 
To minimize analysis differences between the univariate and multivariate approaches, we 
carried out the following: prior to multi-voxel sample extraction, low frequency components 
(below 1/120Hz), serial autocorrelations, and head motion were subtracted from the data. In 
addition, smoothed univariate value signals for all three categories identified in the GLM 
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analysis were removed from the data to ensure that the multi-voxel patterns identified in the 
MVPA analyses do not reflect overlying univariate signals. This was accomplished by 
multiplying the convolved parametric value regressor by the beta estimated in the GLM and 
subtracting the resulting time series from the data on a per-voxel basis. To correct for session-
related mean and scaling effects, we applied second-order detrending and z-scoring on a per-
voxel per-session basis (Alan N. Hampton & O'Doherty, 2007; Kahnt et al., 2010). Here we 
use the terms “univariate” and “multivariate” to refer to signals identified using mass-
univariate general linear modeling and MVPA (after orthogonalization with respect to the 
univariate signals), respectively. An alternative interpretation of “univariate” and 
“multivariate” is the signal identified using the mean and “mean-subtracted” activity, 
respectively, within the searchlight. We repeated the value decoding analyses using this 
alternative approach, which yielded similar results (Supplementary Figure 6). We applied 
spatial smoothing (8mm full-width-half-maximum) to the data used for the univariate GLM, 
but not in the multi-voxel pattern analysis, in order to preserve local variance (Kahnt et al., 
2010; Pereira et al., 2009). Pre-processing and filtering were performed using SPM8 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/), except detrending and z-scoring for which the PyMVPA 
package was used (Hanke et al., 2009). 
 
General Linear Model. 
We used a GLM to identify activity at decision time correlating with goal-values (as 
measured by WTP). The GLM included regressors for image presentation and bid defined 
for each item category (0s duration). Subject-specific WTPs were used as a parametric 
modulator for each regressor. To minimize head motion confounds, motion parameters were 
included as nuisance regressors. For the second-level analysis, beta maps corresponding to 
the WTP regressors for each subject for each item category were included in a 3x1 factorial 
design (each category being a factor). To test for regions representing stimulus value for all 
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item categories in a univariate manner, we performed a conjunction analysis across all three 
categories using the “conjunction null” hypothesis (Nichols et al., 2005). 
 
Classification Algorithm. 
We used a Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB) classification algorithm(Mitchell, 1997) with an 
assumption of zero covariance across voxels . To perform binary classification, our algorithm 
first estimates mean activity vectors and covariance matrices from training data for the 
Gaussian distributions 𝐩𝐩 (𝐱𝐱|𝐀𝐀) and 𝐩𝐩 (𝐱𝐱|𝐁𝐁). Then, the algorithm assigns a test sample 𝐱𝐱𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭 
to the condition with the maximum posterior probability at 𝐱𝐱𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭 based on the estimated 
distributions: if 𝐩𝐩 (𝐱𝐱𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭|𝐀𝐀)  >  𝐩𝐩 (𝐱𝐱𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭|𝐁𝐁) the algorithm infers that 𝐱𝐱𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭𝐭 was sampled under 
condition 𝐀𝐀. Generalization accuracy is estimated using cross-validation (Mitchell, 1997). 
This involves training and testing on mutually exclusive subsets of samples and repeating 
with a different partitioning on each “fold”. Cross-validation was done on a leave-one-
session-out basis. On every fold, the classifier was trained on three sessions and tested on the 
remaining session, thereby avoiding session-related dependencies between training and 
testing samples (N. Kriegeskorte, W. K. Simmons, P. S. F. Bellgowan, & C. I. Baker, 2009; 
Mitchell, 1997; Pereira et al., 2009). Accuracy scores were averaged to give the 
generalization accuracy. All preprocessing and filtering was performed on a per-session 
basis. 
 
Multivariate Pattern Analysis. 
A searchlight procedure (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006) provided a spatially unbiased estimator 
of distributed activity across the brain. Each fMRI data sample had two task-related 
characteristics, stimulus category and value. A potential concern is that significant 
correlation between stimulus category and stimulus values could bias the classification 
results, since the classifier might leverage variance which distinguishes between categories 
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when attempting to decode value, and vice versa. WTP for food was lower on average 
compared to the money or trinket categories (Figure 1c). To address this concern the set of 
samples for each category was median split into ‘high’ and ‘low’ value classes on a cross-
session basis for each subject. This relabeling eliminates correlations between value and 
category labels for every subject (Spearman correlation, p > 0.2 for all subjects), resulting 
in six classes of samples, one for each value/category combination. To avoid class imbalance 
bias, all analyses were balanced on a per-session basis (i.e., the number of samples in each 
class was equalized for each session and therefore cross-validation folded) by randomly 
removing some samples. Analyses were run multiple times to confirm that the outcome of 
the analysis was not dependent on the balancing procedure. 
 
Category-independent value. 
We identified category-independent value signals as those whose representations enabled 
decoding of value level across stimulus categories. We ran all six binary cross-category value 
classification analyses by training to decode high vs. low value on samples drawn from one 
category (e.g., food) and testing on samples drawn from another (e.g., money). 
 
Within-category value. 
We searched for areas encoding value that were able to predict within the same category. 
Note that the value representations pinpointed in this analysis may or may not be category-
dependent, but the results of this exercise are necessary to carry out the category-dependent 
analysis described next.  
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Category-dependent value. 
We identified regions involved in category-dependent valuation as those that allowed us to 
decode values only within particular categories. These value representations would be coded 
in voxel response distributions which differ across categories.  
For this, we compared results of the cross-category and within-category value decoding 
analyses. We first identified voxels that could significantly decode (p < 0.005 𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅) 
between high and low values within each category. Next we tested if these areas could predict 
value across categories. Any voxel that survived the cross-category analysis even at p <0.05 (corrected for two comparisons at each voxel) was deemed to exhibit properties of 
category-independent value encoding. Clusters which survived the within-category analysis, 
but did not survive the cross-category analysis, were deemed to involve category-dependent 
valuation. 
 
Stimulus category identity. 
Finally, we looked for regions exhibiting multivariate encoding of stimulus category. We 
implemented three binary classification analyses – food vs. money, money vs. trinkets, and 
food vs. trinkets. The searchlight accuracy maps were entered into a conjunction analysis 
(Nichols et al., 2005) to identify regions whose activity discriminated between all category 
pairs. This ensured that areas of the brain identified by this analysis contained distributed 
codes pertaining to the identity of each stimulus category individually. 
 
Significance Testing. 
For the searchlight analyses, the percentage of correctly identified samples averaged across 
folds in the cross-validation was used as the classification score in each searchlight, and this 
score was assigned to the voxel at the center. This defined q classification accuracy map for 
each subject, which was then smoothed with an 8mm FWHM kernel. A second-level analysis 
was implemented by performing voxel-wise t-tests, comparing the distribution of accuracies 
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across subjects against 50%, which is the expected performance of an algorithm randomly 
labeling samples. Since multivariate classification is susceptible to optimistic classification 
biases, we carried out permutation tests to validate our decoding procedure (Mukherjee, 
Golland, & Panchenko, 2003) (see Permutation Testing For Multivariate Analyses). 
All univariate and multivariate results were significant at FDR-adjusted p < 0.05 corrected 
for multiple comparisons by controlling the voxelwise false discovery rate (FDR) with a 10 
voxel extent threshold. We had a strong prior hypothesis regarding value signals in medial 
prefrontal regions (Elliott et al., 2000; John P. O'Doherty et al., 2001; Padoa-Schioppa & 
Assad, 2006; L. Tremblay & Schultz, 1999; Wallis, 2007, 2011), thus, for value-based 
analyses, correction was performed within a vmPFC mask defined a priori from related 
functional (Vikram S. Chib et al., 2009) and anatomical (Beckmann, Johansen-Berg, & 
Rushworth, 2009) studies (see Supplementary Figure 1). This correction threshold is denoted p < 0.05 SVFDR. For other analyses, unrelated to value, whole-brain correction was used 
(denoted p < 0.05 FDR). For display purposes, we present all results at p < 0.005. Results 
corrected within a small volume are displayed uncorrected. All results are overlaid on a 
normalized T1-weighted image averaged across subjects. Our main results are based on the p < 0.05 SVFDR threshold (and displayed at p<0.005 uncorrected) since (a) it was used 
previously in a similar paradigm (Vikram S. Chib et al., 2009), thus allowing a direct signal 
power comparison, and (b) controlling the false discovery rate rather than the familywise 
error rate has been shown to have greater sensitivity with minimal risk of false positives 
(Chumbley, Worsley, Flandin, & Friston, 2010). 
 
Permutation Testing For Multivariate Analyses. 
For each multivariate analysis, the searchlight procedure was repeated 200 times with 
permuted labeling (Krajbich et al., 2009; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006; Pereira et al., 2009). To 
satisfy exchangeability criteria (Pereira & Botvinick, 2011) and to prevent label imbalances 
in the cross-validation, labels were permuted along with their positions in the dataset 
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partitions. The resulting accuracy maps were entered into mass univariate t-tests to determine 
if the accuracy distributions over the permuted datasets were significantly different from 
chance. At 𝐩𝐩 < 𝟎𝟎.𝟏𝟏, for all analyses, no voxel’s accuracy distribution significantly deviated 
from random chance in any subject. This indicates that the classification algorithm used for 
the data analysis across all conditions is fair and unbiased, i.e., the significant results reported 
for the non-permuted labels are not due to an optimistic classification bias. 
 
ROI Gradient Analyses. 
The t-score maps computed at the second-level in our univariate and within-category 
multivariate value analyses are indicative of the relative strengths of distinct types of value 
coding within vmPFC. We used these maps to investigate how the structure of stimulus value 
representation varies along (a) an anterior-posterior gradient in mOFC in relation to the 
abstractness of the stimulus being valued and (b) a ventral-dorsal gradient in vmPFC as a 
whole with respect to the relationship between the univariate and multivariate representation 
of value. 
 
Anterior-posterior gradient of stimulus abstractness. 
For voxels in mOFC, the t-scores obtained from the within-category value decoding analyses 
were tested for a correlation with the position of the voxels along the y-axis (Figure 2b). This 
was done for the food and trinkets categories separately. Since the smoothing applied to 
classification accuracy maps prior to the second-level analyses artificially inflates the 
strength of any spatial correlation, we generated a more reasonable correlation distribution 
under the null hypothesis by randomly generating noise within mOFC using the same mean 
and variance as in the empirically observed unsmoothed t-scores. We then smoothed this 
noise and computed the t-score/y-axis correlation, repeating this process 10,000 times. A 
non-parametric p-value was derived by determining the fraction of randomly generated 
correlations which exceeded the actual correlation. 
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Ventral-dorsal gradient of value processing complexity. 
Three analyses were performed to compare univariate and multivariate value signals in 
mOFC and mPFC: first, we correlated each voxel’s univariate and within-category MVPA 
t-scores with its position along the z-axis (Figure 4a). This was done for all voxels in the 
mOFC and mPFC masks together. We generated a null correlation distribution for each 
combination of category and value coding strategy by randomly generating correlations from 
simulated data generated using the same process described above. The null correlation 
distribution defines a non-parametric p-value as the proportion of randomly generated 
correlations which exceed the empirically observed correlation scores. Since we sought to 
determine whether or not the univariate and distributed coding strengths were differentially 
correlated with the z-axis, we derived confidence intervals around the respective correlation 
estimations via bootstrapping. That is, 10,000 samples were randomly generated with 
replacement and a sampling distribution estimated for each category and value coding 
strategy. From this sampling distribution, we can establish the range of values that the actual 
correlations might take (within an error probability thresholded at p < 0.05). 
Second, we examined how voxel preference for multivariate or univariate coding of value 
changes along an inferior-superior axis. To do this, we extracted the t-scores obtained in the 
second-level analyses for the univariate and within-category MVPA analyses for all voxels 
in each mask, and then for each voxel we subtracted the univariate t-score from the MVPA 
t-score, resulting in a single value indicative of that voxel’s relative preference for the 
multivariate or univariate encoding value. This was done for all voxels in mPFC and mOFC 
separately (Figure 4b). The resulting samples were tested using two-sided paired t-tests. 
In our third test, we correlated the second-level t-scores from the univariate and within-
category MVPA analyses on a voxel-by-voxel basis in each region. Again, this procedure 
was implemented for the food and trinkets categories separately. Since the number of voxels 
in each vmPFC subdivision is different, we tested differences in correlations using a 
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bootstrap procedure (Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman, 2008). For each combination of 
stimulus category and vmPFC subdivision, we resampled 348 data points of interest with 
replacement (corresponding to the number of voxels in the larger mOFC mask) and 
computed the correlation. In this way, 10,000 correlation coefficients were generated (Figure 
3b), giving an estimate of the empirical distribution. 
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C h a p t e r  3  
PROSPECTIVE AND RETROSPECTIVE CORTICAL AND STRIATAL 
REPRESENTATIONS OF DECISION VARIABLES 
While there is accumulating evidence for the existence of distinct neural systems supporting 
goal-directed and habitual action selection in the mammalian brain, much less is known about 
the nature of the information being processed in these different brain regions. Associative 
learning theory predicts that brain systems involved in habitual control, such as the 
dorsolateral striatum, should contain stimulus and response information only, but not 
outcome information, while regions involved in goal-directed action, such as ventromedial 
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and dorsomedial striatum, should be involved in processing 
information about outcomes as well as stimuli and responses. To test this prediction, human 
participants underwent fMRI while engaging in a binary choice task designed to enable the 
separate identification of these different representations with a multivariate classification 
analysis approach. Consistent with our predictions, the dorsolateral striatum contained 
information about responses but not outcomes at the time of an initial stimulus, while the 
regions implicated in goal-directed action selection contained information about both 
responses and outcomes. These findings suggest that differential contributions of these 
regions to habitual and goal-directed behavioral control may depend in part on basic 
differences in the type of information that these regions have access to at the time of decision-
making. 
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Introduction 
Two distinct strategies support behavioral control: a goal-directed strategy that flexibly 
generates decisions based on deliberate evaluation of the consequences of actions, and a 
habitual strategy that relies on a reflexive, automatic, elicitation of actions (B.W. Balleine, 
Daw, & O'Doherty, 2008; B. W. Balleine & A. Dickinson, 1998; Dickinson, 1985). These 
distinct mechanisms depend on at least partly dissociable brain systems, with the posterior 
dorsolateral striatum (DLS) being implicated in habits (E. Tricomi, B. W. Balleine, & J. P. 
O'Doherty, 2009; Yin, Knowlton, & Balleine, 2004) and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC) (or homologous regions in the rodent brain) and the dorsomedial striatum (DMS) 
contributing to goal-directed control (B. W. Balleine & A. Dickinson, 1998; Killcross & 
Coutureau, 2003; S. C. Tanaka, B. W. Balleine, & J. P. O'Doherty, 2008; Yin, Ostlund, 
Knowlton, & Balleine, 2005). However, the nature of the information encoding in these 
regions is much less understood. 
 
According to associative learning theory, in habits, associations are formed between stimuli 
(S) and responses (R), without any encoding of the goal or outcome (O). By contrast, in goal-
directed learning, associations are formed between stimuli, responses, and outcomes (B. W. 
Balleine & A. Dickinson, 1998). Specifically, goal representations are suggested to be 
elicited via S-O associations, which in turn retrieve response representations via an O-R 
association (Bernard W Balleine & Ostlund, 2007; Sanne de Wit & Dickinson, 2009).  
 
Several neurophysiology studies have explored whether brain regions implicated in habitual 
and goal-directed action contain different types of associative information. The results of 
such studies are equivocal, with most reporting similar information encoding in both DMS 
and DLS (Gremel & Costa, 2013; H. Kim, Lee, & Jung, 2013; Hoseok Kim, Sul, Huh, Lee, 
& Jung, 2009; Kimchi, Torregrossa, Taylor, & Laubach, 2009; Thomas A Stalnaker, 
Gwendolyn G Calhoon, Masaaki Ogawa, Matthew R Roesch, & Geoffrey Schoenbaum, 
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2010).  Another approach has been to adopt formal computational models of learning and 
correlate these to data acquired with fMRI or neurophysiology (J. O'Doherty, Dayan, Friston, 
Critchley, & Dolan, 2003; Samejima, Ueda, Doya, & Kimura, 2005). Some studies report 
that different types of reinforcement-learning models (model-free vs model-based) correlate 
with activity in DLS compared to DMS, vmPFC, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) 
(Glascher et al., 2010; A. N. Hampton et al., 2006; Lee, Shimojo, & O'Doherty, 2014; K. 
Wunderlich, Dayan, & Dolan, 2012) while others have found evidence for more mixed 
representations (N. D. Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011; Simon & Daw, 
2011). However, while such analyses reveal the computations that might be operating in a 
given area, they do not illuminate the type of information being encoded in those regions 
upon which a particular computational process may act. 
 
In the present study, human participants underwent fMRI while performing a binary decision 
task, in which we carefully manipulated response and outcome identity across experimental 
sessions. Using a multivariate pattern analysis classification method, we tested for the 
presence of response information and outcome information at the time of stimulus and action 
performance in different brain regions. We hypothesized that brain regions implicated in 
habitual control, such as the DLS, would encode response, but not outcome, information at 
the time of stimulus presentation, indicating a role for this region in supporting stimulus-
response associations, while other brain regions such as the vmPFC, dlPFC, and anterior 
DMS would contain representations of both responses and outcomes, indicative of a role for 
those regions in goal-directed learning and control.  
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Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Nineteen healthy right-handed volunteers participated in this study (11 male; mean age 22.9; 
SD 4.1 years). The volunteers were pre-assessed to exclude those with a history of 
neurological or psychiatric illness.  All participants gave informed consent and the study was 
approved by the Institutional Review Board of the California Institute of Technology. 
 
Task 
Participants performed a simple binary decision task (Figure 1A). At the start of each trial an 
initial stimulus environment was indicated by one of two Sanskrit characters. The participant 
then performed one of two possible actions and subsequently entered an outcome state in 
which they received an associated reward. There were two distinct initial stimuli, two 
possible outcome states (respectively represented by a blue circle and a red square), and two 
reward distributions—high (equal probability of $8, $10, $12) and low (equal probability of 
$2, $4, $6). Participants interacted with the environment using two qualitatively different 
actions: a double button press and a trackball roll. These actions were performed on the same 
device using the right hand. Action outcomes were anti-correlated and deterministic, i.e., 
actions always led to outcomes and these outcomes (and associated reward distributions) 
were always distinct. The initial stimulus determined the subsequent action-outcome 
contingencies and thus indicated which of the two actions was highly rewarded on a given 
trial. Crucially, the relationships between initial stimuli, actions, outcomes, and reward 
distributions were permuted across four conditions, ensuring that representations of one 
decision variable (e.g., actions) could not be confounded with those of another (e.g., 
outcomes) (phi correlation coefficient < |0.005|). A description of the full permutation order 
is provided in Table 1. Participants received training prior to each condition to ensure that 
they were fully aware of the relevant action-outcome contingencies.  Twelve sessions were 
run in total (three for each condition) with sixteen trials in each session (eight for each initial 
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stimulus). In addition, after training, participants nearly always selected actions leading to 
the high reward distribution and thus could not confound our decoding of initial stimulus, 
actions, and outcomes with the anticipated level of reward.  
 
fMRI Data Acquisition 
Functional imaging was performed with a 3 T Siemens Trio scanner. Forty-five contiguous 
interleaved transversal slices of echo-planar T2*-weighted images were acquired in each 
volume, with a slice thickness of 3mm and no gap (repetition time, 2650ms; echo time, 30ms; 
flip angle, 90°; field of view, 192mm2; matrix, 64x64). Slice orientation was tilted 30° from 
a line connecting the anterior and posterior commissure. This slice tilt alleviates the signal 
drop in the OFC (Deichmann, Gottfried, Hutton, & Turner, 2003). We discarded the first 
three images before data processing and statistical analysis, to compensate for the T1 
saturation effects. A whole-brain high-resolution T1-weighted structural scan (voxel size: 1 
x 1 x 1mm3) was also acquired for each subject. 
 
Data Preprocessing and Filtering 
Slice timing correction, motion correction, and spatial normalization were applied to the data. 
Prior to multi-voxel sample extraction, low frequency components (below 1/120Hz), serial 
autocorrelations, and head motion were subtracted from the data. To correct for session-
related mean and scaling effects, we applied second-order detrending and z-scoring on a per-
voxel per-session basis (Pereira et al., 2009). Pre-processing and filtering was performed 
using SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/), except detrending and z-scoring, for which 
the PyMVPA package was used (Hanke et al., 2009). 
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General Linear Model 
Eight regressors of interest were included in the general linear model (GLM). Each regressor 
corresponded to the identity of a particular decision variable (i.e., one regressor for each 
initial stimulus, each action, each outcome, and each reward distribution). In addition, 
parametric modulators reflecting the actual reward delivered on a given trial were added to 
the reward distribution regressors. Time series of head motion estimated during realignment 
were included as covariates of no interest. 
 
Classification Algorithm 
We used a Gaussian Naive Bayes (GNB) classification algorithm (Mitchell, 1997) with an 
assumption of zero covariance across voxels. To perform binary classification our algorithm 
first estimates mean activity vectors and covariance matrices from training data for the 
Gaussian distributions p(x|A) and p(x|B). Then, the algorithm assigns a test sample xtest to the 
condition with the maximum posterior probability at xtest based on the estimated distributions: 
if p(xtest|A) > p(xtest|B) the algorithm infers that xtest  was sampled under condition A. 
Generalization accuracy is estimated using cross-validation. This involves training and 
testing on mutually exclusive subsets of samples and repeating with a different partitioning 
on each “fold”. Cross-validation was done on a leave-one-session-out basis. On every fold, 
the classifier was trained on three sessions and tested on the remaining session, thereby 
avoiding session-related dependencies between training and testing samples (Nikolaus 
Kriegeskorte et al., 2009; Mitchell, 1997; Pereira et al., 2009) . Accuracy scores were 
averaged to give the generalization accuracy. All preprocessing and filtering was performed 
on a per-session basis. Importantly, the average Spearman correlation between combinations 
of decision variables across subjects was 2x10-5, 1x10-3, and 2x10-4, respectively, indicating 
that the classifier could not erroneously decode one decision variable based on correlated 
representations of another. 
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Multivariate Pattern Analysis 
A searchlight procedure (Kahnt et al., 2010; Kriegeskorte et al., 2006) provided a spatially 
unbiased estimator of distributed activity across the brain. This involved the performance of 
GNB classification on the fMRI data in spheres of voxels of radius 3 throughout the brain. 
We extracted a sample of neural data corresponding to the initial stimulus, action, and 
outcome timepoints in each trial (with a shift of 5 s to account for hemodynamic delay) by 
averaging the two volumes closest in time (one before and one after) to the relevant timepoint 
(Clithero et al., 2011; McNamee et al., 2013). Each fMRI data sample had two task-related 
characteristics: timepoint and identity. Our hypotheses required us to decode based on a 
variety of interactions between these two characteristics, which we detail below. In 
particular, we performed the following analyses in order to determine whether neural 
representations of decision variables are present at timepoints in a trial other than the moment 
of perception or action. For all analyses below, cross-fold validation was used, in which 
training was done on the data from 11 sessions, and testing was done on the data from the 
12th session. This was then repeated 12 times, using a different test session on each occasion.  
 
Time-span Decoding 
In “time-span” decoding analyses, we trained the classifier at one time point in the trial to 
discriminate activity patterns elicited at another time point in the trial (Figure 1B). 
 
Time-shift Decoding 
Here we train and test at the same timepoint in the trial but label the samples according to an 
alternate timepoint. For example, we decode preceding action at the time of outcome state 
presentation. The important distinction between these “time-shift” analyses and the previous 
“time-span” analyses is that, in our example, the “time-shift” analyses do not require that the 
action representation at the outcome timepoint be the same as that at the action timepoint. 
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Action at Stimulus Time 
To detect regions involved in encoding action representations at the time of initial stimulus 
presentation, we trained our classifier to discriminate between different action 
representations (double button press vs. trackerball roll) at the time of action selection. We 
then tested the classifier at the time of initial stimulus presentation to assess whether activity 
in a given brain area during the time of initial stimulus presentation reflected the action that 
would subsequently be selected on that trial. A successful classification in a given brain 
region would indicate that information about the to-be-performed action is being represented 
during the initial decision period, suggesting the presence of stimulus-response associations 
in that region. 
 
Outcome at Stimulus Time  
To detect regions involved in encoding outcome representations at the time of initial stimulus 
presentation in the trial, we trained our classifier to discriminate different target outcomes, 
e.g., blue circle vs red square, as they were presented at the time of outcome delivery. We 
then tested the classifier at the time of initial stimulus presentation (i.e., at the onset of the 
trial), to assess whether activity in a given brain area during the time of initial stimulus 
presentation reflected the outcome that would ultimately be delivered on that trial (contingent 
on the subsequent action). A successful classification in a given brain area would indicate 
that information about the goal of an action is represented in that area during the initial 
decision period.  
 
Decoding of Integrated Representations 
We were also interested in testing for “integrated representations”, in which distinct 
combinations of stimuli and actions (e.g., S1-A1 and S2-A2) might be encoded as unique 
configurations (S1A1 vs S2A2), as opposed to being encoded as elemental action 
representations (A1 vs A2). The key distinction is that an integrated representation of an S1-
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A1 combination would successfully decode only on trials in which A1 is selected in the 
presence of S1 but not otherwise; in contrast, a unitary representation of action A1 would 
successfully decode on any trial in which A1 was selected, irrespective of whether S1 or S2 
was present. To detect such integrated representations we performed the following steps: 
 
(1) Establishing potential ROIs: First we trained the classifier to decode S1-A1 vs S2-A2 
configurations at the time of initial stimulus presentation and tested for those representations 
at the same time-point. A significant signal in this analysis is indicative of the encoding of 
unitary stimulus representations, unitary action representations, or integrated stimulus-action 
representations. 
 
(2) Ruling out unitary stimulus representation: Secondly, we used the classifier weights 
trained up in stage (1) in order to also test for discrimination between S1-A2 vs S2-A1. If the 
classifier performs significantly above-chance, this would indicate that unitary stimulus 
information is being decoded (since the only consistent labels between the training and 
testing data are S1 and S2).  
 
(3) Ruling out unitary action representation: In our third analysis, we again used the classifier 
weights from stage (1), and tested if the classifier could decode S2-A1 vs S1-A2. Similar 
logic implies that significant decoding in this analysis is consistent with unitary action 
representations. 
 
It is also possible that both integrated and unitary representations are present in a region 
simultaneously. Significant classification in stage (1) but not in stages (2) and (3) is indicative 
of integrated stimulus-action representations only. Thus, in order to attribute decoding 
signals specifically to integrated representations, we consider the conjunction between two 
statistical maps obtained from per-voxel paired t-tests between (i) accuracy scores in stage 
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(1) vs. stage (2) and (ii) accuracy scores in stage (1) vs. stage (3). The only explanation for a 
signal that survives this stringent criterion is that it is generated by an integrated stimulus-
action representation, since the first paired t-test rules out stimulus-only decoding and the 
second rules out action-only decoding. 
 
Significance Testing 
For the searchlight analyses, the percentage of correctly identified samples, averaged across 
folds in the cross-validation, was used as the classification score in each searchlight and this 
score was assigned to the voxel at the center of the searchlight sphere. This defined a 
classification accuracy map for each subject, which was then smoothed with an 8mm FWHM 
kernel. A second-level analysis was implemented by performing voxel-wise t-tests 
comparing the distribution of accuracies across participants against 50%, which is the 
expected performance of an algorithm randomly labeling samples. Since multivariate 
classification is susceptible to optimistic classification biases, we carried out permutation 
tests to validate our decoding procedure (McNamee et al., 2013). 
 
All results were significant at FWE-adjusted p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons by 
controlling the familywise error rate (FWE) with a 10 voxel extent threshold. We had strong 
prior hypotheses regarding action and outcome representations in posteriolateral and anterior 
medial striatum, and in ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Thus, in these areas, corrections were 
performed within small volumes defined a priori based on relevant functional imaging 
studies (see Table 2). Small volume corrections are denoted throughout by SVFWE and 
whole-brain corrections by FWE. For display purposes, we present overlays thresholded at 
p < 0.005 uncorrected. 
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Psychophysiological Interactions 
BOLD time courses were extracted from regions of interest (ROIs) using SPM’s “Volume 
of Interest” functionality correcting for an F-contrast composed of all effects of interest in 
the GLM. ROIs were defined as the set of voxels within a 6mm radius of seed coordinates 
which were independently defined based on related functional imaging studies (see 
Supplementary Table S2). A GLM was then constructed with three regressors in the 
following order: the BOLD time course from the seed region (the physiological term), an 
indicator regressor encoding the initial stimulus onset on each trial (the psychological term), 
and the corresponding interaction regressor. Once the GLMs were estimated for all 
participants, a second-level contrast (i.e., across participants) was specified for the interaction 
regressor. The resulting statistical map details the degree of coupling, modulated by the 
psychological regressor, between the seed region and voxels throughout the brain. It does 
this by measuring how much BOLD activity in the target location is accounted for by the 
interaction term in the GLM. 
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Results 
Behavioral Performance 
Due to the relatively simple nature of the task, and the training conducted before each 
experimental condition, participants were expected to perform close to optimally (defined as 
choosing actions associated with the high reward distribution in each condition).  Consistent 
with this prediction, mean percentage of optimal action-selection was 90% across 
participants.  Performance ranged from (85.4% to 97.4%), except in one participant who was 
an outlier in terms of having a performance level of 60.1%. The individual with the outlier 
performance level was nonetheless included in the fMRI analysis, as a sufficient number of 
trials were still available for the classification performance. 
 
Neuroimaging Results 
Goal-directed associative encoding: S-O, R-O and S-R associations. 
We first tested for areas surviving individual tests for outcome information or action 
information during the initial stimulus period, and then finally report a conjunction across 
those tests, which is the key criterion for a region involved in goal-directed associative 
encoding (Balleine & Ostlund, 2007). 
 
Outcome at stimulus time. 
We first tested for brain regions involved in encoding outcome identity at the time of the 
initial stimulus, as such representations would be indicative of regions having access to the 
goal or outcome at the time of decision-making. Prospective representations of the predicted 
outcome state at the time of stimulus were identified in right dlPFC (p < 0.05 SVFWE, 
t(18)=4.55, x=60, y=20, z=34) and in central OFC (p < 0.05 SVFWE, t(18)=3.11, x=18, 
y=32, z=-20).  
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Outcome at action time. 
We also tested for regions encoding outcome information at the time of action performance. 
For this we used a time-span analysis to train the classifier on outcome representations at the 
time of outcome delivery, and then tested at the time of action execution. We found 
significant signals in dlPFC (p < 0.05 SVFWE, t(18)=5.15, x=51, y=17, z=37), vmPFC (p < 
0.05 SVFWE, t(18)=6.02, x=0, y=53, z=-20), central OFC (p < 0.05 SVFWE, t(18)=5.15, 
x=30, y=38, z=-11), and caudate (p < 0.05 SVFWE, t(18)=4.02, x=9, y=20, z=16). 
 
Action at stimulus time. 
We also expected regions involved in goal-directed control to encode action information at 
the time of initial stimulus presentation. Out of the regions identified above as containing 
outcome information at the time of either initial stimulus presentation or action execution, 
two regions also contained action information at the initial stimulus time, the dlPFC (p < 0.05 
SVFWE, x=57, y=8, z=34, t(18)=3.85) and vmPFC (p < 0.05 SVFWE, x=0, y=53, z=-20, 
t(18)=6.02). 
 
Regions containing both action and outcome information at stimulus time. 
In order to formally identify voxels containing both outcome and action information at the 
time of the initial stimulus, we performed a conjunction analysis on the results of the 
“outcome at stimulus time” and “action at stimulus time” statistical maps. This analysis 
yielded significant effects only in right dlPFC (conjunction, p < 0.05 SVFWE, x=60, y=17, 
z=34, t(18)=3.47). (Figure 7a). Although we did not specify the dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex as an a-priori region of interest, activity was also found in this region at an uncorrected 
threshold. Given that this region was identified as being involved in model-based RL in a 
previous study by Lee et al, 2014, we performed a post-hoc small volume correction using 
dmPFC coordinates identified in that study (x=12, y=32, z=37), which revealed a significant 
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cluster (p < 0.05 SVFWE, x=21, y=35, z=40, t(18)=3.36). As this was a post-hoc inference, 
we refrain from discussing it further, but report it for completeness. 
 
Regions containing BOTH action at stimulus time and outcome at action execution. 
We also performed a conjunction analysis in order to pinpoint regions in which action 
information is available at the initial stimulus time, while outcome information is represented 
during action execution. This contrast revealed significant effects in the vmPFC (p < 0.05 
SVFWE, x=3, y=53, z=-20, t(18)=5.54), as well as the left (p < 0.05 SVFWE, x=-42, y=26, 
z=49, t(18)=4.78) and right (p < 0.05 SVFWE, x=51, y=29, z=43, t(18)=3.97) dlPFC. 
 
Habitual encoding of stimulus-response associations. 
In order to identify brain regions that could potentially be involved in habitual action-
selection we tested for areas that encoded action information at the initial stimulus time but 
that were not encoding outcome information at either the stimulus time or during action 
performance.  Of the areas identified in the analysis testing for significant decoding of actions 
at the time of stimulus, two regions in particular were identified as containing action 
representations that did not also contain outcome representations: the posterior lateral 
putamen (p < 0.05 SVFWE, x=-27, y=-22, z=7, t(18)=3.24) (peak within same cluster x=-
21, y=-19, z=7, t(18)=4.79), and the supplementary motor cortex (p<0.05 FWE, x=15, y=32, 
z=61, t(18)=7.95). In an independent follow up analysis using anatomically defined regions 
of interest centered on the posterior putamen and supplementary motor cortex, we tested 
whether these regions contained on average significantly better predictions of actions 
compared to outcomes at the time of stimulus. In a paired t-test we found that action 
representations were significantly more strongly represented than outcome representations 
in both these regions (see Figure 8; putamen p=0.001, t(18)=3.9; SMA p=0.005, t(18)=2.86). 
In addition to these paired t-tests, we performed one-sample t-tests against a random-chance 
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accuracy score, which indicated that only action information, but not outcome information, 
was present in the putamen and SMA at the time of the initial stimulus presentation. 
 
If putamen is driving motor activity during the performance of habitual actions, one would 
expect this area to be functionally connected to the thalamus, and the thalamus in turn to the 
motor cortex in the contralateral (left) hemisphere, as dictated by the anatomy of 
corticostriatal loops. We tested for psycho-physiological interactions (PPI) between an 
indicator variable for the onset of the initial stimulus and neural activity seeded at the 
putamen and thalamus. The putamen-based PPI resulted in a significant correlation with 
activity in the left thalamus (p<0.05SVFWE, x=-12, y=-19, z=-2, t(18)=4.07) and the 
thalamus PPI correlated significantly with activity in left premotor cortex (p<0.05SVFWE, 
x=-39, y=-7, z=46, t(18)=7.39). A weaker effect was also found in the ipsilateral (right) 
premotor cortex (p<0.05SVFWE, x=42, y=-10, z=58, t(18)=5.45).  All seed coordinates used 
in the PPI were defined independently of results of the other analyses in this study (see Table 
2). 
 
Integrated Stimulus-Action Representations. 
We also tested for integrated stimulus-action representations – encoding specific stimulus-
action pairs as unique configurations (e.g., S1A1) – at the time of the initial stimulus (see 
Methods). Integrated stimulus-action representations were identified in the anterior 
dorsomedial striatum (caudate nucleus; (p < 0.05 SVFWE, x=15, y=11, z=22, t(18)=4.16) 
and hippocampus (p < 0.05 SVFWE, x=24, y=-1, z=-20, t(18)=4.35). 
 
Integrated Action-outcome Representation. 
We also tested for evidence of integrated action-outcome representations at the time of 
stimulus, using a similar approach. No significant decoding of integrated action-outcome 
representations was found. 
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Ruling out response time confounds. 
There was a significant difference in response times for the two actions (two-sided paired t-
test, t(18)=3.415, p=0.003); in contrast, no difference was found in response times as function 
of the identity of the initial stimulus (t(18)=0.561, p=0.582), or outcome state (two-sided 
paired t-test,  t(18)=0.577, p=0.571). To ensure that response times were not confounding 
our results, we ran additional analyses assessing action-dependent decoding.  Specifically, in 
these analyses, we included individual trial reaction times as a covariate of no-interest in the 
fMRI design matrix and re-ran all of the classification analyses involving actions as described 
above.  We filtered out any voxel activity variance explained by trial-to-trial response time 
at the INITSTIM and ACTION timepoints. This was accomplished by estimating a GLM 
which included trial-to-trial reaction times as parametric modulators time-locked to the 
INITSTIM and ACTION trial events. Following GLM estimation, beta values for these 
parametric modulators were multiplied by the corresponding regressors and linearly 
subtracted from the data. All of our results remained significant after inclusion of the reaction 
time covariate, indicating that our classifier is not relying on differences in reaction times in 
order to decode action information. 
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Discussion 
Contemporary associative theory distinguishes between habitual S-R associations and a 
combination of S-O, O-R, and R-O associations thought to mediate goal-directed 
performance (Bernard W Balleine & Ostlund, 2007).  In this study, we used multivariate 
pattern analysis to assess whether dissociable regions of the human brain encode these 
distinct associative structures. Unlike previous work in humans, contrasting qualitatively 
different experimental conditions designed to encourage different action selection strategies, 
or comparing largely parameter driven value signals generated by RL algorithms, our 
approach sought to identify a neural implementation of the associative content of goal-
directed versus habitual behavioral control. We found evidence for stimulus-elicited 
response representations but no outcome representations, indicative of habits, in the DLS 
(posterior putamen).  Conversely, in the vmPFC, dlPFC, and anterior caudate nucleus, both 
response and outcome representations were present, indicative of goal-directed decision-
making. 
 
Our finding of stimulus-elicited response, but not outcome, representations in the DLS 
suggests that this area is especially involved in encoding S-R associations. While previous 
studies have found evidence that activity in this area increases over time as habits come to 
control behavior (E. Tricomi et al., 2009), and that activity in this region correlates with 
model-free value signals (Lee et al., 2014; K. Wunderlich et al., 2012), the present study 
illuminates the associations being encoded in the region. A previous report found that the 
degree of structural connectivity between the posterior putamen and the premotor cortex 
predicts susceptibility to habit-like “slips-of-action” (S. de Wit et al., 2012). Our connectivity 
analysis suggests a potential mechanism by which stimulus-response related activity in the 
putamen is ultimately transferred to the motor cortex via the thalamus, in order to implement 
habitual motor control. 
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Whereas habits depend on a reflexive retrieval of a previously reinforced response, goal-
directed behavior involves selecting, evaluating, and initiating an action based on the 
probability and utility of its consequences. The “associative cybernetics theory” (Bernard W 
Balleine & Ostlund, 2007; Sanne de Wit & Dickinson, 2009) postulates that the retrieval of 
potential outcomes, of the actions that produce them, and of the values of those actions is 
mediated respectively by S-O, O-R and R-O associations.  Critically, to allow for sensitivity 
to sensory-specific outcome devaluation and contingency degradation, defining features of 
goal-directed performance, the associations relating the probabilities and utilities of potential 
outcomes to the stimuli and actions that produce them must be flexible and current, 
suggesting a dynamic binding of features. 
 
One area well suited for the dynamic binding of stimuli, actions, and outcomes is the dlPFC, 
given prior evidence for a role of this structure in working-memory and goal-directed 
behavior more generally (Patricia S Goldman-Rakic, 1996; Earl K Miller & Jonathan D 
Cohen, 2001). We found that activity in this region reflected representations of both action 
and outcome identities at the time of initial stimulus presentation, indicative of a key role for 
this region in encoding the information necessary to guide goal-directed actions at the time 
of decision-making. Specifically, the finding that dlPFC activity reflects information about 
action and outcome identities, necessary for computing goal-directed action values, is 
consistent with a contribution of this area to encoding the model component of a model-
based RL algorithm. Previous findings reported state-prediction errors in this region that 
could underpin the learning of the underlying associations needed to form such a model 
(Glascher et al., 2010). The present findings suggest that not only is dlPFC involved in 
learning or updating such a model, but also in encoding (or at least retrieving) the model 
itself. 
 
 
104 
 
The contribution of dlPFC to the encoding of associative information necessary for 
computing goal-directed actions at the time of initial stimulus presentation can be contrasted 
with our findings in the vmPFC.  Whereas vmPFC did encode information about the action 
at the time of initial stimulus presentation, information about the outcome identity was not 
present until later in the trial, during action execution. However, in the central orbitofrontal 
cortex (cOFC), an area adjacent to and highly connected to the vmPFC (Carmichael & Price, 
1996), outcome identity information was represented at the time of initial stimulus 
presentation.  One possibility, therefore, is that the cOFC encodes the identity of a goal at the 
time of initial decision-making and that this outcome-identity representation is then used to 
retrieve outcome value signals in the vmPFC. Consistent with this interpretation, a previous 
study by our group reported activity in central OFC extending to vmPFC correlating with the 
categorical identity of the goal at the time of decision-making (McNamee et al., 2013). In 
that previous study, information about the value of the goal was most prominently 
represented in vmPFC. An important feature of our experiment is that we have controlled for 
value (i.e., kept value constant throughout, with high and low value outcomes assigned 
equally often to every possible combination of stimuli and actions), to ensure that outcome 
identity information is not confounded with the outcome-value. Thus, we cannot test in the 
present design when value information about outcomes emerges in vmPFC. However, 
previous studies have reported such information to be present in both the vmPFC and in the 
dlPFC at the time of decision-making (V. S. Chib, A. Rangel, S. Shimojo, & J. P. O'Doherty, 
2009; H. Plassmann, J. O'Doherty, & A. Rangel, 2007). 
 
Our findings provide new insight into the differential functions of DLS vs DMS. While the 
posterior DLS (posterior putamen) was found to encode representations of responses elicited 
by discriminative stimuli, but not of outcomes, the anterior dorsomedial striatum (anterior 
caudate) was likewise found to encode response representations at the time of initial stimulus 
presentation but also to contain significantly decodable information about outcome identities 
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at the time of action performance. However, there was also a difference in the type of 
stimulus-response coding present in the DMS compared to the DLS. In the DMS, the 
encoding of response associations was integrated with stimulus identity; a unique distributed 
representation was present in the DMS for each stimulus-response pair. In contrast, in the 
DLS, each response was coded independently of the stimulus that elicited it. The binding of 
stimulus-response associations into a single representation found in the DMS could underpin 
a form of abstraction of stimulus-response codes, which could potentially be part of a 
mechanism for chunking stimulus-response chains. Our finding of a difference in the type of 
encoding present in the dorsomedial vs dorsolateral striatum is important, given that a 
number of previous neurophysiology studies have not found clear differences in information 
encoding between these regions (Hoseok Kim et al., 2009; Kimchi et al., 2009; Thomas A 
Stalnaker et al., 2010). 
 
Some neurophysiology studies have reported outcome representations at the single-neuron 
level in both DLS and DMS (Hikosaka, Sakamoto, & Usui, 1989; H. Kim et al., 2013; 
Hoseok Kim et al., 2009; Lau & Glimcher, 2007; Thomas A Stalnaker et al., 2010), whereas 
here we found such representations only in DMS. An important feature of our experimental 
design is that differences found in outcome identity representations could not be accounted 
for by potential differences in the value of the outcomes. While we did have actions leading 
to high vs low rewards in our experiment, we trained the classifier to distinguish between 
different outcome states leading to the SAME high valued reward. This is necessary because 
differences in outcome value, i.e., between high and low valued goal states, could drive 
differences in outcome-related neural activity in a brain region even if that area is not 
explicitly representing outcome identity; indeed, even a pure S-R learning system would 
discriminate high and low valued states as the high valued state would be associated with 
stronger S-R associations through trial-by-trial reinforcement.  
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Naturally, the absence of significant decoding from the BOLD signal in a given brain area 
does not imply the absence of that information at the level of single neurons. fMRI  and 
single unit data may capture different aspects of neural activity in any event, with the BOLD 
signal suggested to be correlated more closely with input into a region and intrinsic 
processing therein as opposed to output (Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 
2001). Nevertheless, it is striking that our current findings about information content do 
accord very well with previous evidence about the differential role of dorsolateral striatum 
in habitual control, and a corresponding role for dorsomedial striatum and prefrontal cortex 
regions in goal-directed actions (Glascher et al., 2010; Valentin, Dickinson, & O'Doherty, 
2007; Yin et al., 2004; Yin et al., 2005). 
 
To conclude, our present results suggest that different brain areas are involved in encoding 
different kinds of information about responses and outcomes, consistent with a differential 
role for these regions in goal-directed and habitual learning and control. Whereas cortical 
areas, including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
alongside the anterior dorsomedial striatum, contained associative information about the 
identities of both responses and outcomes necessary for goal-directed control, the 
dorsolateral striatum contained only information about stimuli and responses, which would 
be sufficient for habitual but not goal-directed control. 
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Figures 
Figure 6, Task structure. 
 
Figure 6. a) Task structure. Subjects performed a binary decision task. One of two possible 
initial stimuli (INITSTIM) was presented which determined the subsequent deterministic 
action-outcome contingencies between two possible actions and two possible outcome states. 
Outcome states were denoted by either a blue circle or a red square and were followed after 
a short delay by one of two distributions of monetary rewards (large or small). Crucially, 
each possible combination of stimulus, action, and outcome was permuted across sessions, 
thereby ensuring that the identity of the stimulus, or the value of the monetary reward per se, 
does not get conflated with action identity or outcome identity, which are the critical 
variables being examined in the present study. b) Time-span analysis. The aim of this 
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analysis was to identify ROIs containing “preplayed” action and outcome state 
representations which may be contributing to action control. In the example presented 
(ACTION->INITSTIM), this would require an action representation which is present at the 
time of action performance to be encoded at the time of the initial stimulus presentation. 
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Figure 7, Goal-directed, S-O, R-O, and S-R representations. 
 
Figure 7. a) Right dlPFC encoded both action and outcome representations at the time of the 
initial stimulus presentation (conjunction analysis, x=60, y=17, z=34, t(18)=3.47). b) vmPFC 
encoded action at the time of initial stimulus presentation and outcome information at the 
time of action performance (conjunction, x=3, y=53, z=-20, t(18)=5.54). c) Bar plot depicts 
accuracy score distributions in an independently defined dlPFC ROI. This score is the 
decoding accuracy minus 0.5, which is the expected accuracy of a random algorithm.  * 
indicates significance at p<0.05, **p<0.005. d) Bar plot depicts accuracy score distributions 
for vmPFC, ***p<0.0005. 
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Figure 8, Habitual, S-R associations. 
 
Figure 8. a) A region of DLS (posterior putamen), extending into the globus pallidus (GP) 
was found to encode information about the action to be performed at the time of initial 
stimulus presentation (p < 0.05 SVFWE, x=-27, y=-22, z=7, t(18)=3.24), but critically no 
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significant information about outcome. b) The distribution of accuracy scores for actions and 
outcomes at the time of initial stimulus in an independently defined putamen/GP region-of-
interest, ***p<0.0005. 
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Figure 9. Integrated stimulus-action representations. 
 
Figure 9. Integrated stimulus-action representations were localized in DMS (anterior caudate 
nucleus) (p<0.05SVFWE, x=15, y=11, z=22, t(18)=4.16) and hippocampus 
(p<0.05SVFWE, x=24, y=-1, z=-20, t(18)=4.35). 
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Figure 10. Behavioral performance, decision variable orthogonalization, RT/MVPA 
correlations. 
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Figure 10. a) Percentage of sub-optimal choices, the median percentage of sub-optimal 
choices across subjects was 8.9% (mean 10.03, S.E.M. 1.83) corresponding to 1.42 incorrect 
choices per session on average (16 trials per session). One outlier subject did not respond 
optimally on 39.06% of trials. b) The average Spearman correlation between combinations 
of decision variables across subjects was 2x10-5, 1x10-3, and 2x10-4, respectively, indicating 
that the classifier could not erroneously decode one decision variable based on correlated 
representations of another. c) We performed linear regressions based on the average 
decoding accuracies in ROIs with significant time-span decoding of ACTION at INITSTIM. 
We hypothesized that the strength of the multivoxel representation would correlate with 
response times in ROIs which causally contribute to response selection (Picard, Matsuzaka, 
& Strick, 2013). RLM denotes “robust linear regression”, OLM denotes “ordinary linear 
regression”. Due to the discrepancy between the regression p-values for putamen we ran a 
bootstrap analysis in order to empirically generate regression slope distributions for 
significant ROIs. This analysis strongly indicated that decoding accuracies in the putamen 
significantly explained reaction times and confirmed the results for the other ROIs. d) Linear 
regressions between reaction times and OUTCOME time-span decoding at INITSTIM. 
dlPFC was the only region with a significant correlation between decoding accuracy and 
response time. There was also a significant anti-correlation between SMA decoding accuracy 
and response time. Note that all accuracy scores are averaged within an independently 
defined ROI and subtracted from expected performance of a randomized algorithm (0.5). 
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Tables 
Table 1. Experimental conditions. 
Condition INITSTIM ACTION OUTCOME REWARD 
1 S1 A1 Red High 
 S1 A2 Blue Low 
 S2 A1 Red Low 
 S2 A2 Blue High 
2 S1 A1 Blue Low 
 S1 A2 Red High 
 S2 A1 Blue High 
 S2 A2 Red Low 
3 S1 A1 Blue High 
 S1 A2 Red Low 
 S2 A1 Blue Low 
 S2 A2 Red High 
4 S1 A1 Red Low 
 S1 A2 Blue High 
 S2 A1 Red High 
 S2 A2 Blue Low 
Table 1. Illustration of the experimental conditions describing the permutation across 
sessions. (S1,S2) stimuli indicating initial stimulus; (A1,A2) button press and tracker ball 
actions. Note that the order of presentation of the experimental conditions was also permuted 
across participants. 
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Table 2. Regions of interest (ROIs). 
Region Coordinates Source 
dlPFC (48,9,36) (Glascher et al., 2010) 
vmPFC (-3,41,-11) (McNamee et al., 2013) 
cOFC (21,38,-11) (McNamee et al., 2013) 
Caudate (anterior) (6,10,20) (Tanaka et al., 2008) 
Putamen/GP (posterior) (-33,-24,0) (E. Tricomi et al., 2009) 
Hippocampus (18,-6,-20) (-34,-14,-18) (Simon & Daw, 2011) 
   
PPI Analysis Only   
Thalamus WFU PickAtlas mask (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, 
& Burdette, 2003) 
Motor Cortex WFU PickAtlas mask (Maldjian et al., 2003) 
Table 2. dlPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; 
cOFC, central orbitofrontal cortex; GP, globus pallidus. Correction was performed within a 
10mm-radius sphere surrounding the corresponding coordinates. 
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Supplementary Figures 
Supplementary Figure 7. Reaction time permutation tests. 
 
Supplementary Figure 7. In order to clarify the discrepancy between the conclusions of the 
robust and ordinary linear regression analyses for the putamen ROI (Figure 10), we 
empirically generated a slope distributed via bootstrapping. This involved randomly drawing 
accuracy/RT pairs with replacement (1000 samples) and computing the corresponding 
regression slope. The fraction of slope values less than zero provided a one-sided non-
parametric one-sided test of the significance of the regression. 
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Supplementary Figure 8. Decoding action at the time of outcome. 
 
Supplementary Figure 8. Here, we use time-shift decoding (as opposed to time-span 
decoding; see Methods). Results of the ACTION@OUTCOME analysis. Action was 
represented in caudate tail (x=-21, y=-37, z=13, t(18)=4.39) at the time of OUTCOME but 
not at the ACTION or INITSTIM timepoints. 
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Supplementary Figure 9. INITSTIM representations in parietal cortex. 
 
Supplementary Figure 9. INITSTIM representation in parietal cortex (x=27, y=-76, z=49, 
t(18) = 4.95). 
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Supplementary Tables 
Supplementary Table 1. Sub-optimal choice logistic regression. 
No. Observations 3648      
Df Residuals 3641      
Df Model  6      
Log-Likelihood  -1150.3      
LL-Null  -1188.5      
LLR p-value  1.98E-14      
      
      Independent Variable                Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95.0% Conf. Int.] 
Constant                 -1.6365 0.389 -4.211 0 -2.398    -0.875 
Timepoint 
(timepoint within a session)         0.0009 0.003 0.334 0.739 -0.005     0.006 
Value 
(previous outcome value)                  
-0.0118 
 
0.042 
 
-0.281 
 
0.779 
 
-0.094     0.071 
 
Switch 
(compared to previous choice)                
1.1545 
 
0.379 
 
3.047 
 
0.002 
 
0.412     1.897 
 
Switch x Value -0.1494 0.045 -3.324 0.001 -0.238    -0.061 
Timepoint x Value        -0.0005 0 -1.63 0.103 -0.001     0.000 
Timepoint x Switch x Value 9.94E-05 0 0.526 0.599 -0.000     0.000 
The binary dependent variable was an indicator of when a sub-optimal choice was made. The 
only significant coefficients of interest were those corresponding to the “Switch” and 
“Switch x Value” interaction. The “Switch” variable was a binary indicator of when a 
different choice was made compared to the previous. The “Value” variable encoded the 
monetary sum earned on the previous trial. Thus, the negative coefficient of the “Switch x 
Value” interaction variable indicates that subjects made sub-optimal choices in order to not 
repeat an action that had resulted in a relatively low outcome on the previous trial. 
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C h a p t e r  4  
MODEL-BASED SIGNALING IN THE HUMAN AMYGDALA DURING 
PAVLOVIAN CONDITIONING3 
Contemporary computational accounts of instrumental-conditioning have emphasized a role 
for a model-based system in which values are computed with reference to a rich model of 
the structure of the world, and a model-free system in which values are updated without 
encoding such structure. Much less studied is the possibility of a similar distinction operating 
at the level of Pavlovian conditioning. In the present study, we scanned human participants 
with fMRI while they participated in a Pavlovian conditioning task with a simple structure. 
Fitting a model-based algorithm and a variety of model free algorithms, we found evidence 
at both behavioral and neural levels to support a role for a model-based as opposed to a 
model-free learning process in the amygdala. These findings support an important role for 
model-based algorithms in describing the processes underpinning Pavlovian conditioning, as 
well as providing evidence of a role for the human amygdala in model-based inference. 
3 Adapted with permission from (Prévost, McNamee, Jessup, Bossaerts, & O'Doherty, 2013). Data acquisition and fMRI 
data analysis performed by Charlotte Prévost. 
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Introduction 
Neural computations mediating instrumental conditioning are suggested to depend on two 
distinct mechanisms: a “model-based” reinforcement learning system, in which the value of 
actions is computed on the basis of a rich knowledge of the states of the world and the nature 
of the transitions between states, and a “model-free” reinforcement learning system, in which 
action-values are updated incrementally via a reward prediction error without using a rich 
representation of the structure of the decision problem (Corrado & Doya, 2007; N. D. Daw, 
Y. Niv, & P. Dayan, 2005; P. Dayan & Daw, 2008; P. Dayan, Kakade, & Montague, 2000; 
Doya, Samejima, Katagiri, & Kawato, 2002; Gershman, Blei, & Niv, 2010). Accumulating 
evidence supports the existence of model-based representations during instrumental 
conditioning in a number of brain regions, including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
striatum, and parietal cortex (N. D. Daw et al., 2011; Glascher et al., 2010; A. N. Hampton 
et al., 2006). However, instrumental conditioning is not the only associative learning 
mechanism in which model-based computations might play a role.  
Pavlovian conditioning can also be framed as a model-based learning process, in which the 
animal begins with a model of the possible structure of the world: the stimuli within it, and 
sets of possible contingencies that could exist between conditioned stimuli and 
unconditioned stimuli, as well as assumptions about how these contingencies might change 
over time. In essence, learning within such a system corresponds to determining the statistical 
evidence for which structure out of the set of possible causal structures best describes the 
environment, as well as determining whether or when the relevant causal processes have 
changed as a function of time. Model-based approaches to classical conditioning to date have 
used Bayesian methods to yield inference over structure (A. C. Courville, Daw, & Touretzky, 
2006). 
Very little is known about the extent to which such model-based algorithms are implemented 
in the brain during Pavlovian conditioning. The aim of the present study was to address this 
question using computational fMRI. Human participants were scanned while undergoing a 
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Pavlovian conditioning procedure with a sufficiently complex structure to enable the 
predictions of model-based and model-free algorithms to be compared and contrasted (see 
Figure 11). We then constructed a Bayesian algorithm incorporating a model of the structure 
of the learning problem and compared the predictions of this algorithm against two widely 
adopted “model-free” algorithms for Pavlovian conditioning: the Rescorla-Wagner (RW) 
learning rule (Rescorla, 1972) and the Pearce-Hall (PH) learning rule (J. M. Pearce & G. 
Hall, 1980).  
In order to test for model-based signals in the brain we focused on the amygdala, a structure 
heavily implicated in Pavlovian conditioning in both animal and human studies (Buchel & 
Dolan, 2000; Delgado, Olsson, & Phelps, 2006; Fanselow & LeDoux, 1999; Johansen, Cain, 
Ostroff, & LeDoux, 2011). To obtain signals from this region with sufficient fidelity, we 
used a high-resolution fMRI protocol in which we acquired images with more than 4 times 
the resolution of a standard 3mm isotropic scan, alongside an amygdala specific 
normalization procedure (Prevost et al., 2011). We hypothesized that the model-based 
algorithm would account better for both behavioral and fMRI data acquired during both the 
appetitive and aversive conditioning phases than would the models of Pavlovian conditioning 
which do not contain such structured knowledge. 
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Results 
Behavioral results 
Affective ratings for the liquid outcomes 
Subjects were asked to give subjective ratings of the pleasant and neutral tasting liquids 
before and after the appetitive session and of the unpleasant and neutral tasting liquids before 
and after the aversive session. The pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant tasting liquids 
(unconditioned stimuli or USs) were reported to be highly pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant 
by subjects as indicated by their ratings averaged across before and after conditioning (Figure 
12a). There was no significant difference in the pleasantness ratings of any of the liquid 
outcomes before and after conditioning (paired t-tests, all p>0.05). 
 
Revealed preference rankings for the cue stimuli 
Subjects made binary preferences between the visual cues used in the conditioning protocols 
before and after the experiment (Figure 12b). Subjects showed increased preference rankings 
for the cues displayed in the appetitive session (averaging across both CS+ and CS- cues as 
both were paired with reward and neutral outcomes over the course of the experiment due to 
the reversal) after as compared to before the experiment (p<0.001). Furthermore, the set of 
cues used in the aversive sessions showed a significant decrease in their relative preference 
rankings (p<0.001). Preference rankings for the control cues (cues not included in either the 
appetitive or aversive conditioning sessions) showed no significant changes from before to 
after the experiment. These results indicate that while the cues displayed in the appetitive 
session have acquired an increased positive value, those displayed in the aversive session 
have acquired a negative value indicating that subjects showed a modulation in their affective 
responses to the cue stimuli as a function of the context in which these stimuli had been 
conditioning (appetitive vs aversive). 
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Pleasantness ratings for the cue stimuli 
We also obtained pleasantness ratings from subjects while in the scanner during the 
conditioning procedure. In the middle of the appetitive session, a few trials after a new pair 
of cues was presented, subjects rated the cue paired with the pleasant liquid significantly 
higher than the cue paired with the neutral liquid (p<0.01) (Figure 12c). Subjective ratings 
were obtained at the end of the appetitive session, hence following reversal of the last pair of 
cues, and although they still rated the cue paired with the pleasant liquid higher than the one 
paired with the neutral liquid, this difference was not significant. Similarly, in the aversive 
session, the cue paired with the unpleasant liquid was rated significantly higher than the cue 
paired with the neutral liquid a few trials after a novel pair of cue was presented (p<0.01) but 
not after a reversal had occurred (Figure 12d). 
 
Heart rate  
Participants’ pulse rate (an estimation of heart rate) was monitored using a pulse oximeter 
for the duration of the experiment. Existing research on heart rate responses to significant 
stimuli has identified an initial bradycardia associated with more aversive stimuli (Libby, 
Lacey, & Lacey, 1973). This deceleration is thought to express attentional orienting to salient 
events through parasympathetic activity (Bradley, 2009). Aversive trials were associated 
with a more pronounced cardiac deceleration (as assessed by the number of beats) compared 
to appetitive trials during anticipation, in a time window of 1.5-3.5s following stimulus onset, 
as reported elsewhere (Nicotra, Critchley, Mathias, & Dolan, 2006) (paired t-test, p<0.01). 
Such physiological changes signal a more aversive emotional state for aversive as compared 
to appetitive trials, thereby reflecting a differential heart-rate conditioned response in the 
aversive relative to the appetitive conditioning trials. 
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Respiration 
When analyzing respiration signals, we found that in the aversive condition, subjects learned 
to inspire before cue offset and expire at the time of the aversive liquid delivery. In contrast, 
subjects expired before cue offset and inspired at the time of the appetitive liquid delivery in 
the appetitive condition. The amplitudes between the appetitive and aversive conditions were 
significantly different both before cue offset (3.5s) and at the time of liquid delivery (4.5s) 
(p<0.05). However, note that these results need to be interpreted with caution because they 
do not survive multiple comparisons across all time windows tested.  
 
Pupil dilation and blinking 
We also recorded pupil diameter, an automatic measure of arousal previously shown to 
provide a measure of conditioning (Bitsios, Szabadi, & Bradshaw, 2004; Bray, Rangel, 
Shimojo, Balleine, & O'Doherty, 2008; Seymour, Daw, Dayan, Singer, & Dolan, 2007). We 
found a significantly smaller amplitude in pupil diameter for trials where the cue was 
predictive of the pleasant liquid (appetitive condition) as compared to trials where the cue 
was predictive of the neutral liquid (neutral condition) (p<0.05) in a time window of 0.8-1.5s 
after cue onset where amplitude changes in pupil diameter have previously been reported 
(Seymour et al., 2007) in the 10 subjects from which we obtained pupil amplitude measures 
(Figure 12e). A higher degree of arousal (significantly smaller peak amplitude) would have 
been equally expected when subjects saw cues predictive of the aversive liquid; however, 
reliable analysis of amplitude in pupil diameter for these trials was prevented by the 
prolonged blinking elicited by these aversive cues. Given that blinking is also a conditioned 
response, we looked for evidence of blinking in the aversive condition as opposed to the 
neutral condition. We found significant differences between the aversive and neutral 
conditions during the first second after cue onset and the last second before cue offset (paired 
t-tests, p<0.05) as well as at the time of liquid delivery and swallowing (paired t-tests, 
p<0.01). 
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Model comparison on behavioral data using reaction times. 
We used Bayesian information criterion (BIC) to compare the model goodness of the HMM 
against the baseline model and the model-free algorithms on the basis of trial by trial 
variation in reaction times. We found that the HMM model fit better than each of the other 
models including the baseline model, indicating that this model was providing the best 
account of trial by trial variation in conditioning as reflected in reaction times. On the other 
hand, neither the RW nor the PH learning rules provided a better fit to the data than did the 
baseline model, suggesting that these algorithms cannot account for changes in reaction time 
as a function of conditioning any better than a random actor (Table 3 and Table 4). The 
normalized RT data is shown plotted against the value signal predictions of the HMM model 
in Figure 12f,g, indicating that RTs become slower under situations where the cue presented 
is associated with a stronger prediction of an aversive outcome in the aversive condition, and 
become faster as cues are associated with a stronger prediction of an appetitive outcome in 
the appetitive condition. 
 
fMRI results 
We report results from our analyses from our model-based learning algorithm (the HMM 
model) within the amygdala using a height threshold of p<0.005, with an extent threshold 
significant at p<0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons. We first report expected value 
signals because these signals are generated by both our model-based and model-free learning 
algorithms and can therefore be easily compared. However, note that finding neural evidence 
for precision signals is an even more critical test for model-based computations in this task, 
as such signals can only be generated by our model-based learning algorithm. 
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Expected value signals 
We first investigated BOLD activity in the amygdala correlating with expected value (EV) 
signals at the time of cue presentation (see Figure 13 a for an illustration of EV signals). In 
the appetitive session, we found significant activity positively correlating with expected 
value in the medial part of the right amygdala, corresponding to the basolateral complex 
(Figure 14a in green, MNI [x y z] [10 -10 -18], T = 6.29, k=28 voxels). In the aversive 
session, activity positively correlating with expected value was found in the centromedial 
complex of the left amygdala (Figure 14a in red, [x y z] [-27 -2 -9], T = 5.63, k=44 voxels; 
[x y z] [-17 -15 -14], T = 5.41, k=69 voxels), such that the greater the activity in these areas, 
the less an aversive outcome is predicted to occur. We also looked for areas correlating 
negatively with EV in both the appetitive and aversive sessions, that is, areas showing an 
increase in activity the less a positive outcome was predicted to occur given the cue. We did 
not find evidence for such activity in the amygdala in either the appetitive or the aversive 
session at our statistical threshold. 
 
Precision signals 
Next, we examined amygdala activity correlating positively with precision or else correlating 
negatively with precision during both the appetitive and aversive sessions (see Figure 13b 
for an illustration of precision signals). While no significant negative correlation was found 
with precision, we did find significant correlations with precision signals during both the 
appetitive and aversive sessions within our centromedial complex ROI (appetitive session: 
[x y z] [25 -1 -10], T = 4.12, k=44; aversive session: [x y z] [27 -5 -10], T = 5.31, k=115; [x 
y z] [18 -2 -16], T = 4.75, k=44) (Figure 15a). To test whether there was a significant overlap 
between these clusters in the appetitive and aversive sessions, we performed a formal 
conjunction analysis (at our omnibus threshold of p<0.005 with a cluster extent of p<0.05). 
In this contrast we found a common area activated by precision signals in the appetitive and 
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aversive sessions in the centromedial complex of the amygdala ([x y z] [24 -4 -9], T = 3.52, 
k=23) (Figure 15c). 
 
Model comparison on BOLD data 
In order to determine whether BOLD activity in the amygdala is better accounted for by the 
HMM than by the model-free learning algorithms, we performed a Bayesian Model Selection 
(BMS) analysis. The expected value contrasts from our “model-based” Hidden state Markov 
switching model (HMM) and the “model-free” Rescorla-Wagner (RW) and Pearce-Hall 
(PH) models were used to compare BOLD activity in the amygdala separately for the 
aversive and appetitive sessions. In this model comparison, we included voxels within a 4mm 
sphere centered on the peak voxels of amygdala activities correlating with either expected 
value signals for the ‘model-based’ HMM or expected value signals for the model-free 
algorithm using the leave-one-out method, thereby avoiding a non-independence bias in the 
voxel selection. We found that the model-based HMM outperformed both model-free 
algorithms with an exceedance probability of 0.94 (posterior probability = 0.64) for the 
aversive session and of 0.93 (posterior probability = 0.55) for the appetitive session.  
We also performed a similar BMS to discriminate between our “model-based” HMM and a 
simpler version of this HMM which uses Bayesian updating but does so in a manner 
resembling a more “model-free” algorithm. The essential difference between these two 
HMMs is that the “model-based” HMM does not allow for a reversal without moving from 
a non-reversal state to a possible reversal state. Note that the expected reward signals 
generated by these two HMMs are highly correlated, whereas the precision values are not. 
Hence, we compared neural activity within the contrasts showing activity positively 
correlating with precision signals including voxels within a 4mm sphere centered on the peak 
voxels of the amygdalar activities correlating either with precision signals for the “model-
based” HMM or the ‘’model-free’’ HMM using the leave-one-out method, thereby avoiding 
a non-independence bias in the voxel selection. We found that activity was better explained 
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by precision signals estimated by the “model-based” HMM in both the aversive and 
appetitive sessions (aversive session: exceedance probability=0.99; appetitive session: 
exceedance probability=0.57). 
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Discussion 
In this study, we used a Pavlovian conditioning task with a rudimentary higher-order 
structure in both appetitive and aversive domains to investigate whether neural activity in the 
human amygdala reflects learning that requires access to model-based representations. By 
comparing neural activity correlating with expected value signals generated by model-based 
versus model-free learning algorithms using a Bayesian model selection (BMS) procedure, 
we have been able to show that in at least some parts of the human amygdala, activity during 
Pavlovian conditioning is better accounted for by a model-based rather than a model-free 
algorithm. 
One of the critical distinctions between the model-free and model-based learning algorithms 
in the present study is that while the expected value of a stimulus previously paired with the 
unpleasant outcome is still low following reversal of contingencies, because that was the 
value it had before reversal in a model-free system, the expected value of this stimulus will 
become high in a model-based system because it incorporates the knowledge that after a 
reversal stimulus values switch (i.e., there is full resolution of uncertainty when a reversal 
occurs). We have captured model-based representations in formal terms using an elementary 
Bayesian Hidden Markov computational model that incorporates the task structure (by 
encoding the inverse relationship between the cues and featuring a known probability that 
the contingencies will reverse). 
Our behavioral analysis demonstrated that participants showed evidence of conditioned 
responses to the conditioned stimuli and thus successfully learnt the associations between the 
different cues and outcomes. In a trial-by-trial analysis in which we correlated reaction times 
against the model predictions, we found that the HMM model predicted changes in reaction 
times over time as a function of learning better than the model-free alternatives, and that 
indeed the model-free algorithms did not predict variation in reaction times significantly 
better than chance.  
 
132 
 
In the imaging data, we found trial-by-trial positive correlations of model-based expected 
values in an area consistent with the basolateral complex of the amygdala according to the 
Mai atlas in the appetitive session, and in areas in the likely vicinity of the centromedial 
complex in the aversive session (Mai, Paxinos, & Voss, 2008). It is interesting to note that 
activity in these same areas (i.e., basolateral versus centromedial complex) has been found 
to correlate with expected value signals generated by a simple RW model in a recent reward 
versus avoidance instrumental learning task (in an appetitive versus aversive context 
respectively) (Prevost et al., 2011). Using a BMS procedure, we found that amygdala activity 
correlating with expected value was better explained by model-based rather than model-free 
learning algorithms. Whereas the model-free system has received considerable attention in 
the past (J. P. O'Doherty, A. Hampton, & H. Kim, 2007), the more sophisticated and flexible 
model-based system has been more sparsely studied particularly in relation to its role in 
Pavlovian learning. Thus, our results point to the need for integrating model-based 
representations and their rich adaptability into our understanding of Pavlovian conditioning 
in general, and of the role of the amygdala in implementing this learning process in particular. 
 Another important feature of the model-based algorithm featured in this study is that as well 
as keeping track of expected value, this model also keeps track of the degree of precision in 
the prediction of expected value over the course of learning. This precision starts off low at 
the beginning of a learning session with a new stimulus because the expected value 
computation is very uncertain at this juncture, but once outcomes are experienced in response 
to specific cues, the precision in the estimate quickly increases. However, this precision 
lessens again as the trial progresses because a reversal in the contingencies is increasingly 
expected to occur (hence the expected value becomes more and more uncertain). Signals 
correlating with precision were found to be located in the vicinity of the centromedial 
complex in both the appetitive and aversive sessions. Precision signals might play an 
important role in the directing of attentional resources toward stimuli in the environment. 
The presence of a precision signal in the centromedial amygdala in the present paradigm 
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could be a key computational signal underpinning the putative role of this structure in 
directing attention and orienting toward affectively significant stimuli. 
The presence of a precision-related signal in the amygdala during Pavlovian conditioning 
may relate to other findings in which the amygdala has been suggested to play a role in 
“associability”, as implemented in a model-free algorithm such as the Pearce-Hall learning 
rule (Li et al., 2011; Roesch, Calu, Esber, & Schoenbaum, 2010). Associability as defined in 
such a model is essentially a model free computation of uncertainty, the inverse of precision: 
associability is maximal when the absolute value difference between expected and actual 
rewards is greatest. However, in our case, an associability signal is clearly distinct from the 
signal we observe in the amygdala in the centromedial complex (even leaving aside the fact 
the signal we found is negatively as opposed to positively correlated with uncertainty). First 
of all, because the signal in our HMM is model-based, it changes to reflect anticipated 
changes in task structure (such as a reversal), whereas Pearce-Hall associability does not 
change to reflect anticipated changes in task structure, rather, both change only reflexively 
once contingencies have reversed. The model-based nature of our signal was confirmed by 
comparing the precision signal generated by the model-based algorithm with that generated 
by a model-free version of our Hidden-Markov Model: activity in the amygdala was best 
accounted for by the precision signal generated by the model-based algorithm. Note that 
although this BMS comparison provided clear evidence in the aversive session, the evidence 
was much weaker in the appetitive session, in which case interpretation in favor of either 
model is difficult. However, it is interesting to note that ‘aversive’ precision signals in the 
amygdala were better accounted for by a model-based learning algorithm given the 
traditional view of the amygdala being associated with aversive processing, although this 
view has been considerably challenged in the past few years (Baxter & Murray, 2002; 
Murray, 2007).  
Finally, we checked the correlation between the precision signal we found here and an 
associability signal generated by the Pearce-Hall learning rule, and we found the correlation 
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between these signals to be essentially negligible (with r ranging from -0.06 to -0.14), as 
opposed to being strongly negatively or positively correlated, as would be anticipated were 
these signals to tap similar underlying processes.  
The fact that in the present study we found model-based signals in the amygdala does indicate 
that this structure is capable of performing model-based inference even during Pavlovian 
conditioning. However, it is important to note that the findings of the present study do not 
rule out a role for this structure in model-free computations during Pavlovian conditioning. 
Indeed, while the model-free learning rules we used did not work very well in accounting for 
behavior on the task (as indexed by changes in reaction times), we did find some evidence 
(albeit weakly) of model-free value signals in the amygdala as generated by either a Rescorla-
Wagner or Pearce-Hall learning rule. Indeed, while using our HMM model we did not find 
evidence for aversive-going expected value signals in the aversive session (i.e., by showing 
an increase in activity the more the unpleasant tasting liquid was expected), we did find such 
a signal correlating with expected value as computed by a Pearce-Hall learning rule. As a 
consequence, we cannot rule out a contribution for the amygdala in model-free computations. 
It is important to note however, that in many tasks in which neuronal activity was found in 
the amygdala to correlate with the predictions of model-free learning algorithms (Elliott, 
Newman, Longe, & William Deakin, 2004; A. N. Hampton, Adolphs, Tyszka, & O'Doherty, 
2007; Prevost et al., 2011; Yacubian et al., 2006), such tasks were either not set up to 
discriminate the predictions of model-free versus model-based learning rules, or else the 
relevant model comparisons were not performed. Thus, it is entirely feasible that many of 
the computations found in the amygdala in previous studies correspond more closely to 
model-based as opposed to model-free learning signals. More generally, if indeed, both 
model-based and model-free signals are present in the amygdala during Pavlovian 
conditioning, then an important question for future research will be to address how and when 
these signals interact with each other. 
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To conclude, we have found in the present study evidence for the existence of model-based 
learning signals in the human amygdala during performance of a Pavlovian conditioning task 
with a simple task structure. These findings provide an important new perspective into the 
functions of the amygdala by suggesting that this structure may participate in model-based 
computations in which abstract knowledge of the structure of the world is taken into account 
when computing signals leading to the elicitation of Pavlovian conditioned responses. The 
findings also resonate with an emerging theme in the neurobiology of reinforcement learning 
whereby value signals are suggested to be computed via two mechanisms: a model-based 
and a model-free approach (P. Dayan & Daw, 2008; Doya et al., 2002). Whereas up to now, 
theoretical and experimental work on this distinction has tended to be focused on the domain 
of instrumental conditioning (N. D. Daw et al., 2005; Glascher et al., 2010; A. N. Hampton 
et al., 2006), the present study illustrates how similar principles may well apply even at the 
level of Pavlovian conditioning. Thus the distinction between model-based and model-free 
learning systems may apply at a much more general level across multiple types of associative 
learning in the brain. Furthermore, the present results provide evidence that model-based 
computations may be present not only in prefrontal cortex and striatum, but also in other 
brain structures such as the amygdala. 
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Materials and Methods 
Subjects 
Nineteen right-handed subjects (8 females) with a mean age of 22.21 ± 3.47 participated in 
the study. All subjects were free of neurological or psychiatric disorders and had normal or 
correct-to-normal vision. Written informed consent was obtained from all subjects, and the 
study was approved by the Trinity College School of Psychology research ethics committee.  
Task Description 
Subjects participated in a Pavlovian task where they had to learn associations between 
different cues (fractal images) and a pleasant (blackcurrant juice [Ribena, Glaxo-Smithkline, 
UK]), affectively neutral (artificial saliva made of 25mM KCl and 2.5 mM NaHCO3), or 
unpleasant (salty tea made of 2 black tea bags and 29g of salt per liter) flavor liquid. The task 
consisted of two sessions lasting approximately 22 minutes each. Each session was 
composed of 120 trials, leading to a total of 240 trials. In one of the sessions, subjects 
underwent an appetitive Pavlovian conditioning procedure whereby they were presented 
with cues leading to the subsequent delivery of either the pleasant flavor, or the affectively 
neutral one, while in the other aversive conditioning session subjects underwent an aversive 
conditioning procedure whereby they were presented with cues leading to the subsequent 
delivery of either the unpleasant flavor stimulus, or else the affectively neutral stimulus. The 
rationale for including the appetitive and aversive conditioning procedures in separate 
sessions as opposed to including both conditions intermixed within the same sessions was to 
avoid contrast effects observed in prior behavioral piloting whereby cues signaling the 
aversive outcome tended to overwhelm cues signaling the pleasant one such that both the 
pleasant and the neutral cue stimuli were viewed as relief stimuli (contrasted against the 
aversive outcome) (Seymour et al., 2005). Performing the appetitive and aversive 
conditioning procedures in separate sessions ensured robust behavioral conditioning in both 
the appetitive and aversive cases and largely avoided contrast effects between the appetitive 
and aversive conditions.  
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For both sessions, on each trial a cue was displayed randomly on either the left or right side 
of a fixation cross for 4 seconds. Following a well-established Pavlovian conditioning 
protocol (Gottfried, O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2002, 2003; J. O'Doherty et al., 2004), subjects 
were also instructed to indicate on which side of the screen the cue was presented by means 
of pressing the laterally corresponding button on a response box, yet they were also instructed 
that the subsequent outcomes were not contingent on their responses. This serves two 
purposes: it allows one to monitor the extent to which participants are paying attention to the 
cues on each trial, as well as offering a response time measure which can serve as an index 
of conditioning. The offset of the cue (after 4 secs) was followed by delivery of one of the 
liquid flavor stimuli with a probability of 0.6, or else no liquid stimulus was delivered. The 
next trial was triggered following a variable 2-11 secs inter-trial interval.  
At the beginning of each session, subjects were presented with two novel fractal cues (not 
seen before in the course of the experiment): which we will denote as cue 1 and cue 2. In the 
appetitive session, cue 1 predicted the subsequent presentation of the pleasant liquid 60% of 
the time (or no liquid delivery 40% of the time), while in the aversive session cue 1 predicted 
the delivery of the aversive liquid 60% of the time (or no liquid delivery 40% of the time). 
cue 1 and cue 2 trials were presented in a randomly intermixed order. After 16 trials (8 trials 
of each type), a reversal of the cue-outcome associations was set to occur with a probability 
of 0.25 on each subsequent trial. The probabilistic triggering of the reversal after the 16th 
trial ensured that the onset of the reversal was not fully predictable by subjects. Once a 
reversal was triggered, cue 1 no longer predicted the appetitive or aversive outcome but 
instead was associated with delivery of the neutral outcome, while cue 2 now predicted the 
appetitive or aversive outcome. After another 16 trials (8 trials of each type) following the 
onset of the reversal, another event was triggered to occur with probability 0.25 on one of 
the subsequent trials: this time instead of a reversal, a completely novel pair of stimuli was 
introduced. One of these, cue 3, was now paired with the appetitive or aversive outcome, 
while cue 4 was now paired with the neutral outcome. These new cues were presented for a 
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further 16 trials, and followed again after a probabilistic trigger of p=0.25 on each subsequent 
trial with a reversal of the associations. After the reversal, a new set of cues was introduced 
according to the same probabilistic rule and this was followed again by a reversal. Thus in 
total, 3 unique pairs of stimuli were used in each session and each of these pairs underwent 
a single reversal (Figure 11a,b). A completely different set of cues was used for each session, 
so that subjects experienced a total of 6 pairs of fractal stimuli throughout the whole 
experiment. 
Within each session, the presentation order of the affective and neutral cue presentations was 
randomized throughout, with the one constraint being that the cue predicting the neutral 
tasting liquid delivery had to be delivered twice every four trials. This ensured that the 
appetitive and neutral cues, and aversive and neutral cues, were approximately evenly 
distributed in their presentation throughout the appetitive and aversive sessions, respectively. 
All fractal images were matched for luminance. The order of the sessions was 
counterbalanced across subjects so that half of the subjects started the experiment with the 
appetitive session and half of the subjects with the aversive session. 
Subject Instructions 
Before the conditioning session, subjects received the following task instructions: 
“In each trial, an image will appear on the screen and may be followed by some liquid 
delivery. There are six different images per session. Each image will lead to either a pleasant, 
neutral, or unpleasant tasting liquid. You will have to learn these associations. However, 
during the experiment, this may change (or reverse), making image 1 associated with the 
liquid of image 2 and image 2 associated with the liquid of image 1. This reversal may 
actually happen more than once during the experiment and you have to fully pay attention 
and realize that it has happened. These cues may change during the experiment, so that you 
will have to learn these associations again with these new cues (which may also reverse). 
At the beginning of each trial, the image will either appear on the left or right side of the 
screen. You will have to press the left button of the response pad if the image appears on the 
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left side, or the right button if it appears on the right side. It is important that you press the 
button because we need to record your response times, although the trial will carry on if you 
don't press any button. 
At the beginning and end of each session, we will ask you to rate different images and liquids. 
You will also have to rate these images in the middle of each session.” 
Apparatus 
The pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant tasting liquids were delivered by means of three 
separate electronic syringe pumps positioned in the scanner control room. These pumps 
pushed 1 mL of liquid to the subject’s mouth via ~10 m long polyethylene plastic tubes, the 
other end of which were held between the subject’s lips like a straw, while they lay supine 
in the scanner. 
Behavioral Measures 
Affective evaluations of the fractal images and liquids 
Participants were asked to provide subjective ratings indicating their perceived subjective 
hedonic evaluation for each of the 6 pairs of fractal images that were displayed. This was 
done during the experiment before each session, in the middle of each session (during the 
scanning), and at the end of each session by presenting a picture of the fractal alongside an 
instruction to rate the fractal for its pleasantness on a scale going from 1 (do not like at all) 
to 4 (strongly like). These ratings could therefore provide a behavioral measure of evaluative 
conditioning (Bray et al., 2008) at three different time points throughout the experiment. 
Furthermore, before and after the appetitive session, the pleasant and neutral liquids were 
rated for their subjective pleasantness using a scale ranging from -5 (very unpleasant) to +5 
(very pleasant), and similarly the aversive and neutral liquids were rated before and after the 
aversive session.  
Preference ranking test 
Before the experiment started and after the experiment was over, participants were asked to 
make binary choices indicating their relative preferences for each of 16 different fractals (12 
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of which were included in the experiment; 6 each in the appetitive and aversive sessions 
respectively, while 4 of the fractals were not featured in either session). Each of the 16 
fractals was paired with each other fractal. This test allowed us to estimate a preference 
ranking for each of the fractals, thereby potentially providing an additional and even more 
direct behavioral metric of evaluative conditioning beyond the pleasantness ratings. 
Pupillary dilation 
Pupil diameter was continuously measured during scanning using an MRI compatible 
integrated goggle and infrared eye tracking system (NordicNeuroLab AS, Bergen, Norway). 
Pupil reflex amplitude has been shown to be modulated by arousal level and can therefore 
be used as a physiological index of conditioning (Bitsios et al., 2004; Bray et al., 2008; 
Seymour et al., 2007). Pupil measurements could not be taken from 9 participants because 
space constraints within the head-coil alongside variations in head size meant that in some 
individuals the eye-tracker could not fit them comfortably. 
Fluctuations in respiration and heart rate 
Estimates of heart rate and respiration were recorded using a pulse oximeter positioned on 
the forefinger of subjects’ left hand and a pressure sensor placed on the umbilical region. The 
time courses derived from these measures were used as a further physiological index of 
conditioning as well as being used separately to remove physiological noise from the fMRI 
data analysis (see fMRI data analysis). 
Data Acquisition 
Functional imaging was performed on a 3T Philips scanner equipped with an 8-channel 
SENSE (sensitivity encoding) head coil. Since the focus of our study was on the amygdala, 
we only acquired partial T2*-weighted images centered to include the amygdala while 
subjects were performing the task. These images also encompassed the ventral part of the 
prefrontal cortex, the ventral striatum, the insula, the hippocampus, the ventral part of the 
occipital lobe and the upper part of the cerebellum (amongst other regions). Nineteen 
contiguous sequential ascending slices of echo-planar T2*-weighted images were acquired 
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in each volume, with a slice thickness of 2.2 mm and a 0.3 mm gap between slices (in-plane 
resolution: 1.58 x 1.63 mm; repetition time (TR): 2000 ms; echo time (TE): 30 ms; field of 
view: 196 x 196 x 47.2 mm; matrix: 128 x 128). A whole-brain high-resolution T1-weighted 
structural scan (voxel size: 0.9 x 0.9 x 0.9 mm) and three whole-brain T2*-weighted images 
were also acquired for each subject. To address the problem of spatial EPI distortions, which 
are particularly prominent in the medial temporal lobe (MTL) and especially in the amygdala, 
we also acquired gradient field maps. To provide a measure of swallowing motion, a motion-
sensitive inductive coil was attached to the subjects’ throat using a Velcro strap. The time 
course derived from this measure was used as a regressor of no interest in the fMRI data 
analysis. Finally, to account for the effects of physiological noise in the fMRI data, subjects’ 
cardiac and respiratory signals were recorded with a pulse oximeter and a pressure sensor 
placed on the umbilical region and further removed from time-series images. We discarded 
the first 3 volumes before data processing and statistical analysis to compensate for the T1 
saturation effects. 
Preprocessing 
All EPI volumes (partial scans acquired while subjects were performing the task and the three 
whole-brain functional scans acquired prior to the experiment) were corrected for differences 
in slice acquisition and spatially realigned. The mean whole-brain EPI was co-registered with 
the T1-weighted structural image, and subsequently, all the ‘partial’ volumes were co-
registered with the registered mean whole-brain EPI image. ‘Partial’ volumes were then 
unwrapped using the gradient field maps. After the structural scan was normalized to a 
standard T1 template, the same transformation was applied to all the ‘partial’ volumes with 
a resampled voxel size of 0.9x0.9x0.9 mm. In order to maximize the spatial resolution of our 
data, no spatial smoothing kernel was applied to the data. These preprocessing steps were 
performed using the statistical parametric mapping software SPM5 (Wellcome Department 
of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). 
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Amygdalae Segmentation 
Amygdalae Regions of Interest (ROIs) were manually segmented for each subject by a single 
observer using a pen tablet (Wacom Intuos3 Graphics Tablet) in FSL View (FSL 4.1.2). This 
program allows magnification and the simultaneous viewing of volumes in coronal, sagittal, 
and horizontal orientations. Amygdalae were manually outlined on each coronal image 
containing the amygdala using detailed tracing guidelines based on the Atlas of the Human 
Brain (Mai et al., 2008). Outlines were checked in horizontal and sagittal planes when they 
proved more valuable for the identification of structure boundaries. The anterior limit of the 
amygdala was defined using the horizontal and sagittal planes. The following guidelines 
were used: in its rostral part, the amygdala is bordered ventromedially by the entorhinal 
cortex, ventrally by the temporal horn of the lateral ventricle and subamygdaloid white 
matter, and laterally by white matter of the temporal lobe. Midrostrocaudally, the amygdala 
increases in size and is bordered ventromedially by a thin tract of white matter separating the 
amygdala and the entorhinal cortex, laterally by the white matter of the temporal lobe, and 
medially by the semiannular sulcus. Caudally, the amygdala is bordered dorsally by the 
substantia innominata and fibers of the anterior commissure, laterally by the putamen, 
ventrally by the temporal horn of the lateral ventricle and the alveus of the hippocampus, and 
medially by the optic tract. 
Amygdalae Normalization 
Because structures in the MTL exhibit significant inter-individual anatomic variability, the 
signal-to-noise ratio in group analyses is substantially limited in this area (Insausti et al., 
1998). Atlas-based approaches used to register whole-brain EPI images across subjects (such 
as SPM) look for a global optimum alignment which is achieved under the limitations 
imposed by the available degrees of freedom, and which is at the expense of regional 
accuracy. Consequently, BOLD signals in the MTL may be underestimated or possibly 
missed (Miller, Beg, Ceritoglu, & Stark, 2005). Alignment of the MTL is substantially 
improved by a ROI-alignment (ROI-AL) approach, where segmentations of regions of 
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interest (ROIs) are drawn on structural images and aligned directly, resulting in an increased 
statistical power (Yassa & Stark, 2009). The last iteration of this alignment tool is ROI-
Demons, which has proven to be exceptionally accurate in the alignment of hippocampal 
subfields, for instance (http://darwin.bio.uci.edu/~cestark/roial/roial.html). Thirion’s 
original demons algorithm has been implemented by Vercauteren and enforces smooth 
deformations by operating on a diffeomorphic space of displacement fields (Thirion, 1998; 
Vercauteren, Pennec, Perchant, & Ayache, 2007). Here, we used the implementation of ROI-
Demons in the DemonsRegistration command-line tool (http://www.insight-
journal.org/browse/publication/154). Our segmented amygdalae ROIs were registered with 
our amygdalae template based on 20 subjects from a previous study (Prevost et al., 2011) to 
serve as an initial model and to align all amygdalae using DemonsRegistration. The resulting 
registered amygdalae were then averaged in SPM5 (using ImCalc) to create a first model. 
Subsequently, the initial non-registered amygdalae were registered with this first model and 
the newly registered amygdalae were averaged to create a second model. We repeated the 
last two steps three more times in order to generate a more accurate model. We finally 
registered our initial amygdalae ROIs with the fifth model to generate the resulting 
displacement fields (or transformation calculations). These individual displacement fields 
were then applied to each subject’s normalized EPI scans in order to specifically normalize 
their amygdalae to our template amygdalae. We applied the same transformation to each 
subject’s structural scan before averaging all the aligned structural scans, to create an 
amygdalae-aligned average structural brain of our 19 subjects. Finally, amygdalar 
subdivisions were hand-drawn on our template amygdalae using the Atlas of the Human 
Brain (Mai et al., 2008). We delineated three sub-areas within the amygdala: the basolateral 
complex comprised of the basomedial, basolateral and lateral nuclei; the centromedial 
complex comprised of the central and medial nuclei; and the cortical complex (or cortical 
nucleus). In its most rostral part, the amygdala is exclusively composed of the basolateral 
complex. The cortical nucleus appears in the dorso-medial part of mid-rostral amygdala. The 
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centromedial complex appears slightly more caudally than the cortical nucleus in the most 
dorsal part of the amygdala. The basolateral complex increases in size as one moves caudally 
from the anterior amygdala, has its maximal size midrostrocaudaully, and then decreases as 
one moves further back toward the caudal amygdala, whereas the cortical nucleus and 
centromedial complex slightly enlarge midrostrocaudally, but do not decrease in size as one 
moves further caudally within the amygdala. The cortical nucleus ends midcaudally, the 
basolateral complex ends in caudal amygdala, while the centromedial complex ends in the 
most caudal part of amygdala. 
 
Computational Model analysis 
To test whether amygdala activity was better explained by model-based or model-free 
learning algorithms, we correlated brain activity in this region with expected value signals 
estimated by a number of different computational models. In model-free learning algorithms, 
the agent is surprised when a reversal occurs and starts learning again after it happens, 
whereas in model-based learning algorithms, the agent expects the reversal and considers it 
as resolution of uncertainty and does not need to relearn. The two modes of learning are 
diametrically opposed in the current task, therefore allowing us to test whether amygdala is 
tracking model-based or model-free computations. 
 
Model-based Learning Algorithms 
HMM with dynamic expectation of change 
For the model-based learning algorithm, we used a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). In this 
HMM, the inferred state of the environment is defined in terms of an association between 
cues and outcomes and is represented by the psychological variable 𝑆𝑆.There are three 
possible liquid outcomes in the experiment (pleasant and neutral in the appetitive session and 
unpleasant and neutral in the aversive session) and two cues on any given trial. The state 
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values 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 are the possible combinations of cues and outcomes, for example 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 = (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 2,𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙). Although the subjects were unaware that pleasant and unpleasant 
outcomes could not be delivered concurrently, this possible state value was omitted since it 
did not affect the results of the analyses. We also incorporated a binary-valued variable 𝐻𝐻 in 
this HMM. The values of this hidden node determine whether (𝐻𝐻 = 1) or not (𝐻𝐻 = 0) the 
subject is expecting a reversal. A third random variable 𝑂𝑂 represents the observed cue-
outcome combination (see Figure 11d for a simple graphical representation of the model). 
The transition probabilities of the reversal variable 𝐻𝐻 are 
𝑃𝑃(𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡|𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡−1)  = �1 − 𝛼𝛼 𝛼𝛼0 1� 
Variable values are enumerated along the row and column axes. Each entry of the matrix 
represents the probability of moving from one value on trial 𝑡𝑡 − 1 (rows) to another on trial 
𝑡𝑡 (columns). At position (1,2), the 𝛼𝛼 parameter is the probability of moving to the state of 
expecting a reversal (𝐻𝐻 = 1) from the 𝐻𝐻 = 0 state. Once a subject begins expecting a 
reversal, they do not switch back. This is encoded in the asymmetry of the transition matrix. 
The time evolution of 𝐻𝐻 represents a subject’s growing expectation of a reversal in the cue-
outcome association. After the presentation of a novel pair of cues, 𝐻𝐻 is set to the zero state. 
The transitions for the state variable 𝑆𝑆 are conditionally dependent on the reversal variable: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1,𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡) =  �1 − 𝛽𝛽 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 1 − 𝛽𝛽� 
State reversals are inferred with a non-zero probability 𝛽𝛽 when 𝐻𝐻 is in the reversal 
expectation state (𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = 1), otherwise 𝛽𝛽 = 0 and 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1,𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 = 0) is the identity matrix. 
Note that after the first trial following the presentation of novel cues, the subject has a 
nonzero probability of being in the reversal expectation state, thus they are always expecting 
a reversal to some degree and are prepared to react to an observation indicative of a 
contingency reversal. The posterior probability distribution 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) over the state values on 
trial 𝑡𝑡 is determined by the prior state probability distribution 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1), the cue-outcome 
observation 𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡, and the state transition probabilities: 
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𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) =  � � 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1,𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡)
𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑃 (𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡)𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡−1) 
𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) = 𝑃𝑃(𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡)𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡)∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡)𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡)𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  
The prior over the state values at the beginning of a new set of cues is uniform. Beliefs are 
updated based on the likelihood of observing an outcome for a given cue and assuming a 
state such as “cue j is rewarding and this is likely to reverse soon”. For instance, if no reward 
is observed for cue j, then this state is given less credence because the likelihood that this 
occurs is low (0.4), and the expectation of reward for cue j is decreased. Significantly, 
expectations for the other cue are updated simultaneously, even if it is not implicated in the 
current trial. This is because a lower chance for the state “cue j is rewarding and this is likely 
to reverse soon” implies that the state “the other cue is rewarding and this is unlikely to 
reverse soon,” is more likely, and hence, the mathematical expectation of the reward upon 
presentation of the other cue increases.  
The expected reward 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗 when presented with a given cue j is 
𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐸𝐸[𝑅𝑅|𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑗𝑗, 𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 𝑡𝑡] = � � 𝑅𝑅 𝑃𝑃 (𝑅𝑅|𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡, 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 𝑐𝑐)𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡)
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑅𝑅 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠  
The reward 𝑅𝑅 takes the values -1, 0, 1 for unpleasant, neutral, and pleasant rewards, 
respectively. Here, “E” denotes the mathematical expectation operator. This means that the 
forecast is correct on average for all possible outcomes given a specific history of past 
rewards for both cues. 
Confidence in, or precision about, the identity of the current state can be measured by the 
extent to which there are differences in the posterior probabilities of the possible states given 
past experience and the cues presented. When these differences are high, one posterior 
probability is necessarily high, and hence, precision is high. Conversely, if all posterior 
probabilities are the same, precision is lowest. We measure precision on a given trial 𝑡𝑡 using 
the inverse Shannon entropy of the posterior distribution of the state variable 𝑆𝑆: 
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𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) = − � 𝑃𝑃 (𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡) log𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡)  
𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
As more and more trials with no reward are experienced, the 𝐻𝐻 node inputs a growing 
uncertainty about the identity of the current state into the HMM (since a reversal may have 
occurred in the absence of a rewarding outcome). Every time a new pair of cues is presented, 
precision is low but increases dramatically when the agent knows what particular state they 
are in (i.e., what the cue-liquid association is). Precision lowers again until the agent knows 
that a reversal has occurred, after which precision increases again. A random effects Bayesian 
approach was used for parameter fitting and model comparisons (note that we excluded one 
subject who failed to make motor responses from this analysis). Model parameters (such as 
𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽) were fixed a priori and the model fits were not sensitive to the specific values of 
these parameters. HMM estimation was performed via forward smoothing using the HMM 
toolbox for MATLAB (http://www.cs.ubc.ca/~murphyk/Software/HMM/hmm.html). 
Model-Free Learning Algorithms 
Rescorla Wagner model.  
In the Rescorla Wagner (RW) model, the new expected value at trial t + 1 for a given cue is 
based on the sum of the current expected value and the prediction error between the reward 
obtained and the expected value at time t, weighted by the learning rate (Rescorla, 1972): 
𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) +  𝛼𝛼 ⦁ (𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) − 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡)) 
When j is a given cue, α is the learning rate with a range 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and R (t) is the reward 
received on the current trial. If the valenced (pleasant or unpleasant) liquid was obtained on 
the current trial, R (t) = 1, else R (t) = 0. Hence there is one free parameter in this model, α. 
Note that using a random effects approach, we found that the optimal free parameters in the 
appetitive and aversive sessions averaged across subjects were 0.54 (SEM=0.09) and 0.18 
(SEM=0.05) respectively. 
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Pearce Hall model.  
This model differs from the Rescorla Wagner model (RW) in that it introduces an 
associability component and allows the effectiveness of the reinforcer to remain constant 
throughout conditioning. The associability values estimated by this model will decrease as 
the consequences of the conditioned stimulus become accurately predicted (J. M. Pearce & 
G. Hall, 1980). The expected values Q (t) of a given cue were updated according to: 
   𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡 + 1) = 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡) + 𝑆𝑆 ⦁ |𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡 − 1) − 𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡 − 1)| ⦁ 𝑅𝑅 (𝑡𝑡) 
When j is a given cue, S is a free parameter governing the intensity of the CS, and R (t) is the 
reward received on the current trial. If the valenced (pleasant or unpleasant) liquid was 
obtained on the current trial, R (t) = 1, else R (t) = 0. In the Pearce Hall model (PH), the new 
expected value at trial t + 1 for a given cue is based on the sum of the current expected value 
and the product of the absolute value of the difference between the outcome obtained on the 
previous trial and the expected reward on the previous trial, and the outcome obtained on the 
current trial; this product is weighted by the free parameter. Hence there is one free parameter 
in this model, S. Note that using a random effects approach, we found that the optimal free 
parameters in the appetitive and aversive sessions averaged across subjects were 0.58 
(SEM=0.09) and 0.40 (SEM=0.10), respectively. 
 
In addition to the Rescorla-Wagner and Pearce-Hall models, we also tested a hybrid model 
introduced by Li et al., (2011), in which the Rescorla-Wagner rule is used to update value 
expectations, while the Pearce-Hall rule is used to set the learning rate. However, this hybrid 
model performed similarly to the Rescorla-Wagner and Pearce-Hall rules alone in terms of 
model-fits to the behavioral data and performed markedly worse than the HMM. 
Consequently, we do not consider this model further. 
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HMM Model with Static Expectations of Change 
In order to further test whether amygdala activity is tracking precision signals from a model-
based algorithm as opposed to more generically tracking precision signals computed in a 
model-free manner, we used a simpler version of the HMM described above, where precision 
signals resemble more closely what a “model-free” algorithm would estimate. In this version 
of the HMM, 𝐻𝐻 is always set to the 𝐻𝐻 = 1 state and thus the chance of a reversal happening 
is constant over time. As a result, in this HMM, precision starts low every time a new pair of 
cues is presented and increases substantially when the agent knows in which state they are, 
but because the chance of a reversal occurring does not increase over time, the precision 
remains high through the rest of the learning with that cue until a new pair of cues is 
introduced. In other words, there is no decrease in precision related to the anticipation of a 
change in the contingencies (which would come from having a model of when the 
contingencies are predicted to reverse), but instead a decrease in precision occurs only once 
a contingency change has occurred and been detected through trial and error experience 
(hence the algorithm is essentially model-free). Although the precision signals generated by 
our “model-based” and “model-free” HMM are very different, the expected reward signals 
from both signals are strongly correlated. 
Baseline Model 
Our baseline model simply assumes that rewards occur completely at random and no learning 
takes place. Hence, expected values for all trials are kept at a constant value of 0.5.  
Model Comparison on Behavioral Data 
To perform a formal model comparison on the behavioral conditioning data, we used the 
trial-by-trial reaction time data (measuring the length of time taken on each trial for 
participants to press a button to indicate which side of the screen the Pavlovian cue stimulus 
had been presented). Many previous studies have shown that changes in RTs to a Pavlovian 
cue are correlated with changes in associative encoding between cues and behaviorally 
significant outcomes (Bray & O'Doherty, 2007; Gottfried et al., 2003; Li et al., 2011; J. 
 
150 
 
O'Doherty et al., 2004). For each session separately, we log transformed and adjusted the RT 
data to account for a linear trend in RTs over time independently of trial type, as well as to 
remove the effects of changes in reaction time related to switching responses from one side 
of the screen to the other. This was done by regressing the log transformed RTs against a 
matrix containing a column of ones, a column accounting for the linear trend over time, and 
a column indicating whether participants switched their response from left to right or vice 
versa between the current and previous trial using the function regress in Matlab.  
Using the same function, we then regressed these adjusted response times against the 
expected values generated by our ‘model-based’ HMM, our ‘model-free’ RW and PH 
models, and our baseline model. (For the baseline model, a small amount of noise was added 
to each expected value in order to compute the regression; without any noise the regression 
would not be calculable). This second regression analysis was run for each of these models, 
and cycled through all the possible learning rate parameters for the RW model, and CS 
intensity parameters for the Pearce-Hall model between 0 and 1, with increments of 0.001. 
This method returned Sum Squared Error (SSE) values for each of these parameter values, 
thereby allowing us to obtain the best fitting value for the free parameter for the appetitive 
and aversive sessions (i.e., the free parameter associated with the lowest SSE value). In order 
to compare the model goodness between these four different models, we converted the best 
SSE value of each session (appetitive and aversive) and each model into a Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC) value. The BIC adds a penalty proportional to the number of 
additional free parameters to the SSE value of each model, depending also on the number of 
degrees of freedom, which in this case is the total number of trials per session across all 
subjects (Schwarz, 1978). Using this procedure, we found that in both the appetitive and 
aversive sessions, the ‘model-based’ HMM outperformed the baseline model, and the 
baseline model outperformed both the ‘model-free’ RW and PH models (Table 3 and Table 
4). Therefore, the ‘model-based’ HMM best fit our behavioral data, whereas the best fitting 
RW and PH models did not fit our behavioral data better than a random model. Hence, unlike 
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RW and PH, the ‘model-based’ HMM predicted RTs better than chance performance. Note 
that we did not regress the expected values generated by our simple HMM since they were 
highly correlated with that of our ‘model-based’ HMM. 
 
fMRI Data Analysis 
The event-related fMRI data were analyzed by constructing sets of δ (stick) functions at the 
time of cue presentation and at the time of outcome for the appetitive and aversive sessions. 
For our main GLM (illustrated in Figure 14 and Figure 15), additional regressors were 
constructed by using the expected values and the precision values generated by the model-
based HMM as modulating parameters at the time of cue presentation. In order to compare 
model-based versus model-free learning algorithms in the amygdala, we ran three additional 
GLMs. For RW, the regressors were similar to our model-based HMM except that we did 
not have a regressor for precision which is not estimated by RW, and we added a modulating 
parameter for prediction error at the time of outcome. The regressors used in the GLM 
computed using PH model were the same as the ones used in our model-based HMM, except 
that the precision modulating parameter was replaced with an associability modulating 
parameter at the time of cue presentation. Finally, we ran a “model-free” HMM GLM using 
the same regressors as for our model-based HMM. All of these regressors were convolved 
with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). The six scan-to-scan motion 
parameters derived from the affine part of the realignment procedure were included as 
regressors of no interest to account for residual motion effects. To account for motion of the 
subjects’ throat during swallowing, we added a regressor of no interest for swallowing 
motion. Finally, we also included 13 additional regressors to account for physiological 
fluctuations (4 related to heart rate, 9 related to respiration) which were estimated using the 
RETROICOR algorithm (Glover, Li, & Ress, 2000). 6 of the 38 (2 sessions x 19 subjects) 
log files could not be used to estimate these regressors due to a technical problem during data 
collection, and the missing physiological regressors were simply omitted for those sessions. 
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All of these regressors were entered into a general linear model and fitted to each subject 
individually using SPM5. The resulting parameter estimates for regressors of interest were 
then entered into second-level one sample t-tests to generate the random-effects level 
statistics used to obtain the results shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15. All reported fMRI 
statistics and p values arise from group random-effects analyses. We present our statistical 
maps at a threshold of p < 0.005, corrected for multiple comparisons at p < 0.05. To correct 
for multiple comparisons, we first used the 3dFWHMx function in AFNI to estimate the 
intrinsic smoothness of our data, within the area defined by a mask corresponding to our 
amygdala template. We then used the AlphaSim function in AFNI to estimate via Monte 
Carlo simulation an extent threshold for statistical significance that was corrected for 
multiple comparisons at p < 0.05 for a height threshold of p < 0.005 within the amygdala 
ROI. 
 
Model Comparison on BOLD Data 
In order to test whether the amygdala acts according to model-based or model-free learning 
algorithms, we used a Bayesian model selection procedure (BMS) to test which expected 
value signals estimated by model-based versus model-free learning algorithms better 
accounted for amygdala activity (Stephan, Penny, Daunizeau, Moran, & Friston, 2009). For 
both the appetitive and aversive sessions, we included in this model comparison individual 
betas averaged across voxels within a 4mm sphere centered on the peak voxels of the 
amygdalar activities correlating with either expected value signals for the HMM or the 
model-free algorithm using the leave-one out method, thereby avoiding a non-independence 
bias in the voxel selection (N. Kriegeskorte, W. K. Simmons, P. S. Bellgowan, & C. I. Baker, 
2009). Using the spm_BMS function in SPM8, we compared expected value signals across 
all model-based (HMM) and model-free models separately for the appetitive and aversive 
sessions.  
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We used a similar approach to compare neural activity pertaining to precision signals 
estimated by our “model-based” and “model-free” HMMs. The difference between these two 
HMMs is that the “model-based” HMM does not allow for a reversal without moving from 
a “non-reversal state” to a “possible reversal state”. As a consequence, the precision values 
generated by these models are clearly distinguishable and thus easily comparable using a 
BMS (whereas the estimated expected rewards are strongly correlated). Again, we included 
in this model comparison voxels within a 4mm sphere centered on the peak voxels of the 
amygdalar activities correlating with precision signals for either the “model-based” HMM or 
the ‘’model-free’’ HMM using the leave-one out method. Here, we compared activity 
correlating with precision signals between the “model-based” and “model-free” HMM 
separately for the appetitive and aversive sessions (see Results section for the exceedance 
probabilities). 
 
ROI Analyses 
Functional regions of interest (ROIs) were defined using the MarsBaR toolbox 
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/). Beta estimates were extracted for each subject from the 
functional clusters of interest as they appeared on the statistical maps of a given contrast 
using the leave-one-out method to avoid a non-independence bias. They were then averaged 
across subjects to plot expected reward (Figure 14b) and precision (Figure 15b) according to 
three categories (category one corresponding to the lowest values and category three 
corresponding to the highest values). 
 
154 
 
Figures 
Figure 11. Appetitive versus aversive Pavlovian learning task. 
 
Figure 11. Sequence and timing of events in the appetitive (a) and aversive (b) sessions. On 
each trial, a cue was presented on one side of the screen for 4 seconds, followed by some 
liquid delivery 60% of the time. The trial ended with a 2-11s inter-trial interval. Each session 
started with the presentation of cue 1 and cue 2, leading 60% of the time to a pleasant or a 
neutral liquid delivery in the appetitive session or an unpleasant or a neutral liquid delivery 
in the aversive session. After a number of trials, a reversal occurred so that cue 1 now led to 
the liquid associated with cue 2, and cue 2 led to the liquid associated with cue 1. 
Subsequently, a new pair of cues was presented, which also reversed after a number of trials. 
In total, three new pair of cues were presented, and each of these pairs reversed once. c) 
Computational models used to estimate expected reward on each trial (Qj). The expected 
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rewards generated by the model-free learning algorithms (Rescorla-Wagner (RW) and 
Pearce-Hall (PH) were compared against a model-based learning algorithm (Hidden Markov 
Model or HMM) at both the behavioral and neural levels. d) Graphical model representation 
of the Bayesian HMM. 
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Figure 12. Behavioral results. 
 
Figure 12. a) Ratings for the pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant liquids (-5 being very 
unpleasant and 5 very pleasant). *** indicates a significance of p<0.001 as computed by one 
sample t-tests comparing the mean of the different liquids against a mean of 0, n.s stands for 
not significant. b) Difference in the number of times a cue is preferred after - before the 
experiment. *** indicates a significance of p<0.001 as computed by one sample t-tests 
comparing the mean of the different liquids against a mean of 0. c,d) Ratings for the cue 
paired with the pleasant (c) or unpleasant (d) liquid and the cue paired with the neutral liquid 
after a few trials after a new pair of cue has been presented (Post new learning) and a few 
trials after a reversal has occurred (Post reversal). A rating of 1 indicates that participants 
strongly dislike the cue whereas a rating of 4 indicates that they strongly like it. ** indicates 
a significance of p<0.01 as computed by two sample t-tests comparing the means of the 
ratings for the cues paired with pleasant/unpleasant and neutral liquids. e-g) Conditioned 
responses. e) Time course for pupil diameter in response to cues paired with the pleasant 
liquid (green line) and the neutral liquid (black line) averaged across all trials in the appetitive 
session for the 10 subjects showing reliable amplitude in their pupil diameter. A one-tailed 
paired t-test for a time window 0.8-1.5s revealed a significant decrease in constriction when 
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participants were presented with cues paired with the pleasant liquid (p<0.05). f,g) Detrended 
and normalized response times averaged across low, medium, and high categories of 
expected values (EV) as determined by the model-based learning algorithm in the appetitive 
(f) and aversive (g) sessions.  
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Figure 13. Expected value and precision signal time series. 
 
Figure 13. Plots showing expected value signals (a) and precision signals (b) from the model-
based learning algorithm for the appetitive (green) and aversive (red) sessions for a typical 
participant. 
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Figure 14. Expected value signals from the model-based learning algorithm model in the 
amygdala. 
 
Figure 14. a) Blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signals positively correlating with the 
magnitude of the expected value of the cue were found in the basolateral complex in the 
appetitive session (in green) and in the centromedial complex in the aversive session (in red). 
b) Plots showing the beta estimates for low, medium, and high categories of expected 
rewards in the appetitive (green) and aversive (red) sessions in the clusters activated using 
the leave-one-out method. 
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Figure 15. Precision signals from the model-based learning algorithm in the amygdala. 
 
Figure 15. a) Blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signals correlating with the precision 
of the cue were found in the centromedial complex of the amygdala in both the appetitive 
session (in green) and aversive session (in red). b) Plots showing the beta estimates for low, 
medium, and high categories of precision in the appetitive (green) and aversive (red) sessions 
in the clusters activated using the leave-one out method. c) Results from formal conjunction 
analysis of precision signals from the appetitive and aversive sessions in the centromedial 
complex. 
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Tables 
Table 3. BIC scores. 
Session HMM – RW HMM - PH 
Aversive Mean = -3.09 
SEM = 1.05 
p<0.01 
Mean = -5.08 
SEM = 0.84 
p<0.0001 
Appetitive Mean = -6.22 
SEM = 1.46 
p<0.001 
Mean = -6.23 
SEM = 1.53 
p<0.001 
Table 3. Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values and standard errors to the mean (SEM) 
for the model-based learning algorithm (HMM) versus the model-free learning algorithms 
(RW and PH). A smaller BIC value indicates a better fit, therefore the model-based learning 
algorithm best fit the behavioral data. P-values as computed by paired t-tests on BIC values 
are also reported. HMM is significantly outperforming both model-free learning algorithms 
in both the appetitive and aversive sessions. 
 
Table 4, Random effects test of models compared to baseline. 
Session HMM < Baseline RW < Baseline PH < Baseline 
Aversive <0.05 0.93 1 
Appetitive <0.001 1 1 
Table 4. A random effects test of the models versus a baseline model was performed by 
simulating random expected value estimates (10,000 repetitions) and then computing a non-
parametric p-value per subject as the fraction of repetitions in which the baseline BIC is 
lower than the model BIC. These p-values were then combined across subjects using Fisher’s 
combined probability test. Only HMM outperforms the baseline model in both the appetitive 
and aversive sessions. 
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C h a p t e r  5  
BELIEF STATE-SPACE MANIPULATION IN HIERACHICAL INFERENCE 
Hierarchical inference is a ubiquitous task for humans. From stock markets to social 
interactions, the natural world contains many hidden variables which may only be indirectly 
inferred based on conditionally related signals. Knowledge of the state of these ‘latent’ 
variables is required for optimal inference regarding the abstract decision structure of a given 
environment and therefore can be crucial to decision-making in a wide range of situations. 
Inferring the state of an abstract variable requires the generation and manipulation of an 
internal representation of beliefs over the values of the hidden variable. Here, we aimed to 
explore the learning strategies employed by human subjects in a hierarchical state-estimation 
task. The task contained two experimental conditions corresponding to whether or not 
“switches” could take place. We hypothesized that this key environmental feature would bias 
subject behavior between distinct learning strategies which differed depending on the 
subjects' manipulations of their belief state-space. Namely, in a “switch” condition, we 
expected participants to attempt to update beliefs over the entire belief state-space while in a 
“no-switch” condition, we hypothesized that they would exclude low-probability states from 
the inference process in order to minimize computational load. 
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Methods 
Task 
Participants engaged in an observational probabilistic hierarchical inference task akin to 
card-sorting tasks used to investigate executive functioning (Robbins, 1996). On each trial 
(Figure 16), subjects were presented with two stimuli composed of three features: color, 
motion, and shape. Each of these features had two exemplars. Color could be red or green, 
motion could be in the left or right direction, and shape could be a circle or a square. The two 
stimuli were randomly generated based on these exemplars in an anti-correlated fashion, i.e., 
one of the stimuli was red while the other was green, and similarly for the motion and shape 
dimensions. On any given trial, one of the exemplars was “active” but the subject was not 
told which exemplar this was. After the stimuli were presented for 1s, the stimulus containing 
the “active” exemplar was stochastically selected. The task of the subject was to infer which 
dimension contained the active exemplar. After a jittered ISI, subjects bet on which 
dimension contained the active exemplar by distributing $20 across the three dimensions. 
Subjects were paid the amount of money they put on the objectively correct dimension in a 
randomly chosen trial. Suppose that on such a trial, they bet $10 on color, $5 on motion, and 
$5 on shape. Then, if the correct dimension was actually motion, they would receive $5. It 
was explained to the subjects that they should bet on each dimension according to their 
beliefs and degree of uncertainty in their beliefs. It was explained to the subjects that they 
should pay close attention to the selection process and integrate information over several 
trials in order to form their beliefs. Each subject engaged in six blocks of 40 trials each. Half 
of the sessions contained unsignaled extra-dimensional switches in the active exemplar. That 
is, when a switch occurred, the new active exemplar came from a different dimension to the 
previous active exemplar. Switches could occur multiple times within the same block. Switch 
and no-switch blocks were randomly interleaved. At the start of each block, subjects were 
told whether they were in a switch or no-switch environment. Subjects were trained on 
simplified versions of the task immediately before the main experiment began.  
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Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging 
Twenty-two healthy right-handed Caltech students (mean age 24 years, SD 2.9, 14 male) 
volunteered to participate in this study. The data from two participants were excluded 
because their median performance was below that of a random decision-making algorithm. 
All participants gave informed consent and the study was approved by the Institutional 
Review Board of the California Institute of Technology. Functional imaging was performed 
with a 3 T Siemens Trio scanner. Forty-three contiguous interleaved transversal slices of 
echo-planar T2*-weighted images were acquired in each volume, with a slice thickness of 
3mm and no gap (repetition time, 2340ms; echo time, 30ms; flip angle, 80°; field of view, 
192mm2; matrix, 64x64). Slice orientation was tilted 30° from a line connecting the anterior 
and posterior commissure. This slice tilt alleviates the signal drop in the OFC (Deichmann 
et al., 2003). We discarded the first three images before data processing and statistical 
analysis, to compensate for the T1 saturation effects. A whole-brain high-resolution T1-
weighted structural scan (voxel size: 0.9 x 0.9 x 0.9mm3) was also acquired for each subject. 
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Learning Model 
Sensing Probability - Beta Distribution Parameter Updates 
An alternative formulation would be to directly track the counts of each selection event on a 
per-dimension basis. This gives a very compact encoding which can be flexibly unpacked in 
order to generate probability representations. It is not dependent to any neuronal model of 
probability. We use a Dirichlet belief variable 
𝐵𝐵 ∼ 𝑆𝑆𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡(𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2,𝛼𝛼3) 
where the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 parameters encode the strength of evidence within each dimension 
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ∶= 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+ ∶=  𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖+  −  𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖− 
Note that the index + always refers to the feature which currently holds the balance of  
Probability, i.e., + =  𝑎𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑓𝑓=1,2𝑛𝑛𝑓𝑓  
𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 can always be manipulated to reflect the number of selections of the alternative feature in 
that dimension by combining with 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐, the number of trials since the last changepoint: 
𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖
−  =  𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐  − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖+2  
The mean and mode being, respectively, 
𝑬𝑬 ∶=  𝜶𝜶
∑𝜶𝜶
 
𝒙𝒙 ∶=  𝜶𝜶 − 1
∑𝜶𝜶 − 3 
The marginal distribution for a dimension 𝑙𝑙 is 
𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ∼ 𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎(𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝛼𝛼0 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖) 
where 𝛼𝛼0 ∶= ∑𝜶𝜶. This model suggests the following prediction errors: 
 
Per-dimension prediction errors (with predictive coding): 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆=1 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 1
𝛼𝛼0 + 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼0  − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
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𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆=0 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖
𝛼𝛼0 + 1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼0  − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
Per-dimension prediction errors (without predictive coding) could be modeled as follows: 
𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 ∼ 𝐵𝐵𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎(𝑛𝑛+,𝑛𝑛−) 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆=1 = 𝑛𝑛+  +  1
𝑛𝑛+ + 1 + 𝑛𝑛− −  𝑛𝑛+𝑛𝑛+ + 𝑛𝑛− 
𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖
𝑆𝑆=0 = 𝑛𝑛+
𝑛𝑛+ + 1 + 𝑛𝑛− −  𝑛𝑛+𝑛𝑛+ + 𝑛𝑛− 
Across-dimension prediction errors are given by a divergence metric, although the 
expression for the KL-divergence between Dirichlets is relatively complicated, see (Gallistel, 
Krishan, Liu, Miller, & Latham, 2014) for the Beta version. 
𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1||𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡) = �𝑛𝑛𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 �𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 �𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡  
where we define 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡+1 as the Dirichlet variable computed up to trial 𝑡𝑡 and 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡:𝑡𝑡′ as the 
Dirichlet variable computed from trial 𝑡𝑡 to 𝑡𝑡′. 𝐵𝐵𝒉𝒉𝑡𝑡:𝑡𝑡′ is the same Dirichlet variable but 
computed based on the hypothesis set 𝒉𝒉. For BOLD signal modeling purposes, all prediction 
errors are presumed to be positive since information has no valence. We fit a prior for all 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
as a “softmax” parameter which is bounded from below by 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 = 2,𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖  =  2 for all variables. 
 
Reasoning About Beliefs - Do I Need To Change My Beliefs? 
This can be captured in a model by thresholding the divergence between a current belief and 
the posterior probability given the observed data: 
𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾(𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡′||𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢)  >  𝑇𝑇1 
If 𝑇𝑇1 is not exceeded, no further updating is performed on this trial, and the same beliefs are 
reported. This quantity is used in (Gallistel et al., 2014), however, it is a complex computation 
requiring perfect memory. It also raises the question, if 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡′ is being computed on every trial 
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anyway, why not use that? A more computationally efficient and plausible method would be 
to threshold based on the history of “event prediction errors”: 
∑𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢:𝑡𝑡 log𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾(𝑆𝑆)𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵(𝑆𝑆) = (𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢) log 0.8 − log𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵�𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢:𝑡𝑡� > (𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢)𝑇𝑇1 
where 𝑡𝑡′ is the current trial, 𝑆𝑆 is the observed selection event, 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡𝑢𝑢 is the number of trials 
since the last update, and 𝐾𝐾 represents perfect knowledge of the generative process. This 
ratio compares how well your beliefs explain the environment dynamics versus the 
maximum possible prediction performance given perfect knowledge 𝐾𝐾. For example, the 
likelihood 𝐿𝐿(𝑆𝑆|𝐾𝐾) of selection 𝑆𝑆 on a given trial based on the generative model of the 
environment is 𝐿𝐿(𝑆𝑆|𝐾𝐾) = 0.8 in the switches condition and 𝐿𝐿(𝑆𝑆|𝐾𝐾) = 0.7 on the non-
switches condition. This quantity is similar to the likelihood divided by the model evidence 
in Bayes' rule and thus probably results in an algorithm equivalent to that of (Gallistel et al., 
2014). This could be computed on a trial-by-trial basis and averaged 
𝛿𝛿 ∶= log  𝐿𝐿(𝑆𝑆|𝐾𝐾) − log𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵(𝑆𝑆) 
𝛿𝛿 = log 𝐿𝐿(𝑆𝑆|𝐾𝐾) −� log 𝐿𝐿(𝑆𝑆|𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖)𝑃𝑃(𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖)
𝑖𝑖
 
𝛿𝛿 = log 𝐿𝐿(𝑆𝑆|𝐾𝐾) − log�𝐿𝐿(𝑆𝑆|𝐸𝐸)𝑃𝑃(𝐸𝐸|𝑆𝑆)𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆)
𝐸𝐸
 
∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛
> 𝑇𝑇1 
On a given trial, 𝛿𝛿 has a maximum value of log 0.80.2 = log 4 = 1.386 corresponding to an 
incorrect deterministic belief and a minimum value of log 0.80.8 = log 1 = 0 corresponding to 
a perfect prediction. 
 
Reasoning About Beliefs - Hypothesis Elimination and Explaining Away 
Hypothesis testing involves the elimination of hypotheses by thresholding beliefs. If the 
posterior probability of a particular hypothesis falls below a certain threshold 𝑇𝑇2, then a 
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conclusion is made that this hypothesis is incorrect and should not be considered any further. 
This is accomplished by directly threshold the posterior belief mode 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 < 𝑇𝑇2 
then we eliminate dimension ℎ𝑖𝑖 as a hypothesis, set 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  =  0 ⇒  𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = 0, and no longer 
update. This will effect the updating over other dimensions via the “explaining away” 
phenomenon. For example: 
𝑃𝑃(ℎ1|𝑆𝑆 = 1,ℎ2 = 0)  >  𝑃𝑃(ℎ1|𝑆𝑆 = 1) 
Practically, we distribute the 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 variable amongst the other dimensions in proportion to their 
probabilities, e.g., (𝛼𝛼1,𝛼𝛼2,𝛼𝛼3) → �0,𝛼𝛼2 + �𝛼𝛼1×𝛼𝛼2𝛼𝛼2+𝛼𝛼3� ,𝛼𝛼3 + �𝛼𝛼1+𝛼𝛼3𝛼𝛼2+𝛼𝛼3�� 
It is possible that subjects' would have some idea of the pattern of associations between 
features in previous trials and distribute 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 according to such memories, but this is probably 
quite noisy and we will disregard it. Practically, this means that we only “re-distribute” 
probability at the dimension level and not the exemplar level. 
𝑇𝑇2 should depend on the number of hypotheses remaining, i.e., we would not use the same 
threshold to eliminate one of three hypotheses and also to eliminate one of two. Thus, 𝑇𝑇2 is 
fitted as the product of a free parameter multiplied by the random chance level of probability 
which depends on the number of hypotheses remaining. 
 
Reasoning about Beliefs - Re-evaluating Hypothesis Eliminations 
People may have “second thoughts”—“was I really correct to eliminate hypothesis ℎ𝑖𝑖?” If 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 > 𝑇𝑇2 for the most recently eliminated hypothesis, we re-consider ℎ𝑖𝑖 as a hypothesis, 
update our hypothesis set 𝒉𝒉, and re-compute 𝐵𝐵 based on 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡ℎ:𝑡𝑡 where 𝑡𝑡ℎ is the trial on which 
the last hypothesis elimination was performed. We only model the re-consideration of the 
last hypothesis elimination (rather than for example the last two) for two reasons: (i) bounded 
cognitive resources and (ii) re-consideration of two hypotheses is effectively a reversal. Note 
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that rejecting a conclusion constitutes an “internal changepoint”. We assume that subjects 
cease to track information regarding dimensions other than the assumed correct dimension 
thus when a conclusion is rejected, the subject has no recent data to draw upon and therefore 
begins again with a flat prior. 
 
Detecting Changepoints - Identification and Retrospection 
Changepoint trials on which the active exemplar has been switched to another. We can detect 
such changes by comparing the likelihoods of competing explanations—either there was a 
changepoint on some trial or there wasn't. We compute a Bayes factor 𝐾𝐾: = 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|𝑀𝑀1)
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|𝑀𝑀0) weighted 
by model priors 𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀1)
𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀0) in order to adjudicate. The model evidence for the no-changepoint 
model 𝑀𝑀0 is the sum over hypothesis likelihood functions: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐:𝑡𝑡|𝑀𝑀0) = �𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐:𝑡𝑡|ℎ𝑖𝑖)
𝑖𝑖
 
For the changepoint model we need to sum over the possibility of the changepoint occurring 
on each trial: 
𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐:𝑡𝑡�𝑀𝑀1� = �� 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐:𝑡𝑡′|ℎ𝑖𝑖)
𝑖𝑖
+ �𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡′:𝑡𝑡|ℎ𝑖𝑖)
𝑗𝑗
�
𝑡𝑡′
× 1
𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐
 
where 1
𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐
 represents the uniform probability that a trial 𝑡𝑡′ contains the changepoint. 
 
The Bayes factor 𝐾𝐾 is not appropriate for model comparison in this case. In the prior model 
probabilities are not equal given that a changepoint relatively rare, thus we multiply the 
Bayes factor 𝐾𝐾 by the prior odds: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀1)
𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀0) = ∑ 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 × (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐)𝑛𝑛−11:𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 (1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐)𝑛𝑛 = (𝑡𝑡 − 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐)𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐   
and threshold the following signal: 
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𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|𝑀𝑀1)𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀1)
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|𝑀𝑀0)𝑃𝑃(𝑀𝑀0) > 𝑇𝑇3 
Note that these quantities can be computed simply by counting the number of hypothesis-
consistent selection events occurring within the given timeframe (since the data likelihood is 
the same under all hypotheses). The minimum value of this quantity is 0 (𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 → 0) while the 
maximum value is ∞ (𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 → 1). Let us assume that max𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 = 0.33 and min𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 = 0.005, 
then a more realistic maximum value would be ∼ 2 × 2 = 4 and a more realistic minimum 
would be ∼ 1
2
× 0.005 = 0.0025. 
 
If a changepoint is detected, we attempt to identify the specific trial on which this occurred 
via 
𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 = arg min
𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐<𝑡𝑡′≤𝑡𝑡
�𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐:𝑡𝑡′�ℎ𝑖𝑖� × 𝑃𝑃�𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡′:𝑡𝑡�ℎ𝑗𝑗�
𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗  
We also update our perception of the changepoint rate (also known as the hazard rate 
(Wilson, Nassar, & Gold, 2010)): 
𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐 ←
𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 − 1
𝑛𝑛 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 − 2 
where 𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐 is the number of perceived changepoints, 𝑛𝑛 is the total number of trials, and 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐 ,𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐 
are hyperpriors to approximate the true changepoint rate. Note that this can handle the case 
where more than one hypothesis is still active. Just as with hypothesis elimination, reversals 
can be re-evaluated. In such a situation, we re-set the priors according to 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐:𝑡𝑡. 
 
Producing A Decision - Risk Attitudes and Dirichlet Modeling 
Given their actual belief mode across dimensions encoded by 𝒙𝒙, subjects may report a warped 
set of announced beliefs 𝝅𝝅 according to their risk attitude. Introducing a risk-aversion 
parameter 𝛾𝛾, we have: 
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𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1/𝛾𝛾
∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗
1/𝛾𝛾
𝑗𝑗
 
where 0 < 𝛾𝛾 < ∞. This is isomorphic to re-scaling the belief parameters directly 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 ≔ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖
1/𝛾𝛾 
 
 
 
172 
 
Model Fitting 
Our main hypothesis was that subjects may use a hypothesis-testing strategy in order to 
simplify the state-space representation. As with statistical hypothesis testing (Liese & 
Miescke, 2008), this is accomplished by thresholding a summary statistic (in this case, a 
posterior belief) and rejecting hypotheses which did not meet this threshold. We assume that 
subjects subsequently eliminate this dimension from their belief state-space and no longer 
update this variable. We propose that this computational mechanism is a form of gating 
which might underpin executive attention (Lara & Wallis, 2014; Robbins, 1996). Parameter 
𝑇𝑇2 was a direct measure of this effect. The parametric value of 𝑇𝑇2 measures the evidence 
𝑃𝑃(𝑫𝑫|ℎ𝑖𝑖)  required by each subject to reject a hypothesis ℎ𝑖𝑖. Lower values of 𝑇𝑇2 imply that 
more evidence is required in order to reject a hypothesis. In addition to fitting this parameter, 
we also fit4 𝑇𝑇3, which controls subjects’ sensitivity to switches, a risk attitude parameter, and 
a softmax parameter for a total of 4 parameters. We fit these parameters in two ways: (i) by 
standard maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and (ii) by hierarchical Bayesian analysis 
(HBA). This was motivated by the fact that this task is particularly challenging and thus MLE 
may not be sufficient to accurately fit these parameters. Using HBA, we can “regularize” 
per-subject variability in task performance with group-level behavior, thus achieving a better 
fit. In addition, a direct comparison between these estimation methods has not been 
performed in the context of Bayesian inference and thus contributes to a growing suite of 
studies comparing these methods in the psychological literature (Farrell & Ludwig, 2008; 
Fox & Glas, 2001; Wiecki, Sofer, & Frank, 2013). 
Objective Function 
We used the cumulative Kullback-Leibler divergence between the model predictions and the 
actual announced beliefs of the subjects as a measure of model error. This was computed for 
4 In the switch condition only. 
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all sessions and thus represents a within-sample indicator of model prediction. This objective 
function was optimized during parameter estimation. Since more complex models tend to 
overfit, we need to regularize this objective function based on the number of parameters 
considered. We use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for the purposes of model 
comparison. A BIC formula based on KL-divergence is derived in Appendix B. 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
For MLE, we used the MYSTIC framework, a Python-based model-independent 
optimization package (McKerns, Strand, Sullivan, Fang, & Aivazis). We used the Nelder-
Mead simplex solver, which wraps the fmin function in scipy.optimize 
(http://www.scipy.org/). This commonly used optimization algorithm ran until the relative 
change in the objective function dropped below 0.0001. Our parameters were constrained as 
described in Table 1.  
Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis 
Group and individual parameter were estimated simultaneously and related in a hierarchical 
model using Markov chain Monte Carlo sampling (MCMC) (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & 
Rubin, 2003). Specifically, we used the Metropolis-Hastings method (MacKay, 2003). 
100,000 were burned and 100,000 subsequently drawn to estimate the posterior over the 
model parameters. A comparison of three chains indicated that the sampling process had 
converged (𝑅𝑅� = 1) (Brooks, Gelman, Jones, & Meng, 2011). The chains always converged 
in the switches condition but did not always converge in the no-switch condition despite the 
fact that subjects’ behavior is less noisy in the no-switch condition due to the relative 
simplicity of the environment. From a data analytics point of view, this might be intuitively 
explained by the fact that there is less independent behavioral data in the no-switch condition. 
Participants often converge on the correct dimension within the first 10 trials and then 
subsequently make very similar belief reports for the remainder of the experiment. We 
assumed that parameter values were normally distributed at the group-level and modeled 
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hyperpriors for the group-level means. Specifically, we used a uniform prior (ranging over 
the corresponding parameter bounds) for the mean ?̂?𝜇 and computed the group-level variance 
𝜎𝜎�2 as  
𝜎𝜎�2 = 1
�?̂?𝜇(𝑎𝑎− ?̂?𝜇)/3 
where 𝑎𝑎 is the maximum possible value of that parameter. This ensured that the distribution 
was unimodal but flexible and also precluded the necessity of separately estimating the 
variability parameter (Ahn, Krawitz, Kim, Busemeyer, & Brown, 2011). MCMC was 
performed using the PyMC Python package (Patil, Huard, & Fonnesbeck, 2010) versions 
2.3. 
 
Methodological Comparison 
In Figure 17 and Figure 18, samples from the hierarchical model of behavioral parameters 
are presented. In white are samples drawn from the prior before any sampling occurs, while 
in black are samples drawn from the stationary distribution after the chains had been 
determined to have converged. These figures suggest that two important characteristics of 
accurate parameter fitting are satisfied using HBA (i) the posterior probability density is 
concentrated smoothly around unique combinations of parameter values (as opposed to a 
noisy extended density function with a large non-trivial support) and (ii) the stationary 
posterior distributions are not dependent on the specification of a prior. In contrast to many 
decision-making paradigms (Wiecki et al., 2013), learning models result in dependencies 
between samples. This means that the data likelihood 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|𝜃𝜃) is non-Markov. In order to 
compute 𝑃𝑃(𝑫𝑫|𝜃𝜃), the learning model must be re-run in its entirety for each new combination 
of parameter values 𝜃𝜃. This computational bottleneck can be avoided by pre-computing all 
learning model predictions for a grid approximation of parameter values 𝜃𝜃�. The sampling 
algorithm can then draw on these pre-computed predictions instantly for the nearest-neighbor 
parameter values 𝜃𝜃� in order to compute 𝑃𝑃(𝑫𝑫|𝜃𝜃) ≈ 𝑃𝑃(𝑫𝑫|𝜃𝜃�). In Figure 19, I plot correlations 
 
175 
 
between parameter fits based on sampling with and without “grid preparation”. Parameter 
values estimated using the two approaches were very highly correlated despite the dramatic 
reduction in processing time for sampling based on pre-prepared model predictions. 
In order to compare the quality of HBA and MLE parameter fits, model predictions from 
both methods were Spearman correlated with the announced beliefs of the subjects for the 
switches and no-switches conditions separately (Figure 20). In paired t-tests across subjects 
and conditions, it was found that the HBA method led to model predictions that were more 
strongly correlated with the announced beliefs from the subjects (p=0.00022). 
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General Linear Modeling 
SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/) was used for slice timing correction, volume 
realignment, and spatial normalization to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
echoplanar imaging template. All volumes were then spatially smoothed using a three-
dimensional Gaussian kernel (at a full-width-half-maximum of 8mm). Prior to GLM 
estimation, the data was also high-pass filtered by removing signal components oscillating 
at a frequency below 1/120Hz. 
 
We estimated general linear models on a per-subject basis and then, in order to model random 
effects, performed second-level t-tests on sets of first-level contrasts (Penny, Holmes, & 
Friston, 2003). There were three timepoints of interest in each trial (Figure 1), namely (i) cue 
onset, (ii) stimulus selection, and (iii) simplex onset. Broadly speaking, these cues should 
elicit representations of prior information, updating based on the observed selection, and 
representation of posterior beliefs, respectively. Thus, we matched the relevant components 
of our learning model to their corresponding trial timepoints. Given that beliefs are 
represented in three dimensions, we used negative entropy as a univariate measure of belief 
for the purposes of linear modeling. We hypothesized that (i) posterior probabilities for each 
dimension would be represented in the same region and (ii) local mutual inhibition would 
imply that the neural signaling emanating from that region would scale with the strength of 
belief in any one dimension (Machens, Romo, & Brody, 2005, 2010; Strait, Blanchard, & 
Hayden, 2014). This is captured by negative entropy which is effectively a non-parametric 
measure of precision. During the update phase of the experiment, we used Jensen-Shannon 
divergence as an information-theoretic measure of the distance between the prior and the 
posterior. This can be thought of has a “Bayesian prediction error” triggered by the 
observation of a stimulus selection (see Appendix A). 
Each no-switch session had seven regressors in total, four onsets for the cue, stimulus 
selection, simplex onset, and rating. Parametric modulators were included for the cue 
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(negative entropy of the prior −𝐻𝐻(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟)), stimulus selection (Bayesian prediction error), 
and simplex onset (negative entropy posterior −𝐻𝐻(𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟)). In the switches condition 
an extra parametric modulator was added to the stimulus selection indicator regressor 
corresponding to 𝑇𝑇3. Time series of head motion estimated during realignment were included 
as covariates of no interest. All results are displayed at p<0.001 uncorrected. 
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Discussion 
Computational theories of prefrontal cortex broadly agree that one of the main functions of 
this area is to direct attention towards relevant goals and environment variables (E. K. Miller 
& J. D. Cohen, 2001). An important component of this process is estimating the current state 
of the environment (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). In many realistic scenarios (Stanley & Adolphs, 
2013), the current state of the environment is hidden and must be estimated over many 
interactions with the environment from conditionally related signals. This process is made 
particularly difficult by the high-dimensionality of our stimulus-rich world (Robert C. 
Wilson & Yael Niv, 2011). The Wisconsin card-sorting task has often been used to measure 
a participant’s ability to flexibly identify relevant environment variables and adapt to 
switches in the environment dynamics (Berg, 1948). Here we scan subjects engaged in a 
probabilistic hierarchical inference task inspired by the Wisconsin card-sorting task while 
they are scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging. A computational analysis of 
their behavior revealed that they used a belief thresholding strategy (see Learning Model, 
Figure 21) in conditions where the environment is stable. In uncertain conditions, they did 
not eliminate hypotheses from their state-space and their behavior was well-approximated 
by a Bayesian algorithm. 
We performed a model-based fMRI analysis using time series of internal variables generated 
from our learning model. Our results are consistent with the neural hypothesis that dlPFC 
holds and updates an internal model of the belief state-space. We find that activity in dlPFC 
scales with the certainty of priors beliefs at cue onset (Figure 22), and also reflects the 
Bayesian prediction error driven by stimulus selection (Glascher et al., 2010). Subsequently, 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex activity scales with the certainty of posterior beliefs when 
subjects make their response (Figure 23). This is consistent with studies which show that 
dmPFC is more active in decision-making scenarios where knowledge gleaned from abstract 
state-space representations must be integrated into behavior (Alan N. Hampton et al., 2006). 
An important component of learning in the switches condition is identifying whether a 
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changepoint has occurred. We find (Figure 24) that fronto-polar cortex tracks increasing 
evidence of a changepoint as expected due to previously acquired evidence that FPC is 
involved in computations regarding the favorability of alternative behavioral strategies 
(Boorman, Behrens, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2009). 
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Figures 
Figure 16. Task. 
 
Figure 16. At cue onset, two stimuli are randomly generated in three binary dimensions. One 
second later, the environment stochastically selects one of the stimuli based on which 
exemplar is “active” (which is unknown to the subject). After an inter-stimulus interval of 
0.2, or 4 seconds, subjects report their beliefs regarding which dimension is currently active 
on a continuous scale. Each trial is separated by an inter-trial interval of 2, 5, or 8 seconds. 
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Figure 17. MCMC example, group-level. 
 
Figure 17. Samples from the prior are in white while samples drawn from the stationary 
distribution are in black. These samples are plotted for softmax, risk aversion, and hazard 
rate parameter distributions in the switches condition. One can see that the model is 
insensitive to the specific value of the hazard rate. In contrast, the softmax and risk aversion 
parameters combine focally in parameter space. 
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Figure 18. MCMC example output, individual-level. 
 
Figure 18. Plotted are the prior and stationary distributions for two subjects (5 and 13). Note 
the Gaussian priors in contrast to the uniform distributions used for the group mean 
hyperprior (Figure 17). The large divergences from the prior to the stationary posterior 
indicate that the model fitting procedure is not reliant on the specification of a strong prior 
(Bishop, 2006). One can see that, at the level of individual subjects, the probability density 
function is peaked on specific values of the hazard rate. This is in contrast to the group-level 
(Figure 17). This suggests a large variability in expected changepoint probability across 
subjects. 
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Figure 19, Grid preparation of model beliefs for HBA. 
 
Figure 19. In order to speed up the HBA analysis, model beliefs were pre-computed as a 
function of all learning parameters. Then the sampling process need only to retrieve the pre-
computed beliefs rather than compute them online. Here I compare the model fits with “no 
grid-preparation” (150,000 samples, ~3hrs) and without “grid-preparation” (10,000, ~36hrs). 
The results show that the correlation for all fitted parameters is > 0.99, thus vindicating this 
method. Note the lack of correlation for the hazard rate in the no-reversal condition as 
expected. 
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Figure 20. Correlation with announced beliefs computed using HBA and MLE 
techniques. 
 
Figure 20. As a quantitative indication of the relative quality of the HBA and MLE fits, model 
predictions from both methods were Spearman correlated with the announced beliefs of the 
subjects. Correlations based on HBA are plotted in the top panels, while the bottom panels 
display the same data for MLE. This is done for the switches (or “reversals”) and no-switches 
(“no-reversals”) conditions separately. In paired t-tests across subjects and conditions, it was 
found that the HBA method led to model predictions that were more strongly correlated with 
the announced beliefs from the subjects (p=0.00022). 
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Figure 21. Model comparison. 
 
Figure 21. a) log Bayes factors for each subject plotted per condition. The larger the log 
Bayes factor, the better the fit of a belief thresholding model compared to a purely Bayesian 
learner. Log Bayes factors are estimated from 100,000 samples of the stationary MCMC 
chain. These results indicate strong evidence for a belief thresholding mechanism in the no-
switches condition but are ambiguous in the switches condition. b) This is consistent with 
the use of deviance information criterion (DIC) as an indicator of model fit. DIC is a 
hierarchical generalization of BIC, which is easily computed via MCMC (Patil et al., 2010). 
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Figure 22. Neural activity at cue and simplex onsets. 
 
Figure 22. a) −𝐻𝐻(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟) was represented in dlPFC bilaterally at cue onset. These clusters 
were positioned very similarly to those observed in (Glascher et al., 2010) for state prediction 
errors. b) At simplex onset, −𝐻𝐻(𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟) correlated with activity in dorsomedial 
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC, t(19)=4.42, x=3, y=53, z=25) and premotor cortex. 
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Figure 23. Bayesian prediction errors in dlPFC and ventral striatum at stimulus 
selection onset. 
 
Figure 23. Bayesian prediction errors were observed in dlPFC and ventral striatum at the 
stimulus selection timepoint. Note that no −𝐻𝐻(𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑟𝑟) correlation was observed in ventral 
striatum at the cue onset timepoint. 
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Figure 24. Neural correlates of changepoint model Bayes factors. 
 
Figure 24. Increasing evidence of a changepoint (red) was represented by bilateral clusters 
in fronto-polar cortex. Activity in dorsal vmPFC scaled with evidence consistent with a 
changepoint not having occurred. 
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Tables 
Table 5. Parameter bounds. 
Parameter Low Bound Upper Bound 
𝑇𝑇2 (testing threshold) 0 1 
𝑇𝑇3 (switch sensitivity) 0 10 
𝛾𝛾 (risk) 0.005 10 
𝜏𝜏 (softmax) 2 20 
Table 5. Parameter bounds for MLE and HBE analyses. 
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C h a p t e r  6  
CONCLUSIONS 
The studies described in this thesis address several questions in the neurobiological and 
psychological literatures regarding the representation of variables while the brain engages in 
several standard learning and decision-making paradigms. Since a groundbreaking study in 
2001 (Haxby et al., 2001), the use of pattern analysis tools in functional neuroimaging has 
become more prevalent to the point where it forms a robust minority of studies (Norman, 
Polyn, Detre, & Haxby, 2006). As an investigative tool, pattern identification techniques 
(Bishop, 2006) provides a complimentary approach to the univariate analyses typically used 
in functional neuroimaging experiments (Coutanche, 2013). This allows us to evaluate some 
underlying assumptions of previous neuroimaging studies as to the meaning of 
representation-via-correlation (John P. O'Doherty, Alan Hampton, & Hackjin Kim, 2007). 
For example, if the activity in a region correlates with the value of chosen actions (Klaus 
Wunderlich, Rangel, & O'Doherty, 2009), is that region representing the chosen action? Can 
we detect evidence for a distinct neural firing pattern that is unique to a particular action? 
Similar arguments can be made for other decision variables such as environmental states and 
values (Vikram S. Chib et al., 2009). MVPA can provide evidence in support or against such 
conclusions as shown in Chapter 3. Based on a time-delayed binary choice paradigm, we 
decoded representations of decision variables at different points in time throughout the 
decision process. We a priori defined several regions of interest based on related univariate 
functional imaging studies (McNamee, Rangel, & O'Doherty, 2013; Saori C. Tanaka, 
Bernard W. Balleine, & John P. O'Doherty, 2008; Elizabeth Tricomi et al., 2009) 
 and tested whether the corresponding representations were present in these regions while a 
decision is made (Table 2). Our results were broadly consistent with our current assumptions 
regarding the functional role played by each region within the model-free vs. model-based 
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framework (Dolan & Dayan, 2013). In particular, the representation of outcome identity in 
prefrontal cortex (both dorsolateral and ventromedial portions) is supported by a wealth of 
lesion data (Fellows & Farah, 2003) and the presence of outcome representations in anterior 
caudate is congruent with a fMRI study showing that anterior caudate activity scales with the 
learned correlation between an action and an outcome (Saori C. Tanaka et al., 2008). We 
found that actions but not outcomes were represented in dorsolateral striatum. Previous 
functional imaging (Elizabeth Tricomi et al., 2009) found this region to be particularly 
implicated in habitual action control (see Chapter 1 for a review). For example, after multiple 
sessions of free responding, subjects (who were deemed to be insensitive to outcome 
devaluation and thus acting habitually) were found to have an overall increased level of 
activity in posterior putamen (Elizabeth Tricomi et al., 2009). Neurophysiological studies are 
less clear on the DLS vs. DMS distinction between action and outcome encoding. Both action 
and outcome signaling were present in both these regions in rodent models (Thomas A. 
Stalnaker, Gwendolyn G. Calhoon, Masaaki Ogawa, Matthew R. Roesch, & Geoffrey 
Schoenbaum, 2010). How should be integrate the clear differences found in our MVPA 
study? First, a failure to reject to the null hypothesis does not imply that a particular 
representation does not exist in a region. Combined electrophysiological/fMRI studies have 
shown that some signaling detected in the visual stream using single-unit recordings is 
inaccessible to fMRI (Dubois, de Berker, & Tsao, 2015). Taking the aforementioned 
example of action but not outcome encoding in DLS, we can reasonably conclude that either 
(a) action encoding is stronger than outcome encoding in DLS, or (b) that actions and 
outcomes are represented differently (e.g., neuronal response and/or feature space 
characteristics may vary), and that the action encoding mechanism is more amenable to 
fMRI. In (Dubois et al., 2015), it was concluded the spatial clustering of neurons with similar 
response profiles was necessary for fMRI-MVPA decoding while sparseness did impact 
classification performance. A second possible source of divergence between the results of 
fMRI-MVPA and single-unit experiments is the nature of a typical electrophysiological 
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analysis. Usually, neurons are categorized by their response profiles and counts of neurons 
whose activity significantly correlates with task variables are tabulated. This essentially 
univariate analysis may lead to erroneous negative results whenever representations are 
encoded in a distributed fashion. For example, if a stimulus is encoded in a vector space 
spanned by a set of attribute dimensions and neurons only encode a one of these dimensions 
than analyzing these neurons in isolation may not reveal the hypothesized distributed 
representations in this region. 
In Chapter 3, we show that stimuli and actions are combined into unique distributed 
representations. To our knowledge, these are the first published results showing that the brain 
combines internal and external variables to form new variables. Going forward, it is possible 
that many other combinations of internal and external variables may similarly be utilized by 
the brain. In the social domain, the combination of an agent representation along with an 
action representation would be one example. These results also emphasize a deeper 
philosophical point regarding psychology and neuroscience research — in a typical 
experiment, we do not know what representations are being used by the brain’s algorithms. 
Given the fundamental interplay between representation and algorithm (Marr & Poggio, 
1976), it seems that this theme would serve as a rich seam of research. In particular, it 
highlights how crucial neural data can be since it seems that no psychological experiment 
could provide evidence for such representational strategies. Determining the functional role 
of such representations and how they emerge will be critical to understanding how action 
control systems in the brain operate and interact (Dolan & Dayan, 2013; O’Doherty, Lee, & 
McNamee, 2015). The theory of predictive state representations may provide a 
computational framework in which to understand these representations (Littman, 1996). 
Briefly, states are represented by the preceding history of state-action combinations that led 
to that state. For example, if an agent transitions through S1-A1-S2-A2-S3 then state S3 is 
represented as S1-A1-S2-A2. This scheme addresses the question of how a completely 
novice agent, with no prior experience of the environment, consolidates its experiences into 
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a structured representation of their environment. Subjects might be scanned in more complex 
environments while similar decoding analyses are performed in order to confirm whether 
subjects build representations of novel environments in a similar manner to that predicted by 
this theory. 
 
MVPA can also determine how a variable is being represented. An important question is this 
regard is “what is the feature space in which a variable is transmitted?” There are multiple 
approaches to this issue within the MVPA framework. One prominent technique is 
representational dissimilarity analysis (Kriegeskorte, Mur, & Bandettini, 2008) where a 
distance measure is applied to neural data vectors usually followed by a cluster analysis. 
Furthermore, the resulting representational dissimilarity matrix can be embedded in a 
Euclidean space for visualization. An experimenter would infer that clustered data samples 
are represented in the same manner and, most importantly, that the distance between data 
samples represents the distance between samples in feature space. One drawback of this 
approach is that results can depend strongly on the distance measure used (Kriegeskorte et 
al., 2006). Thus, this approach is particularly well suited to large sets of diverse stimuli in 
order to ensure robustness. In Chapter 2, we addressed this question of neural representation 
in the case of value signaling in the human brain using an alternative approach (McNamee 
et al., 2013). Instead of “model-free” representational dissimilarity analyses, we ran multiple 
decoding analyses using different data labels. From these results we logically deduced 
representational characteristics of the neural data. For example, we provide the first evidence 
that value is represented in a manner which is dependent on the class of stimuli being 
evaluated. In addition, the loci of stimulus-dependent and stimulus-independent value 
representations was suggestive of a stimulus-to-value pathway from central orbitofrontal 
cortex to medial orbitofrontal cortex to more dorsal regions of ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex. In addition, these results pointed to the presence of multiple functional gradients in 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Namely, a posterior-to-anterior gradient with respect to 
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stimulus abstractness along the medial orbital surface and a ventral-to-dorsal gradient along 
which the complexity of value encoding decreased. That is, value signaling tended to be more 
distributed along the orbital surface. Several primate experimental datasets are consistent 
with various components of this broad neurobiological theory (Cai & Padoa-Schioppa, 2012; 
Kringelbach & Rolls, 2004; Wallis & Kennerley, 2011) but further experimentation is 
required for confirmation. In order to corroborate the gradient hypotheses, one could repeat 
a similar experiment as the one performed here but with a more controlled set of stimuli 
which evenly spanned the spectrum of “abstractness”. Probably the most difficult challenge 
of such a study would be to define and precisely measure the psychological notion of 
stimulus abstractness on a continuous scale. Published electrophysiological data is consistent 
the aforementioned ventral-dorsal gradient however the functional implications of this 
network-level are not understood (S. Kennerley et al., 2011). Theoretic analysis of data from 
multi-electrode arrays would be an ideal approach however implantation in such deep 
cortical regions remains difficult. In the absence of an empirical dataset, theoretic analyses 
could still proceed in order to make predictions regarding the functional role of these distinct 
value signaling strategies. Testable behavioral predictions could be generated for patients 
with brain lesions (Gläscher et al., 2012). Ideally, two populations of such patients would be 
used. One population with lesions along the orbital surface and the other more dorsally. A 
rough conjecture would be that the former population would be inhibited when evaluating 
novel goals online while the latter would make noisier choices for goals with learned, or 
easily computable, values (e.g., monetary sums). Finally, the premise of this study ignores 
“the other half” of decision valuation — the costs of actions themselves. Based on recent 
neuroimaging (Croxson, Walton, O'Reilly, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2009), 
electrophysiological (Hillman & Bilkey, 2012), and especially lesion-based evidence 
(Camille, Tsuchida, & Fellows, 2011; Rudebeck et al., 2008), one hypothesis would be that 
a parallel action-to-value transformation occurs in dorsomedial portions of the brain and that 
both stimulus-to-value and action-to-value signals are integrated in a “final common value 
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pathway” in subgenual cingulate in preparation for action initiation. Although the feature 
space for actions could be very high-dimensional (corresponding to all possible degrees of 
freedom in the human body), probably a relatively small subspace is relevant for valuation 
(e.g., energy cost) thus value gradients may be more difficult to detect. 
The fundamental distinction between the results of Chapters 2 and 3 is that the focus of the 
analysis on variable and algorithm respectively. Chapter 2 answers the question of how a 
variable (in this case, goal value) is represented while Chapter 3 effectively asks “how is an 
algorithm represented?” In other words, what are the input and output variables of the 
algorithm. This latter question can be addressed using univariate fMRI analyses since our 
inference is based on the presence or absence of particular variables. Chapter 4 provides an 
example of this. From the representational point of view, we ask “how is Pavlovian learning 
represented in the amygdala?” Due to the presence of neural activity correlating with 
precision signals that can only be obtained from learning based on a higher-order model of 
the environment structure, we conclude that Pavlovian conditioning, in the amygdala, is 
model-based on nature. This result could potentially be applied to a wide range of research 
paradigms which focus on the amygdala, for example, fear conditioning and the 
identification of emotion from facial expressions (Adolphs, 2010). In the case of facial 
expressions, one could ask how our knowledge regarding the mental state of another human 
being impacts our classification of their emotional state. This paradigm would be amenable 
to a model-based analysis and, based on our results here, we would hypothesize that 
amygdala activity would be sensitive to the belief structure a participant holds for another 
person (Koster-Hale & Saxe, 2013). 
With respect to the task in Chapter 4, one could ask how participants might come to 
understand the task structure without instruction. How could one determine what the relevant 
variables are in the environment for decision-making? In Chapter 5, we examine how 
humans construct belief structures online. Participants engaged in a probabilistic Wisconsin 
Card-Sorting Task (Berg, 1948) and reported their posterior beliefs on a continuous scale 
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(Figure 16). Behavioral analyses (Figure 21) showed that humans dynamically adjust the 
process by which decision state-spaces are constructed. In particular, it was found subjects 
were less likely to reject hypotheses regarding the environment dynamics when unsignaled 
changepoints could occur (Robert C. Wilson & Yael Niv, 2011). This behavior is consistent 
with an optimal observer model. Intuitively, it means that humans try to keep track of as 
many variables as possible in order to be able to adapt rapidly to an environment changepoint. 
If there are no changepoints (as was the case in half the sessions), there is no reason to do 
encode and update all possible variables, and instead, one can focus on those which are 
relevant in the current state of the environment. More generally, one can view these results 
as integrating reinforcement learning with cognitive science (Chater, Tenenbaum, & Yuille, 
2006; Téglás et al., 2011) — we studied how subjects construct cognitive representations via 
reinforcement. Neurally, activity in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) was correlated the 
precision of the prior beliefs on each trial (as measured by negative entropy) and the 
divergence between the prior and posterior as evidence is accumulated (a “bayesian 
prediction error”). This is consistent with the functional characterization of dlPFC as a 
“working memory” module (P. S. Goldman-Rakic, 1995). Our results provide a 
computationally precise, model-based point of view which complements the prior literature 
(John P. O'Doherty et al., 2007). We can view our results within the classical framework of 
attention whereby dlPFC evaluates the relevance of state-space components (i.e., the color, 
motion, and shape variables) to the current decision problem. Recent electrophysiological 
data in monkeys in an analogous region is congruent with this interpretation (S. Tremblay, 
Pieper, Sachs, & Martinez-Trujillo, 2014). Despite the sophisticated nature of the 
computational mechanisms observed, this thresholding model could lead to sub-optimal 
inferences regarding the structure of the world and thus decisions. A hypothesis regarding 
the dynamics of the environment might be erroneously eliminated due to an unlikely run of 
events. The development of these cognitive “blind spots” could potentially be present in a 
wide range of decision-making paradigms and is ripe for further investigation. For example, 
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one could model the “jumping-to-conclusions” bias (Averbeck, Evans, Chouhan, Bristow, 
& Shergill, 2011) using the computational model developed in Chapter 5 (P. Read Montague 
et al., 2012). This bias is often observed in clinical populations with disruptions in 
dopaminergic pathways in the brain such as seems to be the case with schizophrenia (Rolls, 
Loh, Deco, & Winterer, 2008). Working memory impairments have already been shown to 
underpin reinforcement learning deficits in schizophrenic patients (Collins, Brown, Gold, 
Waltz, & Frank, 2014) which suggest, in concert with the results described here, that 
disruptions in the mesocortical pathway (which projects to dlPFC) might impede 
schizophrenic patients ability to construct and maintain accurate models of the decision 
environment. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Processing of rewards and percepts are typically modeled using different tools in 
computational neuroscience based on the scientific development of these disciplines. 
Learning is typically modeled using Bayesian formalisms in the perceptual domain (Gold & 
Shadlen, 2007) while associative learning or, more generally, reinforcement learning (RL) is 
used in reward-based decision-making (Peter Dayan & Berridge, 2014; John P. O'Doherty, 
2011) with some notable exceptions (A. Courville, Daw, & Touretzky, 2004; A. C. Courville 
et al., 2006; Nathaniel D. Daw & Courville, 2007). Based on the simple functional analogy 
between information-theoretic log-probabilities and economic value as exemplified in the 
computational convergence of decision-making models across these domains (Krajbich, 
Armel, & Rangel, 2010), we show Bayesian updating is equivalent to reinforcement learning 
in “log space”. It turns out that the learning rate parameter in RL is effectively a temperature 
or softmax parameter in Bayesian updating. Let us consider the simplest possible application 
of Bayesian inference—the estimation of a single parameter value ℎ given a stream of data 
𝑆𝑆. We assume that we have an a priori defined model which specifies the data likelihood 
values 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ). Based on a single sample, Bayes’ theorem gives the following update: 
𝑃𝑃(ℎ) ← 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ)𝑃𝑃(ℎ)
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆)  
←
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ)𝑃𝑃(ℎ)
∑ 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ)𝑃𝑃(ℎ)ℎ  
In log space, log𝑃𝑃(ℎ) ← log𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ) + log𝑃𝑃(ℎ) − log�𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ)𝑃𝑃(ℎ)
ℎ
 
This can be re-arranged into a linear update rule based on summing a prediction error log𝑃𝑃(ℎ) ← log𝑃𝑃(ℎ) + �log𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ) − log�𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ)𝑃𝑃(ℎ)
ℎ
� 
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What is missing in this expression is a learning rate. After adding a learning rate 𝛼𝛼, we will 
re-interpret this equation in “exp space”. log𝑃𝑃(ℎ) ← log𝑃𝑃(ℎ) + 𝛼𝛼 �log𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ) − log�𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ)𝑃𝑃(ℎ)
ℎ
� 
log𝑃𝑃(ℎ) ← log𝑃𝑃(ℎ) + log𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ)𝛼𝛼 − log��𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ)𝑃𝑃(ℎ)
ℎ
�
𝛼𝛼
 
log𝑃𝑃(ℎ) ← log𝑃𝑃(ℎ) + log𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ)𝛼𝛼
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆)𝛼𝛼  
𝑃𝑃(ℎ) ← 𝑃𝑃(ℎ) × �𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆|ℎ)
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆) �𝛼𝛼 
Here, �𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷|ℎ)
𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷) �𝛼𝛼 can be interpreted as a ratio prediction error. It measures the ratio between 
the evidence of data 𝑆𝑆 given perfect knowledge of the variable under investigation ℎ against 
the current prediction. The prediction error is scaled by 𝛼𝛼 which weights its contribution to 
the new estimate of 𝑃𝑃(ℎ) as a learning rate would. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Here we derive the Bayesian Information Criterion (Schwarz, 1978) for KL-divergence. The 
basic definition of KL-divergence 𝑆𝑆 is 
𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄) ∶= �𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 log 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
  
but we will use it in the following equivalent form5: 
𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄): = −𝐻𝐻(𝑃𝑃) − 〈log𝑄𝑄〉𝑃𝑃  
 
The BIC formula is 
−2 log𝑃𝑃(𝑥𝑥|𝑀𝑀) ≈  𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵 ∶=  −2 log max
𝜃𝜃
𝐿𝐿(𝑥𝑥|𝜃𝜃,𝑀𝑀) +  𝑘𝑘(log𝑛𝑛 − log 2𝜋𝜋) 
For 𝑛𝑛 ≫ 0, this is effectively 
𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵 ≈  −2 log max
𝜃𝜃
𝐿𝐿(𝑥𝑥|𝜃𝜃,𝑀𝑀) +  𝑘𝑘 log𝑛𝑛 
In terms of log-likelihoods based on our model-predicted 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 and announced belief 
distributions 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴, 
𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴,𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀) = −𝐻𝐻(𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴) − 〈log max
θ
𝐿𝐿(𝑥𝑥|𝜃𝜃,𝑀𝑀)〉𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = − 13𝑛𝑛� log maxθ 𝐿𝐿(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡|𝜃𝜃,𝑀𝑀) + 𝐵𝐵
𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  
 
assuming a flat prior on the data where 𝑛𝑛 is the number of trials and the factor of 3 refers to 
the three belief dimensions. Thus minimizing KL-divergence is equivalent to maximizing 
log-likelihood and we have 
𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵 ≈ −2 log max
θ
𝐿𝐿(𝑥𝑥|𝜃𝜃,𝑀𝑀) +  𝑘𝑘 log 3𝑛𝑛 
5 See http://www.hongliangjie.com/2012/07/12/maximum-likelihood-as-minimize-kl-divergence/. 
 
                                                 
201 
 = −2[−3𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴,𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀)] +  𝑘𝑘 log 3𝑛𝑛 = 6𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴,𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀) +  𝑘𝑘 log 3𝑛𝑛 
 
Note that KL-divergence is additive over samples 
𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃1:𝑛𝑛,𝑄𝑄1:𝑛𝑛) = 𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃1:𝑗𝑗,𝑄𝑄1:𝑗𝑗)  +  𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗:𝑛𝑛,𝑄𝑄𝑗𝑗:𝑛𝑛)  
 
Note that 2𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃,𝑄𝑄) is the 𝐺𝐺-statistic, to which 𝜒𝜒2 is now understood to be an approximation6. 
There are only two degrees of freedom in our data and predictions, namely two out of the 
three beliefs. In our derivation, this implies that the prior over the “third'” belief is 1 since it 
is uniquely defined by ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑙𝑙)𝑖𝑖=1…3 = 1. Thus we simply drop this belief vector from our 
BIC score to get, 
𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵 =  4𝑛𝑛 𝑆𝑆(𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴,𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀) +  𝑘𝑘 log 2𝑛𝑛 
where 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 and 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀 are computed over the color and motion dimensions only. 
 
6 See e.g. http://strimmerlab.github.io/statisticalthinking/pdf/c4.pdf, page 4. 
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